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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION
Ample recognition ha« "been given ¥y historians to the 
dominant influence in the last century of European History of the 
two great forces of democracy and nationalism - forces which are not 
even yet exhausted. There is a close parallel and an inherent 
connection v which has however "been neglected, between their social 
and political ascendancy and the contemporary constitutional 
development of federalism. It is found in alliance with each and 
"both, and in more than one case it has "been the medium of an 
unrestrained expression to one or the other. The year of the 
Trench Revolution was the year of the formation of th^ American 
federal State, which was not unrelated to American democracy, or, - 
it may toe said - to American nationalism. The racial aspirations 
of the German nationality which wer« not powerful enough to effect
ji
a dismemberment of Austria or to submerge the interests of particular 
States, found realisation in a federal rather than a national 
Constitution. The Swiss federation which during the century has 
also become a State, was speeded on its way by successive democratic 
impulsea and pays homage to the cause of nationalism no less "by the 
reconciliation it affords to several Jarring nationalities, than 
by the unification of a single race. Nationalism in Canada,or 
democracy in Australia can with no more Justice "ba neglected.
(1) I write in the third ye ir of the European war and in ths 
month of the Russian Revolution.
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The fire States already mentioned havs all become 
^•derations since the Declaration of Independence* Some of the 
South American Republics have also in recent years become Federal 
States, and thus within little more than a century, Federalism has 
developed with a startling rapidity.
In fact the time-honoured classification of States into 
monarchies, aristocracies and democracies has become obsolete and
no longer applicable to modern conditions. An analysis which
(1) 
ignores the constitutional differences "between Russia and Germany
or France and the United States is obviously deficient The old 
basis must be r^adapted and supplemented by a new political 
division of States into Single and Composite, Unitary and federal,
Coiqposite States differ from Unitary States in the 
plurality of their nature and the incomplete cohesion of their 
component parts. A Unitary State is a single sovereign State with 
one supreme governasmt; a composite Stato la formed by several of 
such sovereign States in different degrees of alliance. If each 
or any one of these allied States, however, surrenders its sovereign^ 
and independence wholly into the hands of another body, it ceases 
to be a member of a composite state, and becomes part of a Unitary 
State. Thus the union of England and Scotland formed not a Composite 
"but a Unitary State, for neither country retained any sovereign 
rights of independent action outside or abov« the powers of the 
single common Parliament of the Union. The mark of a Unitary State
(1) Before the abdication of the Tsar.
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ie the legislative omnipotence of a single body and the consequent
(1)
subordination of all other Legislatures. Thus the British Eftpirc,
is a Unitary State, for the Parliament at Westminster is legally 
supreme over every other Assembly in the Fmpire t though in practice, 
the Parliaments of the Self-governing Dominions ar« independent as 
to their internal affairs*
There are many kinds of Composite States from a loose 
personal Union, to a compact Federal State, which is t indeed, the 
only form of such combinations of sovereign States to which the 
title "State" may rightly V* applied* Their classification is 
determined Tiy the nature and degree of the Union existing "between 
their maiateQrs. Alliances of this composite nature are at least 
as old as the Greeks, but the only successful combination of local 
independence with a permanent and efficient Union is that reached "by
the modern Federal State which isw the most finished product of(21 
political ingenuity and can only fee attained in a r^finad age."
All important modern federations, and especially the five which are 
th^ subject of this study, are Federal States - though not all in 
the same degree - and may "foa distinguished lay certain well-defined 
characteristics from other Composite Unions and especially from
T
"confederations of States", which present the nearest and most 
common approximation to the 'Federal ideal* short of the Federal 
State itself. Theso characteristics dll be described in the
1) fee Marriott Political Institutions.
',2) Freeman. TT istory of Federal rovernm^nt, p.5
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course of a Later elaboration of the principles of a federal State, 
but the nature of ^ederalisra will be iD^st understood by a 
consideration of the circumstances in which it is most applicable,
The chief strength of federalism llss in the fact that it 
is eminently adaptable to peculiar conditions where total Union is 
an irksome bond to which absolute separation would be preferable, 
and yet where some degree of co-op*rative action is felt to 1>3 
advantageous. - A federal Stat^ requires for its formation two 
conditions. "There must exist in the first place a body of 
countries such as the Cantons of Switzerland* the Colonies of 
America or the Provinces of Canada so closely cornected by locality, 
by history, by race or the like, as to be capable of bearing in the 
eyes of their inhabitants, an inpress of common nationality. It 
will also generally bf. found, if we aipeal to experience, that 
lands which now form part of a federal Ptat<;t w«re at some stage of 
their existence bound together by close alliance or by subjection 
to a common sovereign. It were going further than the facts warrant 
to assert that this earlier connection is essential to the 
formation of a Federal State. But it ie certain that where
Federalism flourishes it is in general the slowly-matured fruit of
(1) 
some earlier and looser connection.** All these conditions will be
found to exist to a greater or less extent in all of the five
W 
modern Federations. The Swiss and the German Federal States are
most conspicuously "the slowly matured fruit of an earlier and a
(1) Dicey Law of the Constitution Pt.l. chap.111.
(2) See inxV* chaps. 11. va. -V. & V.
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(1) 
looser connection." The Canadian Federation however was formed
not "toy the ripening of an earlier immature connection but "by the 
relaxation of a Union which was already too tight. In all the 
federations moreover wher** the "bonds of alliance have been 
tightened and strengthened in the formation of a Federal ?tate, 
the rsquir^rnQnts of military defence have played an important part. 
In Australia alone was this element almost entirely absent. On 
the acquisition by Germany of certain Pacific islands the possible 
need of future defence entered into the calculations of statesmen, 
but Australia ie too far r^iaovod from the serious danger of attack 
for the motive to have had much compelling force In the formation 
of the Union. Austr. Ilia's tribute to Pederalism is indeed the 
greater as it was prorated not "fey urgent needs, "but fey a conscious 
and deliberate appreciation of its benefits - more especially in 
the comrsjtjroial sphere.
Thus a sufficient amount of common interest and mutual 
sympathy must exist feutween the Confederated States such as would 
prompt their union and remove the constant danger of civil war. 
"""•or the Federation binds tho inhabitants to fight on the same side 
and if they have such feelings towards one another or such diversity 
of feeling towards their neighbour, that they would generally
prefer to fight on opposite sides, the Federation is not likely to
(*) 
be of long duration or to >e well observed vhlle it subsists. 11
more inqportant however than the existence of elements of Union
U) J. S. ;/ill P p.GovS chap. Xvn. (i) in part.
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is the necessity for elements of diversity* It is the presence 
of local divergencies of history, rac® or economic conditions which 
prevents complete union and justifies a Tederal relation. Where 
there are no differences or the differences are not realised, 
federalism is out of place, for its supremo object is to conciliate 
and give expression "by local sovereign independence to the peculiar 
character is tics of each member. Its essential character is as 
much determined "by the desire to preserve particular local interests 
which would lee neglected or subordinated "by uniform action from a 
central Legislative, as by the surrender of certain common concerns 
to a united regulation* Thus even the mere territorial extension 
of a State beyond a certain point way render tfre outlying districts 
too much out of touch with the Central Government for a uniform and 
single policy to be either wise.or effective, besides burdening 
a single Government with a host of claims which it is not competent 
to satisfy. Had the Roman Empire become a Federation it might 
have endured longer.
Nevertheless the existence of differences which are too 
fundamental or too great may destroy even the smll capacity for . 
union necessary to a federal State, Incompatible civilisations or 
even totally different economic interests would not perhaps profit 
by & single moral code or a uniform tariff. Territorial 
dontiguity is obviously a favourable and isay be a necessary 
condition. A federation of the British Empire for example would 
be compelled to overcome difficulties not confronted by any other 
federation. Mere geographical separation in itself creates at
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once differences between the members which may prove too vital for
t
reconciliation*
The federal State my be equally in danger from too great 
a disparity in aiae or strength between the meters. Thus if 
there is one Ptate disproportionately great and powerful, it will 
tend bath to >e independent of and to dominate the rest, and if 
there are two or mor* "they will Tie irresistible when they agree, 
and when th*y differ, svsrythin,? will ba decided by a struggle for 
ascendancy "between thu rivals 11 , . Th$ dominance of a single 
powerful State is illustrated in the German Federation, but the 
danger is somewhat lessened in mars regular federal -tates by the 
various means by which the mediation of the State has been dispensed
with anil the direct relation between the federation and the
(1)
individual established. In a confederation of states where the
alone is the unit such a condition of comparative equality
•
is essential and its absence has been a frequent cause of trouble 
and of disruption.
The federal principle zuay bo extended up to a certain 
point in two directions, until on the one hand the component States 
cease to feel that they hav«s any common interests which would lie 
mutually served Toy co-op- ration and in the other direction until a 
the disappearance of any consciousness of differences "bstween them 
which would prevent their corripl^te and absolute union. "It is not 
every nation or every stage of the national existence that admits of
(1) See infra PP. 11 -
Chapter 1, INTRODUCTION d
a Federative Government * Federation is only possible fender certain 
conditions, when the States to fce federated are so far akin that 
they can ee united and yet so iar dissimilar that they oannot »e 
fused into a single body politic* 1* A very peculiar state of .senti­ 
ment must exist among the inhabitants of the countries it is 
proposed to units. *Thay must desire union but not unity. If 
thare be no dec ire to unite, there i& clearly no basis for Federalism: 
if, on the other hand, there be a desire for unity, the wish will 
natuarally find its satisfaction under a Unitarian Constitution. —• 
The sentiment therefor^ which creates a federal Stats is the 
prevalence throughout the citizens of mor<* or less allied countries, 
of two feelings which, are to a certain extent inconsistent • the
desire fur national unity and the determination to maintain the
(2) 
independence of aach raan's soporate State. M Thu aim of Federalism
Is to ejcprsss and combine in a single political Institution these 
two sentiments, and the characteristics of a Feder&l otate follow 
from a consistent and effective pursuit of this aim.
The first and essential characteristic of a Federal 
State ife that it is only a partial union of ta&mbers* The 
Contracting states form a united Central Governm&nt only for those 
purposes which they recognise as having in common. ?or all other 
purposes aach state retains independence and its separate 
administration. the nlon has no right of Interference In the
(1) Lord CarmiYon in his speech Introducing Canadian Federation Bill
Pesruary 1867. 
(a) Dicey Law of the Constitution.Pt.l. chap.111. p.lS4
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sphere reserved fur the independent operation of the States 
themselves, nor may the States, as separate entities trespass on 
the domains ;hioh they have placed under the direction of the 
common will.
The nature and number of the interests in which a united•
policy is deemed necessary or convenient, depends largely cf course 
on the circumstances which hav-j prompted the federating States to 
come tog^th«r, on the political and geographical fact rs ^vhich are 
to "be taken into avc'mnt, and generally, on the relative strength 
of the desire for union or the love of independence.
Two "broad principles of division betwee-n local and 
general affairs are, however, afforded by the probable purposes of 
Union and the necessities of the case. Internal plurality is an 
essential feature of a Federation, but external unity is no less 
indispensable. The lines of division must be all on th--> inside 
and none on the outside* The relations between any of the membijs 
of the "Federation and another State, country or any exterior body 
must be conducted on harmonious principles. To the common 
"Federal government therefore are naturally assigned foreign affaire 
the declaration of peace and war, the support of military and naval 
forces and the conclusion of tre aties and alliances ^rith foreign 
countries* In all existing Federations external trade and 
commerce is also controlled by the Union,and in Federal States of 
similar economic conditions this is obviously advantageous. In 
Switzerland t,h«re exists a slight modification in the privilege 
which border Cantons hava retained, of making special conventions
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auTiJect to federal approval, v/ith a foreign state for a particular
(1) 
local purpose. In a hypothetical Federation of the British 2mj ire
graat economic diversity may render a uniform commercial policy 
impossible and may necessitate a local management such as already 
exists in the Hraplre.
Conversely no part-state may ;ngage in foreign affairs on 
its own account* It may not coimnision its ambassadors to a 
foreign court; it may not negotiate with any other State except 
through the instrumentality of a Federal Government, nor may it 
logically remain neutral in the face of a common foe* ThiB 
principle is now recognised in all regular Federal States, "but it
has not always been observed in the more imperfect "Confederations
(2) 
of States" which np to the end of the eighteenth century have "been
(3) 
the sole expression of Federalism.
Secondlyi matters which concern more than one State of 
the Federation| may most advantageously "be assigned to the common 
government* Thu* the United States appears a single State from 
the point of view of New York as well as from the roi^t of view of 
France* The interest of the whole in relation to that of the 
individual member must "be represented "by the United Central 
Organisation. Particularly must disputes "between States "be 
removed from local settlement and submitted to the more impartial 
tribunal of th<* Federation. Interstate trade, conmeroe and all
(1) see inrra chap.111. p.iott. and of. char.IV. p. •!•''"*————————— 
{21 C.f. Sidgwiok Elements of Politics, p. 538 seq. 
If3) With the possible exception of the ancient Achaean League, 
c.f. Freeman History of Federal Government Chap. V.
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other matters in */hich one State is likely to have dealings with 
another are handed into th ; ears of th*a Tederal Governmemt 
To these ar^ usually added "bankruptcy regulations, currency, 
poets and telegraphs, copyrights and other matters where uniformity 
throughout the Federation is desirable.
In thtse last objects of federal Control, th« Federation 
is not concerned with th«.> part-stats aa a separata unit "but with 
^the individuals of which it is composed* In these rapects each 
citiaen is governed "by uniform laws and a common citizenship is 
declared throughout th« whole Federation* Indeed the immediate 
relation "between the federation and the individual of each 
component state is the essential feature of a ^deral State - 
a "Ttandosfttaat* - and is tha chief test according to which mere 
Confederations of ^tat^s or Staatvnbftnde are excluded from this 
category. And an effective relation with the individual can 
only fed obtained, in a modern State at least, "by means of a 
well organised Central Gorernment* The fundamental difference 
in fact "between a Federal State and a Confederation of States 
lies in the composition and powers of the federal Government, 
which is the expression of the degree of the union existing 
"between the members. It must "be something more stable, 
permanent and authoritative than a mere council of diplomats* It 
must fee able to pass laws for the whole Federation; it must have 
authority to make them "binding and the capacity to punish thair 
transgression. The Federation must "ba a "State" in short* with 
an independent dignity and coercive powers, with a developed
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machinery, and legislative, executive and judicial organs. As well
as organised governments of the part~sta&es there must also "be an
(11 
organised Federal Government.
Confederations such a« many of the ancient Greek and
< 2) < 3) 
Roman Leagues or the Leagues of Lombard or Germn cities were
mere allianvao for temporary purposes with no other Federal 
machinery than an intermittent Assembly of delegates, who 
frequently had no power to coimnit their states to the resolutions
they passed* Some Confederation such as the League of Kansa
(4) 
Towns, the United Provinces of the Motherland* or the ancient
(5) 
Ache* an and Lycian leagues possessed ^egislative "bodies which
represented the mexabors and conducted the common affairs of the 
League, ard in different degrees of development, elements of^ 
federal "xecuti-ws and Judiciaries. These Leagues approached more 
nearly to the creation of a modern State organisation, "but few
advanced beyond a relatively rudimentary stage.
mere 
The members of a/ Confederation do not unite} they
merely agree as independent equals to act in common touching 
certain matters of coimon interest; their only constituent law is 
treaty, and their sovereignty remains unimpaired, fcr the only 
central "body is an assembly of delegates with inadequate powers
(1) C.f. '^luntBOhli fceschichte d«r schweia: rundesrachts !• 554 
quoted by freeman Kistory of federal Government
(2) ?5ee freeman op. cit. chaps. VI, IX & X.
(3) r.t .^ismondl ' r iflt. of Ital. Raps. 11. 114 r^ff
(4) C.f. A. ^. * Tart. Introd. to the ^tudy of Federal Government.
(5) ^o« !Tre*i7i?.-ri chaps, v ft VI.
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and no coercive means of enforcing their deor^es r,n recalcitrant
(1)
states*
In a y«d'jral £tat« f howavar, the cor^ponent iart-states
make a permanent surrender of a portion of their sovereignty to
> 
a,new political organism vhioh poos^csas a corporate consciousness
and legal personality of its o-*m. It T^ecoiaey not a mere 
Confederacy during pleasure, golufele at the desire of any one part 
"but a n<9*v social and organic structure -hich, within its sphere , 
"binds every uv^ib^r to an implicit obedience *o its will* As 
regards the .natton-'. w^.ich they hav; in common, th^ "tat^s have 
merged their indiriduality into one national whole, and the 
national authority of this cor^vjunl Stat^- is expressed in the 
^edercil JurlBprudaneo, \vhic]\ is romoYt3d fro-: ths realm of
N
international oonyentioiu and placed within that of public law« 
Tha law of rK,o!i part atAv^ i,: ther-.ifnre of tt/'? .kirdsj it consists 
firstly, of tho Paderal Constitution, Treaties *nd statutes, and 
secondly of its own Constitution and r>tatut83. Thu» federal Law 
forms a ^'indaia<*ntal part of th.i law of 3.5ch r?tat« administered in 
thQ ordinar;-' ^ny,
The 7oder-:i ̂ i^n is not a "<joaipo,«t t ;"> which t:i« States are 
(2)
partiasttand fro;-j whioh they :iay 7/ithdrav/ \t ?ill; a P-tate may with
no more legal Justification secede from a Federal Union than the 
County of Kent may declare itaalf indeponiont of t/h^ rest of ISnglanft
(1) 0*f. *nison The State pir. 1377.
(2) TT --A wm3 o.r .l.vAth Carolina 1^30. This theory i=j of eon^e the 
basis of the secession of the Southern States in 1861»
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The Federal JonatitrvUon is a suprama la. emanaUng /r^js the 
whole people. "It was decreed and established" as Chief Justice 
Marshall said" of the constitution of th© United States, "not "toy the 
States in their capacity as sovereign StatoB, "but expressly and 
f ox n ally as the prtwuiAe declare, &% Lie people <>f the United 
states. ^ItKc.tt d^ubt it belongs td the people to confer on the 
tfederai Government all the powers /.hicji It judges convenient and 
nece&sary to accord to it» and to extend or to restrain these
powers according to itfci will. H Or, ad tlie saae Chief Justice
(2) 
declared in a famous paras i, a i 'egular Taderal State i^ ?: an
(3) 
blQ Union of Indestructilelci States."
A 7«doral Stat-^ in its ide 1 fonn is co^i os«*c; of 
iiid*vidual3 *& any aoli^r 3tat,; t and is Tsaa«d ultimately on the 
authority of the people. "It inus i re f ,t on deeper foundations 
than in wi<3 were sanoiio.i of a aciagatod auvhorit^; Uiu stream of
national power must flow immediately from onat i ure or
(4) 
fountain of legitimate authority" -the people oiirjijis^lYes. This
popular source of "J'edaral power mubt be sho«£i a^art from such 
outward a/id vidlold signs as a direct ratification of the 
Honstitution by L.Q p^ :>pl f 'i in tlie aojoapositiori and functions of the 
federal (Joverniaeni; itself. A direct govosrnia-jntal contact 
between the individual arid the Padaration must fe * established
(1) In Kartln V. Hunter's Lessee. 1. Wheat. 384.
(2) In Texas v. ''hit9 7 ^all. 700
(3) 6,f« Bryce American nonmonweolth. Kent Commentaries. Story 
Commentaries.
(4) The Federalist p.135.
«"<Trt r» v\ ^ .»•»•» *• T'*,TfT1T>/s>'VM Vf*• f'lf Y^^' ^Ovy/iapoesr A« —»•/• •* - • •j v..y>^ v*-' i-.
independently of the State of which oh« individual may Tw more 
immediately a member. A double citiaensliip Is therefore set up; 
each individual is at ones a citiaen of his own particular State, 
and in 00^.0:1 wicli every individual of all the other Btacea of the
, a citizen of a largar and different "but no ler.c real
(1)
ederal State. "Hie State alltgiance receives its orovm and
(2)
in th^ cU^nioy of meaib^rship of the ? ; deration .*
principle of the federal State has taken long to 
establish and one iedaral Civil Bar has been fought to secure its 
acceptance* isot all modern federations have fully adopted it in 
all it a consequences, but all have given a sufficient recognition 
to its importance. Herein lias an intimate connection "between a 
^oderal fltats and Democracy, arid ev^n the Lrea^nan Bmpir^, the most 
irr<4g«uar of Federal J'tates has "feeen cordjjellod in a somewhat 
hesitating ac.koowleg^ment , GO im,rod*ice a partial, and in some ways 
a pso ado *4eraoo racy into its Constitution.
Jhe immediate relation Between tne federal Government and 
wi« individual may be expressed in four ways. Firstly th« federal 
Cioverajienc may legislate on certain spatters affecting the individual 
of jjore thdii one Stace, such as "bankruptcy, copyright and so on. 
In <i regular federal State it will also receive exeoutiv« power to 
carry out its legislation in respect of the individual. It must
(1) C.f. J f S. Hill Kepres^ntative -'rovernjnent oliaT)*yjril. Wheaton, 
International Law 5 ed. 1916 Pt 1. p.73 aeq. Freeman Tr istory 
of federal Government e*c
(12) Sir J* CocklBurn Australian federation.
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"be able through Its courts to judge him, and punish his disobedicmo 
to Its laws* It must possess Its own customs officers and tax 
collectors.
For the second way "by which the direct relation between 
the Federal Government and the Individual 14 established 14 by 
means of a taxing power. The federation must depend on the 
individuals for its revenue and must }mv^ the power of taxing 
them either directly or indirectly. In Germany and In Switzerland 
Federal finances are, or may be, supplemented by Constitutions 
assessed upon the part-states, "but the Federal revenue is chiefly 
collected from taxes on the Individuals Independently of the States, 
and In a moru regular Federal Stat^ requisitions on the part-states 
are entirely abolished.
Thirdly the Federal Government iaay demand the services of 
«ach individual member of the Federal 'tate in the military or 
naval defences of the Federation. As William the Conqueror, "by 
the oath of Salisbury, placed every one of his vassals' men under 
a personal obligation to him, the KJrog and Supreme Overlord, so 
the Federal State demands direct service to the Federation from 
every citizen of each State. Instead of assigning to the Stat^ 
the raising and organisation of separata military contingents, the 
federal rroverniaent creates % federal army for which recruits are 
gatheredand enrolled independently of State responsibility. This 
In case of civil war each citiaen owes an allegiance to the 
Federation as well as to th~ State, and the Federation possesses a 




Lastly the Federal Government must represent the 
individual in its organisation, and so necasaary is this feature 
that every Federal State has adopted it* In every Federal State 
the Federal Legislature consists of two " ouses. In one of these 
the individuals of the Federation are represented and the States 
are ignored* It is true that this negleot of the States is so 
far modified that in all existing Federations every ntate must 
receive at least one raemVir in the national House, fert apart from 
this stipulation, representatives are apportioned to the States 
only in proportion to their respective populations. This House 
represents the Federation as a united whole, as a Single State 
composed of individuals.
The Second :rouse, on the other hand, is devoted to the 
representation of the States as separate entities* In this 
l?ouse is preserved the identity and individuality of the States, 
and their sovereignty and independence recognised* In a 
symetrieal Federal State euch as the United States, equal represent 
ation has been accorded to the States* ach State sends to the
Senate - the Second House, - the same number of delegates as its
\ 
fellow states - independently of its siae, population or power.
Sufficient recognition is given to these factors in the First or 
National House. Thus Hew York sends forty-thr^a Representatives 
to the House of Representatives while Delaware in respect of its
~ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^"^^^^^W*^^**'*'^B*)^^Bfc***<^^»i^^*^>*^^^"*j»«^ta^«^p<«» O
(1) See infra ohaps. Ill, 'k vi.
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small population sends only one f but both States alike tend two 
Senators to the Senate. Thus in the National Ecus© tha influence 
of the large States is supreme, "but in the States House it 10 
no greater than that of the small States. tfor a certain 
combination of largo States which in the Senate is <*ntitle£ to 
less than one-fourth of the members, return an absolute majority 
to th^ arouse of Representatives.
In this concession of equal representation of the States 
in the Second Hotxsa of the Legislature has bean discovered an 
effective means of reconciling state jealousies and of removing 
the apprehensions of the smaller States. neither Canada nOr 
Orermany of modern Federal states hav© adapted it, though for 
different reasons. In this latter Federal State not only are the 
component States without equal representation but the delegates 
vote collectively according to instructions, not according to their 
individual opinions*
The Senate of the United States not only expresses in it s 
most perfect form the equal representation of the part-states 
of the Federation, but to it must be given the honour of having 
first enunciated this principle in its oor^ositioiu In my 
opinion it has however been too fondly admired by foreign critics 
to the consequent neglect of that feature of the Constitution of 
the United ^tates which, in reality, is far more original via:- 
'.he *ouse of Representatives* To those accustomed to a bi­ 
cameral Legislature in a Unitary Stat^, a National House IB no 
noveltyj and the significance of the House representing the
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people in a Federation is apt to tee passed over in its general 
similarity to that feature in a Unitary State.
The American 'fathers', however, who created the House of
Representatives fully realised the novelty and moment of the
(1)
precedent they were creating. 4 single-chambered Congress
representing the States of the Federation had existed from the 
first movements of Union. It was a common feature of all 
Confederations, and ite retention in the proposed Union occasioned 
little $**&$* dispute. Certainly the e<|ual representation 
which after 1789 it embodied, was a new and important feature, feut 
not so important or so new as the establishment of a national House, 
This was an innovation of the first order. It was a novel 
expression of the principle of the direct connection "between the 
Federation and the individual, an assertion of the popular 
foundation of the new Union, and the substitution of a national 
legislature of a real Federal State for a conference of delegates 
of the old Confederation of American Colonies.
The Federal legislature of a Federal State must therefore
expression 
consist of two chambers, in which legitimate/is given to th«
centripetal and centrifugal foroes which meet and contend in suoh 
a State, A "bi-eameral Legislature of this kind is therefore 
based on a totally different principle from that on which a 
similar feature rests in a Unitary State. There is in a 
federation no Upper House representing "feirth, wealth or office.
(1) See Journal of Convention. Vol.V. "Slliott's r>e"bates.
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The neoond Chamber is neither an aristocratic obstruction nor a 
mere revising Chamber not fundamentally different in composition 
from the 7irst or Lower House. -aoh House embodies an essential 
and indispensable element of a Federal State.
The two Houses havo double functions for they are, In 
addition, separata chambers of a single Legislature and therefore 
play complementary roles in the passing of laws, and in the
t
performance of other duties assigned to it. They possess all 
the character:' .rst ios of ordinary Legislatures of two Houses and 
it Is obvious that the comparative importance of the two Federal
forces which they embody will be largely determined by their
«
relative positions in th^ joint Assembly, Thus the influence of the
^flB is considerably reduced in Canada and considerably
i 
increased in Germany and the United states by the powers of the
House which represents them, in Its relation to the other parts 
of th** Governments of these "Federations.
The representation of the part-^tatea of a federation 
in tha Federal C/overnweuit constitutes one important distinction 
between a Federal State and a Unitary ntate with well developed 
local Government. Although New Zealand, in common with other 
self-governing "Dominions of the British possesses practical 
internal Independence, It is not represented as a sovereign 
^tate in th<2 Govor?w?nt of the "rap ire, as Hew York is represented 
in Congress.
In all these matters - defence, finance, representation 
and in the general execution of its decrees - a Confeder Uinn of
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States acts through the States thamaelves in their corporate 
capacity; it gives orders to them and they proceed to carry them 
out, or if they ao please, to resist them. In a Federal State - 
and it is this which provides the surest guarantee of permanence - 
the tfedsral Government enters into direst relations with each 
individual citiaen. "The Staatenbund has never yet really worked 
wall. And it mast ever bf so with every device which confuses
the direct relation of the citisen to his fitat**, and puts him in 
doubt as to what his State is and where Us allegiance is due." 
This is indeed the oause of the failure of the First American 
Confed ration. "The great and radical vice in the Constitution 
of the existing Confederation ,» writes Hamilton about 1788, 
"is in the principle of legislation for States or Governments 
in their corporate or collective capacities and as contra- 
distinguiSieifrora the individuals of ^vhich they consist. Fjcoept 
as to the rule of appointment, the United States has an indefinite 
discretion to make requisition for men or money but it has no 
authority to raise either fey regulations extending to the 
individual citizens of America* The consequence of this Is, 
that though in theory their resolutions concerning these objects
are la^vs, yet in practice they are mere recommendations which the
U> (3) observe or disregard at thoir option? Again, "The
(1) Commonwealth of Nations Pt.l chap i. p. 49, c.f. also Problem 




Government must carry Its agency to t.ii«* persons of Its citiaena. 
It must stand in nasd of no intermediate legislatures, "but must•
itself be empowered to employ the arn of th* ordinary magistrate 
to execute its own resolutions. The majesty of the national 
authority must be manifested through the Tedium of the Courts of 
Justice*.
Da Tocquevillfc, writing of the United States at the 
"beginning ofi the nineteenth century and 7,d.th no other *»:perlence 
of a "Federal Scats? hails such an innovation in these words. 
"Hera the term federal Government is no longer clearly applicable 
to a State of things ?hich must he styled an incoiffplete National 
Government; a form of Government has been ^iecovered hich is 
neither exactly national nor "Federal; fcut no further progress has
"feeen made and the new word which vril! one day desl.^ate this
(1)
novel invention doea not yet exist.11 Germany has cortriouted a
word 'Bundesstaat*, vhich is becoming incorporated in/political 
vocabularies of all countries. I have consistently translated 
it "by 'Federal State* and I have endeavoured by constant usa to 
establish beyond confusion the "istinetionbetween thie term and a 
Confederation of states!
One otter point must ):e noticed in the di? trl 1 ution 
of powers between th; .-tatet; and 'federal Oorernment-fi. The 
looseness or tighUiesa of tha ?edoration depends or. the location 
of the *definite' powers. In a loose federation certain
(1) Be Too<iuevill« Dem< cratie en Amerique.
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specific, enumerated powers ar<3 assigned to the Fedsral Government 
while the residuum of indefinite authority is retained by the 
separate States. In a tight Federation the enumerated powers 
are conferred on the States and the indefinite authority is 
reserved to the federal rrovernm-nt,, for It is obvious that the body 
to which is assigned the indefinite authority controls the larger 
and more extensible political sphere.
In the subjects which are assigned to the federal 
Government the States surrender all right to legislation. In 
this sphere they resemble the divisions of a "nitary State acting 
at the will and direction of a single sovereign legislature. In 
all matters t ho- /ever, in respect of which they have retained 
sovereign rights . they are not administrative parts of a single 
Stave, "but Independent members of the Union,
The retention of local powers ->y the States resembles 
in practice the internal S elf -government which has been extended to 
the ^elf-governing Dominions of the British Empire, The contrast 
however lie,s chiefly In the ultimate legal dependence of all 
Colonial powers on the Supreme Parliament of Great Britain and 
Ireland. Each Self-governing Dominion exercises in practice 
complete autonomy with regard to its internal affairs, and no 
Imperial Government would think it wise to disturb this arrangement 
nevertheless, in theory, each colonial Constitution depends for its 
validity on the sanction of the Imperial Parliament, and oo\4d be 
rescinded at the will of this Assembly,
The States of a Federation on the other hand exercise 
their powers in virtue of their absolute sovereignty and their
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rights form an indissoluble paro of the .«•'
Constitutionf Ihe colony of KW Zealand possesses its privileges 
by a grant or concession from a sovereign lagi&l^ure; <,he State of 
;:^-v York or the canton of 2tu ich exeircitiea its authority not fey 
derivation from the ?ed«rai Legislature eut in its .sovereign 
capacity ag an iu<i*p<*ndent Staxe, u> i(/B own inherent and original 
right and entirely according to the direction of its individual will 
The sovereignty of f*aoh State oefora Federating wass noii BO certain a 
matter as its sovereignty ui'terwarda in 6*11 subjecta which have 
l^een left or aaai^ned to it in L»-.** >'Qut»ral Coustx option. In other 
affairb it }ias MO ruor •-. sovereignty than «*n ^riglisli bounty Council.
Similarly the federal constitution i/OBa«dsei* plenary and ample 
authority on all inaotera -^tioh h«*v« ueen commitvjd t»o its care, 
but in the &p/id/*e ox Staoe conti'ol xo ^ oyaaaseo no powor of diotatior 
I v, ia true tJiat in s^e federal Soat<ssj f oerwin concurrent powers 
have "be-in assigned co s LA fee and .neadraJL Govarnm&n oa f an arrange­ 
ment by v/jtJLoJi a Sta^e may onact * law in the akaence of f or in 
harmony witA, a ^! ^d&ral law on ^i« aa/ae 6u~kj<*ct« federal 
legislation .aowever ti-»ke» preceiienee of 3iiab« legislation, and if 
on;.-» t\vo cofiilict, Uie State l-v/, aeco^icss ij«so iacto invalicu 
Another j'-O^er still moi'a x,np;;i tbtiic i&> someox/i^s ooni'tturel 01* the
Vederul Groverrijuaiit* In Canada Wie Do^siniur* Cj-ovwrnL.jrit 
pvssess^d a power of M v«to" On *»Ii c5^e»te legi&laoion and in Switzer- 
-land all Cantonal Constitutions ar^d in practice ail amendments 
must be -uriranteed by the Federal Government, This authority 
almost invests v federal Legislature with the supremacy of a
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of t sinple State, hut even here it is limited by the 
restrictions of the Federal nonstit^rtion.
As a Tedoral rotate is a partial union, it is baaed on 
the principle of a divided or double sovereignty. Each
>
legislature, State nd yed«r^.l, h^.s sorer elgn powers within and 
only within th ̂ sphere assigned to It Indeed, If Professor 
Dicey 1 s t o-fold definition (sovereignty) ba accept d } - 
positively, tlv>j right to n,'^,k^ or nnnr-.Vi any Ifws vh-ttso^v-jr and,
n^gfi.tiv-)ly, the ;ibseno c* of r-v-.y person or body eo^ip^t^nt t^ over-(1 > - 
ri-H or 1 •=.;•' a^lf]^ tliOBQ laws- there is no ' sovereign fi legisla­
ture - in the strict s^nse of the word - in a ?«daral ^tate. 
Indeed there is no authority sv-ch as the English Parliament, 
"supra^ae in all things and over all causes as well ecclesiasti­ 
cal as temporal throughout His Majesty 1 s Dominions* for no 
law-making body in a I'aderal State can step outside a certain 
limited sphere, hich is defined constitution. And if it acts 
beyond Its ponars , ios enactments ill be dnclar^d null and void, 
••^.nd v/ill have no claim to the oTaiidience of any citizen. Thus, 
as Professor Dicey further remarks, every legislature in a 
v d^r^l Rtate is a subordinate la making body, and as such 
r"sa;rfol<-!f3 an Rn^lish rail ay o<^nrany, a Municipal Corporation, 
or a Colonial Asserohly. As all these bodies are subject to the 
limitations pr^scrlbid by the Irajv'.ri ,1 p->rli^ n.-nt , so both State 
and Federal legislatures are B^li.lect to th^ i,«rms of the Federal
(1) La of the Qonstltntion p- 39
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Constitution.
A written Constitution, containing th^ t ;rms of this 
tr;;,ty-like form of Government, is a natural and convenient 
though not perhaps a n< c-^ssary feature of a Federal State. The 
critic a point is the* distribution of powers and success depends 
on a c ireful definition, which should as far as possible renove 
causes for ftispute. In this Constitution each authority of the 
State finds its writ and sanction . It is the supreme IK.V; of the 
land whence, as from an act of Parliament, all "bodies subject to 
it derive their powers.
It is ^Iso consistent that no one of the authorities 
which the Constitution empowers, should "be competent to alt r the 
ehar'iov-r of ity basis or to disturb its relations with the other 
parts of the State. A federal Constitution is th^r^fore rfcgld, 
that is, it is placed T&eyond tlis amendment by the ordinary 
legislative process and can only b*j altered by special bodies in a 
sp^ci 1 manner.
A rigid Constitution Is alien to English Institutions 
and is hostile to the principle of the omnipotence of the English 
Parliament* ITeverth^l ̂ ss the idea of some fundamental "basis 
of f\e Stat« -/as first exi^r^SBed in the Agreement of the People 
and the I nstrnjnent of Government of Cromv/a^lian tiuHs. It was 
further ^^v-jloped in America through the Colonial Ch r'ers which 
played a sirail r p -rt to a modern rigid Constitution, and by
seventeenth and eighteenth century theories of iooial Contracts. 
ix; Tiia Aonaean League possessed no written law and it is possible 
to i;n.L-ine a Federal development "by custom which might dispense 
with such a basis. See Freeman Hist, of Fed. Govt. Ch.V.p 197
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On the formation of the Union, a gigid Constitution was ^dopt^d 
"by the United States as the fundamental law of the Stata , and 
this example has since been followed by Jrance and oth^r countries 
which have occasion to establish or revise thoir institutions 
during the last century. A rigid Constitution is not therefore
X
peculiar, although pre-eminently suitable, to a Federal State.
In all federal States the ariindaent of the Constitution 
is entrusted to special bodies or surrounded by special condition*. 
Its rigidity varies In different States from Germany on th : one 
hand which posses the most ffcexllsle 7*»d^ral Constitution, to the
t /
United States on the othor whose Constitution is amended with 
tha greatest difficulty.
Hot only therefore is ^v >ry legislature In a Federal 
State a subordinate law-making hody with sovoraign pov/er
restricted within the limits prescribed by the Constitution, fcut
i
?ach -«nd yv«ry Legislature is also a non-constituent assembly, 
i.e. it has not authority to anend the Constitution. To the
English raind it is inoo^reh^nsl'tele that a certain legislative
\,
sphere should "tee e^.r-marked as funda, i^ntal and constituent and 
therefore removed "by special formalities from ordinary l^gislatlvf 
access, or that a process which is necessary and sufficient for 
some laws should not "be also sufficient and necessary for others. 
And in a Unitary State a rigid Constitution is op-m to many 
o"bj actions fcut in a federal Stat^ it follows by logical conclusion 
from the existence of a divided sovereignty.
The Constitution in a ?^d »ral State to^.ars therefore the
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same relation to all author it i ;s in the State ?.s an Act of 
Parliament in England. It is the supreme I^r of the land, whence . 
all "bodies derive their legitimate po?/er and which all must obey. 
Like an English Act of Parliament it is the sole and supreme test 
of the validity of all oth^r laws and actions within the State.
An Act of Parliament however emanates from the
Legislature of the State. In a Paderal State, ho ̂ v^r the position 
is reversed for **ach legislature derives its authority from the 
Constitution itself. It n^ith r issues the Constitution nor can 
it amend it. In fact the only fxfcthority in a federal State whioh. 
in any ^ ay approaches the sovereign eminence of the English
»
t>erlif rr-nt, is the one which h-,s the po ;^r to amend t3\e Constitution. 
If some completely sovereign po ,^r is sought in every State, the 
amending authority is the only lining "body in «shich such a power 
mi^ht repose. It alone is competent to modify the relations 
existing "b .-t-'een all oth-^r authorities in the State. It is, as
%
it werei a dormant constituent Legislature - the supreme law- 
making body in the State, ^.nd as suoh res^mbl^s the English 
Porll'im^nt. The cora[p?^rison may not be carried far ho ^v-;r f for 
even the «/n)r«din t ; authority is not legally "Sovereign". Ho Aot of 
Parliament commits any subseq^ ent p;xrliar^nt to its t^rms.
English Parli?iinents hav^ from time to time thrown off restrictions
(1) . 
Toy which they wore intended to "be bound. IChe enactment of a later
(1) C.T. A.V.Dicey - Law of the Constitution.
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Ac" of Parliament in Itself annuls any previous Act with which
it raay conflict. An Act is merely a.o expression - irresponsible
and perhaps capricious - of the o mlpotenc^ of Parliament.
A rigid ( constitution is not, on the other hand, an 
expression of the sever iignly of t--e an^ndinT authority for it 
imposes restriction u} on that; body and indeed delegates to it its 
authority in just i,h« same manner .s to the ?^d«ral and ^tat^ 
Legislatures which arn subordinate to it. ?or the amending 
a1 thority is itself limited by th-; Constitution arid mot act 
according to its terms. Thus the am'Miding 'body possesses 
co-ordinat« powers v/ith t • e legislatures of the States and of the 
federation and all ar^ equally limited by and derived from t.u 
Constitution.
Ther -> is in fact no legal sov^r^irn power in a federal 
Stat^ of this kind. '-•>« 'Federal Legislators is not soyyryign for 
it derives its po/^rs fro i an i .intably Constitution whose terms 
it is not a>ie to affect. " ?^r tiie SHTHO reason no-one of t -e 
l^tat^ Legislator •:& is sovereign. The amending a" thority alone 
may alter the distribution of f notions between the organs^ of t 1 e 
f^tat«, but even it is limited by tre conditions of t]te Constitution. 
Legally th**r fore it is no't sovereign as the Vngllsh Parliament is;
only politically nay it b-> cnlled the sov-reigp authority of the
(1) 
v ,deral Stato of this nature.
The Constitution itself .-aon^ r^rnr*ins as the ultiraate
(1) f!f. A . ^. ^icey. } .3 r>3 et passim.
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repository of ler; ; 0l snv:r ;ignty. B* t V-,is cannot be no re than 
an xvression or an emanation of a living source. There is no 
existing authority which is not subordinate to it. It is In fact 
the instrument of an abdicated sovereign. Ko sov^r^ign can limit 
itp sovereignty b'»t whether it b« Tsar or Parliament, it can 
abdicate its Throne. The American people who issued the 
Constitution of their full soverign rower in 1789 abdicated their 
position. They divided their own sovereignty among a number of 
co-ordinate bodies deriving their authority from the Charter which 
tv e people issued as a permanent expression of their own inherent 
and original sovereignty. Tlie legislatures and people of the 
States of 1789 cormiitt^d posterity to a covenant perpetually 
binding, in resistance to which h^ seceded Stated in 1861 tried 
in vain to assert their freedom. English posterity is bound by 
national debt or an international treaty j la^/xl!;/, though not 
perhaj;e morally Parliament could denounce tin treaty and repudiate 
t"-«e deb'y| btit no authority on earth exists legally copipetert to 
ignore the rigid Constitntion of a '?sder^l ''ta1>;. It was as if 
a.n l?ngliB.vi Parliament having dissolved itsel n an^ authorised no 
means for its r assembling, had left only its Acts which were to be 
Eternally bi^dir.g. No Constitution can s-idur-; thrmi-h c^.^turi^s 
, •vif-iont -j^ij;:i, and in wise anticipation, one authority
Another body- th-3 federal Juciciary - was commissioned
to guara the C<*-i :s .itution and to protect it agai-v»t. *"-i^ uuu^d ,»f 
legislation inconsistent w5 11- its terms. To the United States
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must be giv.n the credit of having invented this feature of Federal 
machinery - as indeed of so many others -, and it has aroused th^ 
wonder and admiration of most critics. Th^ principle on which it 
is based should not "be strange to an 7,nc,lish mind for it is merely 
an extension of the -'n^lish legal practice to a Federal situation.
"HJv^ry Act of Parliament of England will "be enforced by 
Law Courts; svery e*fc«.r assembly derives Ita powers by and only in 
accordance with such an ^ct, and exactly to the extent to which it 
exceeds its authority will its measures be declared invalid and of no 
effect by the Courts*
The Constitution of a federal stat* is, as already 
described , in the same authoritative relation to aysry assembly in
the stat^j as an "nullah Act of Parliament. It is the 'supreme law
will 
of the land 1 , an^tgaliald by the Judiciary. Any legislation, either
or state, which conflicts with its terms will b** declared 
unconstitutional and invalid and consequently rendered null and 
Any encroachment of the States on the Federal domain, or of the 
'^deration on that of the States is equally condemned by the Courts. 
Th? Judiciary becomes the interpreter and living voice of the 
Constitution, and arbiter Between the States and the federation. 
Its power is of iramenge importance especially where as in the United
, the Constitution is so brief. The Courts are "the pivot
(1) 
on which the whole Constitutional arrangements turnfand undoubtedly
the centralisation which has tak«n place in the TJnlto4 States
*. v, Dicoy TAST of the Constitution, } , 166
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federation is largely due to. and wholly sanctioned by th«
(1) 
interpretation of th« Federal Courts*
The principles of a ^-derallsm ar^ further elaborated in 
the more detailed studies of particular federal States. It in in 
th=j Trniter?. rtat^s %nd Federations such as Australia, which are 
consciously modelled upon it that these principles ar^ worked out 
with the greatest consistency and regularity and from which indeed 
they are largely drawn. In less symmetrical Federations such as 
Germany or even Switzerland, .-here the pjen-°ral principles are not 
uniformly applied, I have endeavoured to show the nature and reason 
of their delation from the regular type,
'ithin the limits of this thesis, it is not possible 
t? indicate more than an a bare outline the chief characteristics 
of each Federal State, The historical development of the 
federation, the nature of the central Government and its relations 
with the componert states havn "feeen "briefly analised, "but no 
description of the Constitutions of the part-States has "been 
attempted, with th« ©xcoption of ; assinf? references to th^ir
ganoral Character, which I liore, will tee stiffiolent to illustrate
*
tho differences of political colour in the Federal Government due 
to th^ institutions of the part-^tat^s.
It may "be well, however, to consider here some of the
(1) ^ae infra nhap. 11. for further characteristics.
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disadvantages and advantages which havfj "been urged against or in 
favour of a yed«ral f?tate.
The chief '-.'eaknesa of 3?rtdoralis:i urisea from the 
existence of a double sovereignty ^and t-vj multiplication of 
co-ordinate authorities. Th«»« laad i/i&vitahly to a certain 
weakness of internal cohesion, to a frictior and dissipation of 
energy and to a diversity of localised legislation. The dependence 
of a Federal Government upon t>< terras of a rigid Constitution does 
not, It is sometimes alleged, j ermit a sufficient concentration of 
power in the hands of the joint Executiv* . This rjay lead to a 
/ant of organisation and efficiency which, for yxswapla in case of 
war, would stultify the opposition of a Federal Stata in the presence 
of a more * unified* ^siy*.... Similarly th* demands of an imperiura 
in imperio, as it v;ere, place the individual in doubt as to where 
his allegiance is duo.
A rigid constitution encouragec a conservative attitude, 
and thQ position of the Juciciary as arbiter in tho Statn tends to 
sufestitut^ tJi.-d spirit of litigatior for that of legislation, further 
the efficiency of the whole Federation n^.y "be nacrifice:. to State 
sentiment and to the necessity of conciliating St-h^ ir.tsres.ts, as
for example, "by reflations apportioning jTi£>ni>>-srs of executive or
ID 
legislative eouncils according to ^tate "boimdatries.
The American nivil war is quoted to provt* that the
(1) ^or this and many of the other objections seo T)ic--)y T-&.W of the 
Constitution. 8th ^:d. Inrod. and chaps. 1 & 111.
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Federal tie is weak and ineffective and easily ruptured; and even . 
wjrwr* its stability is not endangered by civil war, the Federation 
endures hardly morej for "Federalism t^nds to pass into nationalism.
The United States and Switzerland are both nations under the form of
(1) (2) 
a federation.* «A Federation is almost alwiya in process of
disintegration or closer coalescence. Its formation is the 
prelude to the creation of a Unitary State, or else it is the first 
step towards complete disintegration. 11
These are the chief objections, real or alleged, which 
are brought up against a ^edoral Stat«*.
The disadvantages oi1 a rigid Constitution - the 
encouragement or a conservative attituide and of a spirit of 
leg lity - are not peculiar to a Federal State though in practice 
they appear to be necessary accompaniments of it. Both hav« 
their advantages and neither exists to the same extent in all 
Federal States. Trie spirit of legality which in the United 
States has developed to a high degree from that * feeling for law* 
which .is asserted to bs th-i secret of English political smcecs, 
exists in no other Foderal State to the same extent. The rigidity 
of the Constitution in all federations except that of the United 
States has been modified in different degrees. In Switzerland, 
so much has the power of the people been enlarged that
CO Mc-py i^id. introd. p.KXVl.
(t.) Alston - quoted by B. Holland. Imperittm et Libertas.
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Constitutional rigidity is little more than a slight and laudable 
check on hasty legislation. Few States indded could be more 
flexible than Switzerland either with regard to the diversity of 
elements it includes or to the ease with which it is susceptible to 
modification.
The Maericun nivilW/ar, which, during more than a hundred
years of Federal -istory. is the only civil war of any federal
U> 
Stat-j, hardly proves satisfactorily the inherent weakness of this
kind of political institution. All states, whether Federal or 
Unitary are liable to civil war, "hen a new and more powerful 
principle stronger than all legal obligations becomes an independent 
test of allegiance. A Federal tie as a Unitary tie, is liable to 
be dissolved by a counter force whether slavery, religion, national 
independence or Parliamentary sovereignty. Moreover the very 
issue of the Civil War served only to secure beyond doubt the final 
indissolubility of the Union, and to establish beyond dispute that 
it is to the federation that a citizen* 8 greater allegiance is due. 
The southern States seceded from one Federation only to
i
set up another and" this fact proves far more in favour of Federalism'2) 
in the abstract than their separation proves against
A Federation is subject to special disadvantages in the 
way of divers^ legislation and confliction of authorities of equal
:reign powers, , both of vhich demerits undoubtedly exist although 
overlapping of 
the/powers is n*t unknown to Unitary States. A certain minimum
(1) The war of the ^ondsrMmd preceded ,he formation <~f a "Pedaral
State" 
(8) "freemi" "1st. of Fed. Govt. Introd.
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of uniformity howsvsr is established, and with the growth of the 
Federal State is in f;ict much extended. Diversity of legislation 
"beyond a certain point is inconvenient and embarrassing, and yet not 
more dangerous than the extension of a uniform legislation to 
conditions vlaich ar^. totally different. For local legislative- 
independence may at least afford satisfactory solutions to local 
problems and in addition it admits of social and educational 
experiments on a small scale which would T»© impossible or too 
hazardous in a larger sphere.
How far the existanci of co-ordinate authorities
produces inefficiency is difficult to judge. There is undoufctedly 
a certain friction, "but yet, as Lord Bryce remarks of the United 
Statesi in practice the double system works well onou^i. It must 
also fce rameiober'-jd that most Federal States ara at the same time 
democracies and in their democratic as much as in their Federal 
capacity, they are open to charged of inefficiency and lack of 
executive concentration. Germany is so much identified with Prussia 
that it can hardly "be quoted in favour of Federal efficiency, "but it 
is at any rats 1 one variation of a Federal State which evinces no sign 
of disorganisation or military powerlessness.
The success and smooth working of H Federal State 
depends unquestionably on the delicacy of the adjustment of its 
various parts; it requires high political skill and complicated and 
ingenious machinery, sensitive to the diverse influences at work.
"So comrlete is th« present integration of th** staU> antf "Pederul
(1)
par ts" declares President Wilson, "that G over nine ntwith us has TlTThe *"""""————
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has become ,
ceased to be plural an $/ singular. — -----The States and
systems are so adjuatsa tinder our public la^v that they may not 
only operate smoothly and affectively *ach in the sphere which is 
exclusively its own, but also fit into each other with perfect 
harnony of co-operation wherever their jurisdictions oro?s or are 
parallel, acting as parts of om* and the sains frame of Government, 
with an uncontested subordination of functions and an undoubted 
common ain. tt
This appears to corroborate Professor Dicey 1 a statement 
that the United States is in reality a nation under the guise of a 
Federation. Yet however national arid unified the Federation of 
the United States may have "become, however closely its various part 
may hav ; be^n interwoven into a single corrrpact organisation - which 
goes far to repudiate the charge of inefficiency and lack of cohesio
MT-^d
/against federalism - in the existence of State privileges and 
sentiment and in political construction, the United f'tates is not a 
nation but a federation. "The Government of tho Union has indeed 
"become permanent, the cherished representative, the vital organ, 
of our life as a nation} but the States have not been swallowed up. 
Their prerogatives are as essential -oo our system as ever. — - — — - 
The nation properly comes "before the States in honour and importance 
not because it is more ir^ortant than they but because it is all
important to them.- —— It is the organic fram-j of the States: it has
(1) 
enabled and still enables them to exist. 1*
(1) ^lleon - The <ttate p. 468 "-d. 1900.
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In Switzerland Although that Federation is marked "07 similar 
national concentration, recent events hare proved fairly 
conclusively that few of the r^tone are ill ing to surrender their 
Federal privileges in exchange for a national TTnion.
The universal testimony of federal history "bears witness 
however, to the gradual tightening of the "bonds, and all 
Federations have developed in a centralising direction. Fedoraliem 
represents a balance between independence and union, but the Federal 
Government itself operates on the side of --nion. To some extent 
Federalism is an educative process ur to Nationalism, for no evidence 
exists in support of the statement that Federalism is the "beginning 
of a process of disintegration. Canada vrhich was first a Unitary and 
then a ^der*il °tate has shown no desire to separate further into
independent provinces.
A federal rnlon is visually compared! TflLth. a national Union to 
the disadvantage of the former, hut in practice th^y are not possible 
alternatives. Fhere a "atlonal trni^n is possible ; ?**v would -lesire 
to 8^.)»8titnte a Federal TTnion. The only alternative to Federalism 
is absolute separation, for as already described, the zaerit of a 
Federal Union lies in tha fact that it is supremely applicable in 
those circumstances where a rational Union is vholly i^onsi'bl^. 
Mere geographical extension vrill always create such a situation. And 
in those caaes a Federal State combines all tha advantae'--^ of a 
national Union with thoee of independence - military and economic 
co-operation, the substitution of law for the arbitrament of war orer 
a large area, the merits of locnl control of local affairs - the
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advantages are obvious and for that rnaaon cu-3 too often 
The diversity of modern ^derations pr^vas i^a flexibility and 
adaptability to varying conditions and ^uuraniees itu periatnance* 
And in cli^ rank of modorn nations, *odar<il States hav-j a prominent 
plac^ - the iraportanoQ of ths United States and "'eri-mny is rnanifa«t 
and of nwitaerland no Idas in othsr diraotiona, and who can 
estimate the potential gr«atii38s of Oan^da and Australia?
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~i"itish po^^seiomj !•? \nerlc?. after thu Tsao* of
Paris in 176? may "be divided int* two groups. The first comprised*
the French tarritoriep which liad "beer ceded at ths pe,?oe 5 consisting 
of the settl«-.:iept.B in the rtle.aterr half <"-f modern C';rad , s.rid 
Louipiann aa far as the Mississippi* Distinguished from these by 
population and hletory vf-*re the thirteen English Colonies situated 
in the approximately lev^l plain between the \lleghanies and the sea. 
Of the»e the ienirsulo.r of Florida had >e^n until 1763 a ^
, and the £tat~;B of ^ew YorV, Pew Jersey and Delaware 
originally fonainr the Dutch colcny of New Netherlands, i.-ad "b^e:;
under the ^nglish f'rc?;n for practic<01y a century. The Inhabitant* 
of the remaining colonies wcr^ with the exception of soma Scotoh and 
Irlrh eattlfiTB entirely of jn^lii^i extraction. The;- had abandoned 
""'rgland at various times d^rlnn- 1,3-.^ seventeenth ?nd early eighteenth 
oenturjres In the hope of religious or political free dorr., or actuated 
by the desire for wealth or adventure, and they had brought with them
i
to the nsv America Tlnglieh l€--n^it?.ge and tradition^, and ^ngllsh 
le^al and political ideas. Their f-ov^rnmente were foraed after
4
the "Rngllpli typ® of the eeventeenth century A-ith governors
Sweden* on the "Delaware founded 1639, conquered by Dutch 
and added to New .Netherlands 1655. The /hole fell into
hands 1664.
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r tJT-resant.'i^lve a^.^nblies , thxvjh th-'sy differ 3d locally through, a 
spontaneous -*.djn»taient to rartlc^.ilar circumsW^ices. They -sre 
b^rvi also "by a 1^ •<,! and is^r.tl cental tic to th«* Kot,-i.;r Ccui.tryi 
appeals from oolonisa conr v e l^.-y v,-ith th3 ^rn^lich Privy Cornell, 
a^d Acts of the English pr?rl.I&r.«rt )md s^jre/.iG forc« in th^ Colonies. 
In practice however the Co.lcnies ^era - save in c-c.Tijv.^rci^l matters - 
almost en ft. ire Jy tftlf-g"-rernir«: and cac:i. colony livcjd in independence 
oo th of the House Covernment said of its neighbor re. There was no 
political connection between the separate colcnieaj the imperial 
authority vma not exercised througli a oo/unon govern.- .i^nt nor
4
represented "by ^ single h r3ad« ^ach colony posses'sed a governor
(1)
who*! it ps* id and eornetimes elected, and through ifhom it conducted
its separate relations with 15n.ji.and. Thera waa no
commercial, military or evar. Indian policy. In the 3nv«n Y ^i/a
War each state hvi ict^d ind^p3nd.jntly i:i i'uiain^ troo^a and money
nd .Tvi-?g to the impo?3i^ilityof a u litod colonial poiao/, Indian
affairs Had "been t*V*n ov^r by the ^'n.^lish Gov -xri-ovii-t* It '.'/as the 
of colonial co-opiration ^..-iic.h pro:.i;t-3d the suggest ion*, of
an Tmperia? tax d'trl ,^ tha troubles ; fhioh Isd to the Declaration of 
(2)
Tnt rr-c*^? ^n.ial c;v.arr-xl3 v^ro fr^CiUent, especially
boundary dispute!** T?v* different t !;eo£;rviYLical conditions of the
upution'3 c,r;d intereuta
(!)• ''.g. Connecticut - Bhode Island,
(2). P«e T.eoky History of rnrland in the eighteenth oenturv 
Vol.IV p.i: .
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together with original religious, political and node?! divergencies
had contributed far more to their mutual reparation thar» the larg*
(1). 
heritage of common ideae and traditions to their Union,
The inhabitants of the northern rer ^ngland Colonies 
wore descendants of the Puritan Pilgrim Fathers, and they &ad 
retained much of the stenmess and fanaticism of Orthodox Puritanism. 
They were mostly small freeholders, frugal and industrious and 
engaged in fishing or agriculture-. There were few social divisions
or extremes of vrsalth or poverty ^n»ng, them; and slavery which had
\AI
navar had much hoi$ twaa rapidly dying out. The unit of their 
political life waa the town, and its character keenly demc«ratic» 
The 30 Stew England Pur it an a felt lit tin sympathy with the
Catholics of Maryland, or the colonists of Virginia or th« Carolina* 
who were mostly msralaejrs of the Church of England, and «ome of whom 
wara descended from eivalier r^fug^es*
The Southern Colonies wars also divided %y great social 
cleavages; ther« was a large body of coloured slaves, and numbers 
of *poor whites*- indented servants-in little "better condition. 
Wealth | social distinction and political power ware an Joyed lay a 
privilag<?d uppar class of landed propri^torai The large slava- 
workad toliacco plantations which formed tht economic "basis oppeaed 
class ware situated on the "banks of tidal rivers and were opposed
(D.IUd* PP.
?isk« Critical Period of the Revolution p.?3 seq. also
op*cit* Vol IV. 
Leoky also Kontoalm & Wolfe Vol 1 p.27 seq.
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to concentrated city life. Political development h :d proceeded
in consequence alon^ the lines of the "ngl^flh county rather than the
town system.
In addition there were lar^e Quaker settlements in 
Pennsylvania and "bodies of Dutch s j t tiers, French Hugaanota and 
Swedes, in the middle colonies, ?/hile Scotch and Irish immigrants
were scattered throughout the Colonies and contributed to their(i).
heterogeneous c>iaracter.
nevertheless schemes of Union had been formulated and in 
one instance had "been partially and temporarily realised. As 
narly as 1643 a promising federation of the Hew England colonies
had "been forced .which anticipated not a f ̂  of the features of the
(2) 
later Union. There was a central body of eight Commissioners,
t^o from each colony with a president chosen from their number at 
their head; this board was empowered" to determine all affairs of 
war and peace, leagues, aids, charges, and numbers of raen for warm 
division of spoils and whatever was gotten by conquest, reception 
of more confederates, and all things of like nature which were th*
proper concomitants or conseouents of a Confederation for amity.
<M
offence and d«fenoa*« It was formed during the ^vlish Civil v:ar
and was marked by a significant display of independence of the Mother 
Country. Its activity lasted for about twenty years, "but the
(1). See Burnaley's Keport 1759-60. £inkerton f s voyvcti X111.752.
(2). Arts of the "United rolonies of *]ew England 7 Ap] endix vol 11. 
W.Wilson's Tfistory of American People, alsc A.v.Pollard w "? cto*i 
in modern Tr i story" 'Colonial ^xpinsion 1 and Tlwaite's ! The 
Colonies 1 p. 156.
(3). Arts of Federation.
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federation finally went -co pieces Iwtescti roy<*l pressure on the 
one hs.nd and ir.tsrual conflicts en ths ether, *v* partly to the 
predor»ira?:«3vr position of TT©sBachus«tt0«
Another attempt at mar -3 general union was made in 1753
the prosr-oct of a yr-^nr^ war and the hostil- attitu&e
U) 
assured *y tribes of Indians on the frontiers" T -.'enty-
five roi^nisgiormrB from Faven statrcs met at Albany and unanimously
that «a Tjnlon of ^1 the -Colonies is absolutely necessary
U)
•f» r -.« t>« /'e-fQ-re -.nd -ccrritv of the Colonies 11 They adopted a .
(3) 
-^f union yro^os^^ >»y v> ^r>1amin franklin, but it .*/as
. ^oth hy all the Assemblies "before -vhich it was 
?.aid \r\ A }p^lca t and lay th*» Boari of Trade in ?nr;land. a ln
A-r^rica it rvafl considered to contain too :moh of prerogatiTe, and
(4) 
in TCn^land it -^as o«nr.tdgrod too deraoo ratio**
There *v«r?> other plans of Union such as Penn's scheme 
of 1697 j but these did not advance so far towards realisation* 
Most of th<58<? schemes of tT^.i^n had emanated from the Government 
party art? ^or that v«?ason were not R/jcepta>»la to the people* The 
un?.uocesr<fvl Mhany scheme of 1753 -*;aB the last effort of the 
official class, and its failurv indicated as nrnch opposition to the
(l)«See Curtis 1 ^Constitutional HisLory of A .^-.tca* vol.1 p,18, 
9?. PC SparVs 1 *T.ife 4 ^or>s of Benjamin Tranklin* 1. 176 j Zll* 
22-25.
.journal of Convention of June 24th Sparks op.clt 111. 22-25.
.Sparks 111. 22-2o.
.^=jr^. 1. 17^.
,7or Penn's Plan of nmon. 3ee Appendix vol. 11. ̂ .Wilson's History 
of American People.
(5
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Governments and their proposals as absence of any desire for union* 
The next increment, a little more than twenty years afterwards, came
i.
directly from the popular Assemblies. In the interval however 
not only had the Colonies learned to fcnow each other somewhat in the 
Seven Years 1 ^ar t "but they had "been roused to a consciousness of 
fellowship "by a common desire for independence. In 1763 however 
there were only "preparations for union and signs of its coming.*
A spirit of independence among the American Colonies had 
"been early displayed. Its first overt expression was perhaps the 
formation of the New England Confederation^ and the indifference 
which England had in practice shown towards her Colonies, in contrast 
with the paternal attidude of France and Spain, as well as the 
political institutions of the colonists themselves, had not
•
discouraged this spirit. The recent removal of the Prench menage 
from the north had also tended to destroy any consciousness in the 
colonists of the need of Imperial protection. It needed only a 
policy of active interference on the part of the Imperial 
Government, to create an explicit desire for complete independence*
It is not possible to enter into the details of the 
commercial and financial measures which preceded the Revolution, 
or into the question of how far the Colonies were virtually represent
(a)
ed in Parliament "by the member for Kast Grenwich. The American War 
of Independence wa_s an incident and a result of ths contemporary
(1) 8f. "Grenville lost America because he read American dispatches* 
See al80NCommonwealth of Nations'.' Pt.l. chap.111. p.210 Beq. * 
(8) By a legal fiction the colonies were supposed to be detached 
portions of the manor of flast orenwich
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colonial theory, added to an irksome and unsound commercial system. 
The doctrine of the absolute dependence of a Colony on the Mother 
Country was abandoned after the American Revolution, and after a 
temporary approximation towards the Greek idea of complete separation 
a co^promis^ has he en adopted by rtranti* £ self -government *° a 
Colony in all that concerns its internal iff airs. The Imperial 
^overnm^nt alone still directs the foreign affairs of its Colonies, 
though in response t« the desire of the self-governing Dominions,
Prime Ministers of these Colonies hav^ V^n invited more and more 
to share in its control. In the eight'^nth century, however, the 
^English Parliament alone claimed to regulate all colonial matters,
Internal and external, though the practical difficulties of the 
situation prevented much interference in internal affairs. "American 
Assemblies are no more than Vestries," remarked Johnson, and 
Grenville urr^ed George 111 not to suffer anyone to advise him to 
dra^v a line between his British and American Dominions. And the root 
of the "nglish failure lay in their inability to distinguish between 
English nuniciple corporations and the American Colonies, " Two 
opposite and inconsistent ideas were in the field, that of Imperial 
Dominion as it was then understood in ^ngland and that of Colonial 
freedom ^s it ivas then understood in America. In view of this it 
vas idle to talk of virtual representation ofcrthe supremacy of the 
"RJn :lish parliament. In point of origin and rrecedents, the 
British case was as strong as case can be. The Knglish argument 
was sound fcut for one fatal defect via. that distance and separation 
and unlike circ distances working upon the original difference of
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disposition and way o•- thlnkln,- v/hioh made some Knglidhmen cross the 
Atlantic while others stayed at home, had formed the Americans into 
a distinct though as yet an undeveloped nation*.
Their lack of national development was nore conspicuous to 
Englishmen than thnir predisposition to national Tinion. Nevertheless 
the history of the American Colonies had bequeathed a double 
heritage of Independence and Union, Towards these ends tv/o 
political Currents had from early times been flowing. The
Declaration of Independence is as much foreshadowed by the 
resistance of Massachusetts in the seventeenth century, and by 
colonial quarrels with royal governors, as the Articles of Union by 
t>ie New ^ngland Confederation and the Albany Scheme of 1753. 
Independence and Union ar© closely connected, it as the desire 
for the first which necessitated the realisation of the second, "We 
therefore, the representatives of the United States of America 
in general Congress assembled, appeal!rift to the supreme Judge of
^rld for the rectitude of our intentions, do in the name and by the 
authority of the sood people of these colonies, solemnly publish 
and declare that thos^ Unit d Colonies are and of right ought to 
be,free and Independent Statssf t. »at they are absolved from all 
allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection 
between thorn and the 5tate of Great Britain,is and ought to be 
totally dissolved, and that as free and independent states they have
(!)• S^e ' folland Incperium et Llbertas. ,
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full power to levy war, conclude peace, control alliances, establish 
commerce and to do all Acts and things which Independent States may 
and of right do. And foi the support of this Declaration with 
a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually
pledge to each other our lives, our fortune* and our sacred honour",
(2)
Mr. ^iske therefore, from this point of view rightly congratulates
the ^nited States on throwing of ~ Imperial Hovereignty, suggesting 
that the longer it was acknowledged, so much the longer would the 
American Colonies have remained separate and isolated* The 
experiences of Australia and South Africa in recent years does not 
support this, but it is nev^rtholesH true that the desire for 
independence was the direct occasion and inspiration of the 
formation of the Union,
The Declaration of Independence was issued and published 
by the Second Continental Congress - a central Assembly containing 
delegates from all the mates. It had baen preceded by the first 
Continental Congress which had met i:? September 1774 at the 
beginning of the troubles to egress its sympathy with the 
resistance of Boston, and to deny the right of the British 
Parliament to tax the Colonies.
The Second Congress which met in May 1775 took up more 
deliberately the task of organising the opposition of the Colonies. 
It declared their complete severance from the Mother Country, issued 
articles of war and preceded to conduct a defence* The
(1) Preamble to Declaratien of Independence. Fc.Donald Statutes and 
Documents of United States History vol. 11.
(2) Critical Period of American T'istory.
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Massachusetts array was adopted as the Continental army, and 
Washington -VHS appointed Commandar-in-Chief . The §tates were 
ordered to r^tse corps of riflenen and the fitting up of a small 
navy was authorised* Plans of military action were dravm upj 
Hew York City, the Hudson Highlands and the Northern frontier were 
ordered to "be put in a state of defence and a- attack on Sanada 
was organised. The game Congress appointed Commissions to 
secure the alliance of foreign countries especially of "France , 
raised war-loans t issued Continental "bills of credit and made 
regulations affecting trade, Indian affairs and rental 
In fact it took <-v;?r almost all matters which had ><?nn 
as fcelongi'r* to th<? sphere of t?\e Home CrOvernment ,
It eoirrpl^Ved its work "by giving Itself a 
TJp to this time the Congress h-»-d had no le.^al authority; the 
Declaration of Independence justified its activity and gave it 
a raison d^tre, "but it had no other foundation than the desire of 
part of the population - and until th? ^ar probably a minority 
for independence. It was the mouthpiece of the national party » 
a •'•evolutionary Assembly, its Taemhers chosen "by revolutionary 
(/^nv^ntions An tlie States. It vtas not intsrded to "be 
body, "but was rather a conf erense of delegates to make suggestions, 
which should b^ reported to their principals the States T.'?^ialatur« 
congress however had begun to pass resolutions - strong ones, such
as the Declaration of Independence and Articles of v^r - wh^oh were
(1)
to have effect without any ratification fry the Stat
* ̂ **"-*"^>^"WT """"•*" —* -^ .im««««««»»^i^w^»««i^WwwriL«_ . - JMU •« vim - -— • nnm.-mj- *— j»_-ur i -.^.ir.ti^- - - _ •a^iim t»^^^MB)l , „ mtm . m mmm \n »i i t m, u •«<»„» .««
(1) A.B.Hart formation of the Union IP. 7^
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and for thi|i,^ome explicit authority was felt to be necessary.
In 1776 three weeks before the adoption of the Declaration 
of Independence, a Corona t tee was a;> } « int^d to draw up the wArtioles 
of Confederation and Perpetual Union." In 1777 they were submitted 
to the States and within three and a hal3f ysars \vere r&tii'ied by all 
of them. By these* Articles, "The States severally enter into a 
firm league of friendship with each oth^r for th-iir common defence, 
the security of tlv-ir libertis;; and their mutual and general 
welfare, "binding themselves to assist each other against all foroe 
offered to, or attacks made upon them, on account of religion, 
sovereignty, trade or any other pretence whatsoever.. M :j?ha ratifica­
tion of the Articles gave the United S^atas, as the Colonies now 
aUted themselves, a legal existence and a written Constitution 
intended to b<3 'perpetually 1 "binding. As a matter of fact the 
"body which these Articles authorised to conduct the common affairs 
of the Colonies, lasted hardly eight years. It carried on the 
concluded peace and then it gradually fell into decay from its 
own inherent weakness*
>7 o federal State existed at this time} the Colonies 
merely formed a loose Confederation; their only oentral "body was a 
Single Assembly, v/ith no executive or judicial organs* A 
rudimentary 7xecutive existed in such of its Committees as "began 
to assume a permanent character - The Board of war, the Treasury 
Office of Accounts, the Committee of Secret Correspondence, which
(1) 4rts, of Confederation Art. Ill
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d'jy-lo^ed ^V-.o oho commiute.i for Por^i^n A.ff-'.irr, until io w-.-io 
supe-xj^ded by the ?orel£-i Secretary. l^cr t-..ia whols Congress 
Vcis aliiost take-i up wi'li different Coi'£jiitteos« Oi a nu: ib^r of 
members that varied from t^n doaan to five score, Coxnciittoes .;er€>ID
appoint ;d i"or a Jioai; of varying
V'-jr the Constituti').] w}iio.U had defined the powers
of Congress harl v:,l£iO limited thvii. It ¥--.-.j xractically restricted
to peaO';? «s.n-i -var t foraign affairs, nav .il and military ^r.-^-n^r:^
(2) 
postal oomini-iiicciti > 3 uv d Indian affairs subject to Sto^.e Idgislation
It had no co/a-iorcial pow'jrs and no authority to rais-; ma/) or money 
on its own account. For ihe&'j it hid to roly entirely i ! i on -cj-i? 
requir.itlons from the r-.tateb. I-; had no power over the individual 
and the Status contributed ^ccordin;: to the^r ability or inclination,, 
!:Iot me quarter of the sum asked for /as collected and recourse, was 
had to bills of credit while ^hfj national debt grev/ larger; AS 
early as 1778 a syst j .< of specific suppli^ ./as adopted by . hich
the otat'^s were allowed to aak-j their contributions in kind, but
(4)
this merely addad to t. .-* confusion and did no;, increase the revenue.
country 7/a^ practlo^ 11," banlorupt unl -^IQ soldiers were 
clamraoring for their i .,y^ Congress became weaker and more 
inefficient erary d,,y* Any imi>ortant in^asurcj required the consent
of threa-fourth^ of t.^ States u,nd a unanimous vot-j was necessary
(§)
for ?in amendment. The Gov.ini'i^nt liaa. neither pover nor money;
(1) John Adaras. (2) Arts of Confederation. Art IX.
(3) Se? snrr>i chap.l. p.21. (4) Of. A.B.Kart. Formation of the
TTniciu p. 91 seq. 
(b) Arts, of Confederation. Art. Xlll.
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it had r-o executive raachinsry of its ovmt and the Scata 
which should have carri«*d out its measures, wera also dis 
Congress itself gradually 'ran down 1 like an unwound clock, and
the United states presented 'that awful spectacle of a ration -ithojrt
(?)
a national government. 1
Dissatisfaction grew with the increasing disorganisation. 
Comerce ^ ! iic<! -md declined aurin ; the war did not revive on its 
termination whsn : vt^ States found that t i«y w«ra out oft from all 
trade with England and her Colonies. • The States wert: v?i angling 
ov^r inter-state tarrifs and umsetiied territorial claims. "What 
indication is there of national disorder 9 porarty and insignificance 
that could "befall a community so peculiarly Tsle^sod with national
advantages as we ar$| which doas not form a part of the dark
(2) 
catalogue of our public mis-TortunBs?* The tima was ni-e xor a
military dictatorship and a scheme was proposed 1.0 raa^y ^/^l
(3) 
King. A rebellion which threatened anarchy teroica out in
^''xsdachusette in 1786 and the dissolution of uie Confederation was 
at hand.
The yoars from t/ie conclusion of peace in I78o imcil the
(1). For inefficiency and pcr^rlesrmes;- of Congress ci\ American.
. T -e ^deralist X7U.
. *? AlrsoAmer. 3M.P.. 'T J.-'t. con. ?f.r,^. ^ro i i^r ratter of Captain 
V. Amatrong to ^ir rrny G^rleton 1783 April 1st. "Thay do not 
•?:'ii^-: '^.'-1 'fT^n^-'a?, *"- :.r-' ingtonl ^iTM tlous, elr-^ h« ^irht easily 
himself elected Kinrc of America, -,s the aimy is entirely
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establishment of the new government in 1789 were indeed the most 
oritioal period in the history of the Union. The end for which 
it had "been formed had "been attained, v/hile its continuation 
seemed to bring nothing nit disorder upon the States. On the other 
hand it was felt that the prewervation of the newly won Independence 
could only "be secured "by the maintenance of the ?Tnion. 3ot only 
was England a near neighbour to the north, but Spain had recovered 
Tlorida and was in possession of Louisiana, while France was 
removed only a little further* The fear of foreign countries was, 
strangely enough, more potent in the eighteenth oentury than tt 
became later whrn steam and telegraphs had brought ^i rop^ so much 
nearer. In words of prophetic value Hamilton urges union, 
"Let the thirteen Status, bound together in a strict and indissoluble 
union, concur in erecting one ^reat American System superior to the 
control of all transatlantic force or influence and able to 
dictate th« fc#;i7ns of connection between the Old and New World-- — 
—— — By a steady adherence to the Union we may hope ere long to
*
become the arbiter of Europe in America, and to be able to incline
the balance of European competition in this part of the ^orld as
(2) 
our interest dictates** In addition the Union possessed a vested
interest in the oommonlands which had been ceded to it on the 
formation of the Confederation in 1781. They had been concerted 
into national property and since 1787 part had in fact been
(1) She owned some of the West Indian Islands.
(2) The federalist. XI.
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organised into new States; each separate Statf; had surrendered its 
claims, and the effect of this common territory on the Union was 
some 'hat analogous to the influence on the English Reformation of 
the transference of the lands of t:ie dissolved Monasteries to the 
new nobility.
It */as felt too that a 60 mon commercial policy and 
a unified revenue might relieve the confusion into which the 
States had fallen. The States were "by no means willing to 
surrender th?*lr entire independence however; what they desired was 
to strengthen the existing Confederation "by giving efficiency and 
pow^r to the Gomroon Government and lay Introducing a tetter 
organisation into the whole system. To have merged th^ir 
separate identities into a complete • nion would have sacrificed the 
traditions of a century and a half, as much as absolute separation 
would have renounced the fruits of the Revolution itself.
In fulfilment of these desires the Convention Fhloh had 
met at Philadelphia to consider a new Government produced in 1787 
the present Constitution. It was submitted to the States and "by 
1789 was ratified >>y the necessary thirteen.
The forces of union had conquered "but not wholly. The 
Constitution instituted a balance "between union and independence, 
which has gradually "but decidedly inclined to the side of the former. 
The Colonies were not Impelled "by an irresistible patriotism; Ibhey 
were prompted by a conecious and deliberate calculation of their 
own needs. It was a Union "extorted from the grinding necessities 
of a reluctant people.*
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•
The federation of the United States is now a permanent 
and cherished State, but is was greeted with little enthusiasm 
in 1789* Within ten years warnings of the future secession were
heard and the Kentucky resolutions of 1798 contained a distinct
(1) 
enunciation of the compact theory* The Constitution was a
compromise, or rather a collection of compromises, and it affords
/ 
an excellent exarajle of two kinds * of those that will work and of
those that will not.
As early as 1733 the slave problem had come up for
settlement* "The United States entered the shadow of the eoming
(2) 
Civil War "before they emerged from that of the Revolution*" The
question was two-fold - were slaves to be represented in the 
National Government, and secondly were they to fee taxedf , Were 
they people and taxable and representable? or were they chattels
*'
which oould neither fee taxed nor represented? In 1733 the
Northern non-slave-holding States had upheld their taxability,
their 
but In 1737 tftey denied/eligibility for representation, asserting
them to be people in 1733 and chattels four years afterwards* The 
Constitution adopted the compromise that a slave should count as 
three-fifths of a freeman and that the slave-holding States 
should be taxed and represented in that proportion. It was a
/
oonpromise Ithout rhyme or reason, and It contained the seeds of 
future trouble, but it served at the time to win the adherence of
[1) Sea supra Chap. 1* p.42 
[a) Piske. Critical feriod p.
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South Carolina to the Union* In 1365 the preplan was settled 
"by the sword in favour of the freedom of the 8 lares.
The issue of the Civil War had another result which is 
more direotly connected with the Gonstitutional history of 
federalism. It destroyed for erer the compact theory of a federal 
State which was a constitutionally barbarous; remnant of the system 
of Confederations of States. The division oreated liy the slave
, * * . \
question was the occasion rather than the cause of the assertion of 
this theory and the subsequent reunion marked its abandonment «
The history of the formation of the American federal 
State is short but ooaqplats with the regularity of a theory* The 
circumstances were peculiarly faTOurable «• thirteen separate States 
with a community of speech, law and race, at liberty to work out 
ftheir own form of Government, and inspired to union by a com on 
Struggle for independence. And the conflict between the theory of
the Contact and the theory of the State Is the essential difficulty
of Federalism 
with which pioneers7 are most likely to be beset*
The nature of the Constitution is as regular as its 
history. It is indeed from this example of a federal State that 
the principles whioh hare been laid down in the Introduwtion * 
the* equal representation of States in the Second House of the 
Legislature, the fonr-fold contact of the federation and the
V
individual, the rigidity of the Constitution and the position of 
the JTudloiary - have been mostly d^awn. Their more particular
(1) See supra chap. 1. p.,37
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application will lie test understood by a consideration first, of
the relations Between the States and the Federation- the distrieutdon
of powers, the representation of the States in the Federal
«
Government, and their relation and that of the Federal State to 
the Constitution - and secondly of the composition and nature 
of the federal Government itself.
The first occasion for the existence of 
important differences in the distribution of authority between
federal and States 1 Governments lies in the allocation of the
U) 
•definite* powers* It is to Toe supposed from the circumstances
of the formation of the Union, that the Jealousy of the States 
and their reluctance to forge for themselves sonds which might 
again become oppressive fetters would lea* them to grant only 
the minimum of necessary powers to the Union and to retain the 
maximum of independence for themselves. Only definite enumerated 
powers are therefore assigned to the Federal Government and the 
residuum of indefinite authority is left to the States. "The 
powers not delegated to the United States »y the Constituion, nor
prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the States respective^
(%} 
or to the people!
The definite powers are therefore apportioned to the 
federal Government and they are assigned in accordance with the 
three necessary conditions of external unity, the uniformity of 
inter-state relations and the necessity of maintaining an effective
See supra • Introd. chap* 1* P*g2 - 23. 
Constitution of U.S.A. Amendment X.
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Federal contact with the indiridual of each State. In all these 
demands the united States has acted in fullest harmony with the 
general principles of a regular Federal State. It has granted to 
the Federal GOTernment sole authority to declare war and conclude 
peace, to maintain a nary, to raise armies and to provide for the 
sailing forth of the militia of each State , and it has in 
consequence exclusive and absolute control ofet the several 
arsenals, dockyards forta and lighthouses which it may establish
f
for Federal purposes. .The Federal Government controls foreign 
affairs, sends oit ambassadors to foreign courts and defines and 
puaUhes breaches of international law. It regulates commerce 
with foreign nations, with the Indians or among the States of the 
Unior and this has been extended to the guardianship of the main 
railways and telegraphs, and the control of all navigable watbrs 
which constitute national highways of inter-state traffic or 
intercourse, and of the means such as bridges, by which commerce 
may cross them in its land passage. Federal commercial powers
grow with the increase of commerce but no Federal law may yet
(2)
touch agencies of commerce which Ife wholly within a single State.
The Federal Government may borrow money, impose or collect taxes
indirectly by customs duties and by a recent amendment it may
(3) 
impose a direct income-tax on the individual. It reeeived power to
(1) See Constitution of U.S.A. Art. 1. sec.8
(2) Cf. W. '*'ilson. The State, p.412.
(3) Amendment XVI. Feb. 3rd.1913.
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(1) 
establish a uniform coinage, postage and telegraph, uniform
bankruptcy and naturalisation laws and to give security for patsnts 
and copyrights. It may and has set up Judicial tribunals, 
inferior to the iupreme Court. It must guarantee to each State 
a republican form of government and protect each State against 
invasion, and on the application of the State legislature against 
domestic violence, but it has no power of veto or disallowance of 
State legislation* Finally it has absolute and exclusive power 
over the district of Columbia, not exceeding ten square miles, in 
which is established the Federal Capital of Washington. Other 
Federal offices such as customs houses, post offices, Court chambers 
are held on ordinary principles of tenure v Columbia alone is 
absolutely and exclusively in Federal possession*
The power of the States are therefore expressly 
restricted "by the authority which has been conferred on the 
Federal Government, which is stated broadly under eighteen heads* 
The restrictions are emphasised "by definite complementary prohibi­ 
tions which have been placed on the States. »Bo State shall 
enter into any treaty, alliance or confederation; grant letters 
of marque or reprisal; coin monies, emit bills of credit, or make
anything but gold and silver coin a legal tender of payment of
in.ssr"tr d 
debts.* This last clause was particularly/to prevent the scandals
t
which had arisen during the War of Independence owing to the
< * •
(1) See Wilson oj&it. p. 482 Constitution Art. 1 s.8
(2) Constitution Art* 1. seq. 10. 1 & a.
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excessive circulation of paper currency. Further no State may
pass any law Impairing the obligation of contracts! or without
the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or
3iS ": • * . *exports, except such/may lie absolutely necessary for executing its 
inspection laws, or any duty of tonnage* It may not keep troops 
unlike the Cantons of Switzerland which are allowed to maintain 
threa hundred permanent troops - or ships of war in time of peace, 
enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a 
foreign powar, or engage in war unless actually invaded or in
such Imminent danger as will not admit of delay*
(1) 
Both the States and the federal Government are
prohibited from passing any "bill of attainder or ex post facto 
law or from granting any title of nobility. And no holder of any 
office tinder the United States may accept any distinction from any 
foreign power. Both the States and, the federation are further
•
forbidden to infringe the rights of individuals in any of the 
following waysfofcy depriving the people of their just right to 
bear arms; by quartering soldiers on private persons in time of 
peace; fey causing the arrest of any person or the seizure or search 
of his property without legal warrant or by requisitioning any 
private possessions for public use without due compensation} "by 
denying to any accused person trial by Jury or making him answerable 
for a capital or 'otherwise infamous crime 1 except on the indictment 
of a grand jury| or by the imposition of excessive ballsr fines or
(1) Constitution Art, !• sec.9 c, 3 & 7 and Amendments l\ - Vlll
XV.
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punishments. Slavery Is everywhere forbidden throughout the 
federal State, and no citiaen of the Tinlted States shall be
•




Certain express restrictions are placed upon the Federal
Government even in limitation of the definite powers assigned to 
it. It is forbidden to suspend the writ of habeas corpus except 
in time of public danger, to impose any tax or duty on articles 
exported from any one State, to give preference to cne port over 
another, or to draw money from the public treasury except in 
consequence of a legal appropriation. It may not make any laws 
respecting the establishment of any religious creed or prohibiting 
the free exercise of religion; nor may it abridge freedom of 
speeeh and of the press, or tha right to assemble peaceably, or to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances*
(3) 
A few powers may be exercised concurrently by either
Stat ? or federal Government i.e. they are granted to the P deration 
but not exclusively and in the absence of their exercise by the 
Federal Authority, they may be exercised by the States. Among these 
subjects are included certain bankruptcy laws and commercial 
matters such as pilot laws and harbour regulations, certain powers 
of direct and indirect taxation, but so that neither Congress nor 
a State shall tax exports from any gtate, and so that no state
(1) Since 1865
(2) Art 1. seo. 9 c. ;:,4 & 7 and Amendment 1.
(3) constitution Art. 1. seo. 4 c. 1. See also Bryce. American 
Commonwealth 1. p.317
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•hall, except with the consent of congresB, tax any corporation or 
other agency created for federal purposes or penaliee any aot done 
under federal authority, nor shall the national Government tax any 
stat^ or its agencies or property. In certain judicial cases wherw 
Congress rai^ht have legislated but has not,or where a party to a 
suit has the choice to proceed either in a federal or a Stat^ Court 
the States may exercise an optional power.
The immediate authority over the individual which is one 
of the chief distinguishing features of a Federal state is granted 
to the national Government with full consistency. This power, 
rather than the sphere or subjects which are assigned to its 
legislation constitutes the chief difference V^tween the position 
of the present Congress and that of the Congress of th^ Confedera -I 
tion preceding it* The Federation may legislate for the individual 
and tax and judge him, independently of the State of which he is a 
member. It may tax hira directly and indirectly and in default 
of payment, judgment, will be visited upon him by the ordinary 
magistrate and by the ordinary process of distraint of property at 
In England. Direct taxes have not been collected more than 
half-a-do*en times and indirect taxation is effected chiefly through 
tariff bills. As already mentioned, the Federal Government my 
sinoe 1913 impose an income tax on the individual citizen.
To the Federal Government and not to the States is also 
entrusted the guardianship of the rights of individuals, which the 
very immutability of the Constitution tempted th« political
• «
philosopher* who framed it to incorporate in its terns as a second
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"Bill of Rights". In fact the "responsibilities of citizenship are 
"both double and direct. Punishment for the violation of 
federal law falls directly on the individual, as does punishment 
for the violation of Stata laws; obligation of obedience is in both 
oases direct j every citizen must obey both Federal law and the law 
of his own Stat*n His citizenship Involves direct relations with 
th^ authr; itiss of "both parts of the aoverniusnt of the country, and 
connects hi» a^ imiediatoly with, the power of the raarshals of the
United States as with the power of the sheriffs of his own county
(1)
or the constables of his o^m town*" Th* federal and S
Governments work within different spheres, within which both are 
equally sovereign and each equally independent of the officers of tht 
other for the execution of its laws.
The federal Government !aay only aet within the sphere 
assigned to it by the CQnstitut5.on and a large province is left to 
the States in which they are sovereign and absolutely independent, 
Any State May set up any form of political institution^ so long as 
it is of a gwsral "Republican* nature. It may form a uni- or
bi-cainer^l legislature, an elected or appointed executive, or
(2)
extend the franchise to women, minors or aliens. In fact although^
the United States* regulates the ri^ht of naturalisation, without 
which no individual may legally claim political rights in every 
8 tat 4, many states have admitted aliens without such naturalisation 
to the privileges and immunities? of citizenship within their own
(1) "r . Wilson. The State p.433
(2) Twelve States ;mve in fact recognisBd the suffrage of women
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particular limits, and Etay do so on what terms they please . ?;ftoh 
»t*te may establish any Church and legislate on ? ^.rriage and 
divorce, and on ciril and criminal law. Great variety in these 
subjects in practice exists throughout the Federal; ion ,fciough most 
states, but not all, have a fundamental coianoi! basirf of :~ngli«h 
The £tat>; alone may create local institutions, may provide for 
education and poor relief. In facf the general regulation of 
internal affairs, and the maintenance of order, is in the hands of
*
the State. ^The State is the rule, th« federation is the 
exception" and the ordinary citiaon in his daily lift? comes most 
into contact with the State authorities. Of the important 
subjects of English Parliamentary agitation within the last century, 
the whole question of Ilectoral Reform, such as occasioned the Acts 
of 1332, 1867 and 1884, and the *xt3nsion of the parliamentary 
franchise to women, municipal Corporation Reform, Higher and 
Elementary education, Church disestablishment and Catholic Kmancipa*- 
tion, and Poor Law Kflform and the revision of the Divorce laws - 
all these would have be*m carried out in the United States "by the
8 tat a and not the federal Government* In illustration of the
(1) 
large powers of tha States it has been asserted that the federal
Government of the United States is neither democratic nor 
aristocratic "but might "be either according t<> the institutions 
of the States. Except with regard to such Federal democratic
(1) Of. Boutmy. Studies in Constitutional TAW.
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features as the necessity of the Consent of Congress to 
declarations of war, this is very true even with regard to such 
matters as the elections of Representatlyes. Nevertheless the 
Pedoral Constitution clearly lilies a democratic governmentj it 
was accepted by popular Convention and is based on popular support; 
and In praotioe the Governments of the States are organised on 
democratic lines* The town* meetings of New Kngland resembles 
the landBgemslnde of some Swiss Cantons and in many States other
Swiss instruments of democracy such as Referendum and Initiative 
and Recall, a feature akin, have been introduced.
The State as a separate unit of the American Federation
has greater power than that of the Cantons of Switzerland or the
f
states of Australia* The Second House of the Legislature or Senate, 
as in all modern Federal States, is devoted to the representation 
"f the states as such* Rash and every State independently of 
its size or population or wealth sends two members to the Senate,
and their power and influence is considerably enlarged by the
(1) 
important functions which have been assigned to the House* Each
state has thus a direct and equal share in this part of the
•
Federal organisation. Until the seventeenth amendment of the 
Constitution m@ pae.s-;d in 1913 the senators were chosen by the 
state Legislature*. Tliey are now chosen directly by the people 
but the Amendment*m«re£0y gave Constitutional sanction to * fact 
whioh Uad long exisoed, for like the Presidential election, the
(1) See supra tthap* 1. p..20
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election of senators had in practice been directly decided by the 
people on party lines. The Senators vote according to their 
individual opinion not according to instructions from the States*
In the congposition of the other parts of the Federal 
Sovsrrmient the States exercise an Influence which eannot 
be neglected. Thus in the national House which is apportioned 
on the basis of the population no snate can be small enough to be
omitted. However scantily it is populated every State oust
«
receive at least one representative. Moreover the qualifications 
of the electors are determined by the terms on which each State 
has basad th* co^os ition of ! ths "Lower Fouse* of its own Legislature 
The electoral district s are not only confined within the limits 
of each Stftte bnt they are marked out by the State authorities
:'
and "by means of ̂ gerrymandering* adequate representation of 
minorities is not always provided. IP any case the minority 
in each State is rendered of no account in spite of the faot that a 
large minority in a large state my $uite easily outrmmber a small 
majority in a small State* Indeed this has twice happened in
»-
Presidential elections which are conducted on a similar system* 
In 1876 and 1888 respectively Mr* Hayes and Mr. Harrison were
elected to the Presidential offa.ce by a Majority of the States
U) 
though each received a minority of the popular votes.
A further illustration of the part which is played
wtHMMWWjMMMHVMtoM^MM4pHlpMMHqBHgMffM|MM>IMMMMMIMMH^ •* •• *«r •«—
(1) In 1876 Mr •Hayes received 252000 popular votes lass than Kr*
Tilden. 
and in J.88S ? rr. Harrison received 95534 popular votes less than
"r. Cleveland*
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by the State with its limited sovereignty and partial independence 
in the American Federal system is afforded by the formations of 
new states out of the wide territories of the west. One of the 
most prominent and peculiar features in American History has been 
the existence and settlement of large, rich unappropriated lands. 
^ot only has a continuous stream of immigrants produced important 
social and economic results, but the political organisations of thej* 
lands has contributed not a litt&e to the success of the Federation 
of the United States.
As early as the days of the Second Continental Congress 
the question of the disposal of the lands west of the Alleghanies 
had arisen, and the claims of individual States to their possession 
had placed great difficulties in the way of settlement* It has 
been already mentioned that these lands were finally placed in the 
hands of Congress with full powers to determine their distribution.
By the Ordinance of 1787 the Western lands north of the Ohio were
(1) 
formed into five new states* The Ordinance established a
precedent which has since been considerably followed. Its terms 
were continued in effect by an Act of 1789 and its main provisions 
were extended to lands south of the Ohio by the Act of -lay 1790. 
It is curious that no mention of the Federal power to prevent the 
expansion of Individual States Is made in the Federal Constitution. 
T5aoh new "territory11 is governed by officers appointed by Congress,
(1) See Ordinance of 1787. McDonald, Select Documents and Statutes 
vol. 11. no. 4
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until it reaches a population of sixty-thousand. It is then
V
granted Self-government and independent statehood on the model of 
the older States. From the time when it possesses five-thousand 
inhabitants it is allowed one member in the House of Representative* 
who may take part in the debates but may not vote.
Of the existing f^rty-eight, all except the original
thirteen and Vermont and Maine have been in this manner Hborn of the 
(2) 
* and the parental tie has not become Irksome as it has been
automatically discarded when the State came of age. It has been
the 
however an important force in/strengthening of the Union and its
significance wets realised by Bismrek in 1870 when he formed 
Alsace-Lorraine into Imperial territory.
Lastly the paramount Influence of the States is seen in 
the conditions which are necessary to amend the Constitution* A 
written Constitution placed beyond %h* alteration by any single
Legislature has been adopted in all its rigidity by the United
(3) 
States. "Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall
esteem It necessary, shall propose amendments to the Constitution, 
or on the application of two-thirds of the several states shall 
oall a Convention for the proposing^ amendments, which In either case 
shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of this 
Constitution, when ratified by theLeglslature of three-fourths of 
the several states or by Conventions thereof as the one or the
(1) The Ordinance contained an interestin : clause - unfortunately omitted from the Federal Constitution,- that no state should separate 
or recede from the Union.
(2) See Appendix to Chapter 11. (3) Constitution of U.S.A.Art.5.
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other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress, Provided 
that no State without its consent, shall be depriTed of its equal 
suffrage in the Senate."
There are therefore two tegitiaate channels for tlie 
initiation of amendments. firstly they may proceed by way of 
Congress. Unlike ordinary legislative proposals they must be 
passed by a two-thlids majority of both Houses. The consent'of the 
V resident is entirely dispensed with as the majority required in 
the Homses is sufficient to pass all laws "over his veto."
Secondly on the application of the Legislatures of two- 
thirds of the States, Congress shall call a Convention for proposing 
amendments. Congress* therefore exercises no discretionary powers 
In regard to amendments demanded by the State Legislatures* This
right of Initiative which is granted to the States as well as to
(1) 
the Federal body, has never yet been used by the States Legislatures*
Proposals to amend the Constitution may also be ratified 
in two ways and in two ways only. According to the principles of a 
symmetrical Federation they may not be passed by any one Legislature 
under the federation. Ho Amendment in fact becomes law unless it 
is ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the States or 
by Conventions chosen ad hoc. The latter alternative has not yet 
been adopted and would probably be* reserved for cases of wholesale 
amendment. In either Instance the ultimate ratifying authority 
for constituent as opposed to non-constituent laws resides in a
fl). Bryce American Commonwealth, vol. 1. page 365.
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three-fourths majority of the States In fact amendments could oe 
passed independently of or even against the will of the federal 
Legislature. If the States were to use their constitutional 
right to initiate amendments, Congress would be bound to submit them 
for ratification,
Moreover, the people as a whole hare no voice in the 
natter. Ho popular majority can ever be large enough to pass or 
to reject an amendment, if one-fourth of the State Legislatures are 
against it, or feres-fourths in its favour. Thus the eight Mountain 
States together with fire of the Hew England States * thirteen States 
in all with a population between them of seven millions could 
successfully reject any amendment desired by the remaining eighty- 
six millions. Ho account is taken of the population of the 
State, Each State has in the amendment of the Constitution as in 
the donate an equal voice, while the voice ef the federation 
itself may be disregarded,
The Constitution is extremely rigid and difficult to 
amend. The necessity of two-thirds of the State Legislatures or 
of a two-thirds majority in congress for proposals, and of three* 
fourths of the State Legislatures for ratification, places great 
obstacles in the path of amendment which are difficult to overcome. 
The revision of one clause is still further hedged about with 
Constitutional safe-guards. "Ho State without its own consent 
shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate". The 
principle of equal representation in the Second House of the 
Legislature must therefore remain untouched so long as one State
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affected withholds its consent. Each state, whatever its sise 
is given an absolute veto in this respeot,so that Delaware with 
two-htndred thousand people or Nevada with eighty-one thousand 
eould effectively oppose the wish of the remaining ninety-three 
odd million inhabitants.
Tho rigidity of the Constitution is indicated by ths 
number of amendments which have been passed* In the wholo 
history of tht United States of over a hundred and twenty years t 
only seventeen amendments in all have been nmde to the Constitution, 
of which ten were passed in 1791 iimaediately after its adoption to 
rectify omissions in tho original draft of the Constitution. Ths 
eleventh and twelfth amendments were passed three years afterwards 
and respectively reverse a Judicial interpretation of the 
Constitution and Introduce a minor reform in the election of ths 
President and Vice-President. No other amendments were added until 
the Crisis of I860. On its termination three amendments were 
passed in 1865, 1369 and 1870 referring to abolition cf slavery, 
And tho enfranchisement of the coloured race. These were 
paessd under abnormal circumstances and at the point of the sword* 
Two ether amendments were passed in 1913 which granted to the 
Federation power to impose an income-tax and gave constitutional 
sanction to the direct popular election of Senators. Occluding 
the first ten, only seven amendments express the political history 
of the Federation. Many bitter controversies on taporttant 
questions - such as the right of Congress tc establish a national
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(1) 
bank have laft no record on the Constitntion. Many other amendments
have been proposed but have failed to obtain the requisite majority 
either in Congress o* of the States.
The Constitution is however very ahort and contains 
rather broad general principles than detailed enactments. 
Constitutional development has therefore proceeded in ths 
unbiolofdoal manner of building round and on the skeleton. The 
amendments to th$ Constitution have been largely stappleTnentd by 
usage, Congressional regulation, and by judicial interpretations. 
None of these can create parts of th* Constitution, but they can 
develope and direct the Constitution in such a way as powerfully
/
and materially to affect its meaning*
U? 
By usage has been established the direct election of the
President by party vote which is exposed to the intention of the 
framors of the Constitution* "The power of an elector to eleot 
is as completely abolished by constitutional understandings in
America as in the royal right of dissent from bills passed by both
(3) 
Houses, by the same force in England." Among other Conventions of
the United States Government may be included "he inaligibility of 
the President for more than a second term of off ice i the assent of 
the Senate to the President's cabinet appointments, and the control 
by a Senator of the Federal patronage in his stat^j the employment 
of itanding Committees in both. Houses and the
!l) Cf. Bryce. American Commonwealth 1. p. 390
2) Bioey Law of the Constitution p. 39.
•a) Cf. 3pu1»y. constitutional Law.
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of the Speaker who nominates them; the employment of the party 
engine known as Caucuses and the party Instrument of the Spoils 
system) as well as the rule that a member of Congress must reside 
in the distriot and State from which he is oh OB en.
By Congressional legislation is regulated the whole 
subject of taxation, direot and indirect, with the exception of 
the federal income tax, the establishment of Federal Courts inferior 
to the Supreme Court and the assignment of particular kinds and 
degrees of jurisdiction to eaoh clasa of courts, the organisation 
of the civil f military and naval services of the country, the 
s4»lnlstratlon of Indian affairs and of the territories, - these 
and many other matters of high import .are regulated by Statutes - 
Statutes "which oannot in strictness enlarge the frontiers of the
— -^
Constitution but which can giv® to certain provinces lying within 
those frontiers far grs*t< r importance than they formally possessed
and by so doing van substantially change the character of the
(2) 
Government * tf
Congressional Statutes are subject to reversal and do 
not become incorporated in the Constitution af Judicial 
interpretations* These too may, and have been reversed by later 
decisions but they are on the whole accepted as fixed principles* 
Aecording to the doctrines of * implied powers' and legality of 
means f necessary and proper 1 to carry out the functions assigned by.
(1) Cf. the institution of the important semi -judicial, sem«i-
exeoutlv* Inter-State commuro^ Commission in 1887* 
(a) Bryoe. Am. . com. 1* p. 593.
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the Constitution to the federation, the Judicial Court has not
sanctioned wide extensions of legislative authority in the
(1) 
finanoial and military spheres but has built up a body
of legal principles whioh form a large part of the Constitution, 
It is aoeepted that every power claimed by the federation must 
be shown to be affirmatively granted in the Constitution, but on 
the other hand it will be construed broadly. As in Kngland, BO in 
the TTnited States , the Courts do not however pass judgment on a law 
but on a ease* That is to say they do not go out of their way to 
assert positively that a law which i* ultra vires is unconstitutional 
b>'t on the fArst oase which coiaes up for trial - perhaps after a 
lap ̂e of years * the claimant who bases his position on that law
will lose his case* Thus irtqportant constitutional questions as
(2) 
in England, are decided in suits between private individuals*
The position of the Judiciary as Intorpr^tsr of the rigid
(3) 
Constitution has already been somewhat explained. The Supremo
Court has also original Jurisdiction r in all oases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls and those in which
(4) 
a State shall be a party*, and appellate Jurisdiction in all other
cases | *in law and equity arising under this Constitution, the laws
«•
of the United States, and the treaties Bade under their authority,
between eitixens of different r.tates* and between oitiaans of the s
(6) 
same State olaiating lands under grants of different States: It is
I) See Bryoe p. 381 (2) See Story. Commentaries Vol.l.p366
(4)Se-e supra ohap, 1. p«3l  Const. Art. ill. s.2. c.2. 
5) Art. Ill* 0.2- o.l
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not coiqpetent to decide cases between a citisen of one State and(!) 
another state. *A11 tha enumerated oases of federal cognisance
are those ifoioh touch the safety, peace and sovereignty of the 
nation^ or which presume that State attachments, State prejudices
and State interests might sometimes obstruct or control the
U) regular administration of Justice.* The jurisdiction of the Federal
Jtedieiary is purely statutory and there is in consequence no 
federal Coiaraon taw. This is administered purely b# the States.
The existence of the federal Courts is based on the (3)
Constitution, and the independence of the judges declared* They
shall hold office dnring seed behaviour and their salaries may not 
be reduced during their tenure. Congress however is invested with 
the power of ordaining and establishing Courts inferior to the 
Supreme Court and of determining the number and organisation even of 
tha% Court* The Jndgsa are appointed by the President., Congress 
has used its power to create two grades of federal Courts ~ circuit 
and District Courts* The Supreme Ccurt Is, therefore, the head
of a large systom of Courts and in thief as in its relation to the/
Constitution, is peculiarly pOTs>erfnl among Federal 3\*dieiariee*
The State Courts possess original and final jurisdiction 
in all cases net relegated to the Federal Courts by the Constitution 
Bach State recognises the judgments of the Federal Court and of the 
Courts of any other part-State , although it does not necessarily
(1) Amendment XI. 
(3) Art. in. s.l.
(2) Kent Commentaries. 1. p.320
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follow the decisions of the latter. The two judicial system* of 
the State and federal Courts are separata and independent however 
In characteristic Aiaerlcan fashion, and Congress has no hand in the 
organisation of the fonaer. The state Court may of course freely 
give its decision on the validity of a Federal law on which no
opinion has been expressed by the 7«d«ral Courts, but an appeal lies
from it to theFederal Courts in these oas?s and "by plain implication 
from the Constitution Congress has no power to dele^U* to -ciia 
State Courts the functions of the Federal Judiciary.
To the United States belongs the credit «f having 
established a Judiciary which is an organic part of the Federal 
Oovermaant. The two other parts of the Central fldvwnrajsnt -
v
the Executive and the Legislature * remain to be described. These 
two department » bear a resemblance to the English Constitution,
i
although wore to'the theory than to the practice «f It*
(2) 
Profesucr Frewmn observes that In countries which are
sufficiently developed to have a distinct Legislature and Executive* 
the differences between them lie not so ra ch in the power which la 
given to the T^ec-i^ivs as in the natnr* of the hands In which it 
placed. l^rosa this point cf view the "^aeesutiv^ of the nnited 
is one of. the most interesting anddpecnliar of modern
ons* ,• As in- the English theoretioal 7Jmeutlve 9 t>ower is 
plaeed in tto.ltands of a single officer. The President is in 
fact an enlarged copy of a Stats lovsrner, who was in most of his 
functions an English Monarch on a small scale. He Is ar,
(1) Cf* Wilsott. The state. p*4?l
(2) Historical Assays* "Presidential Government".
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eighteenth century King of England in republican robes, stripped 
of the irresponsibility of hereditary monarchy, and shorn of the 
divinity that hedges royalty. His prerogatives are restricted by 
the participation of the Senate, and the independence of the States.,
He is made elective and responsible, his tenure of office is
(1) 
limited and his salary is too small "to permit him to maintain a
oourt or corrupt a legislature nor can he seduce the virtue of the
citizens by the gifts of titles of nobility for such are absolutely
(2) (3) 
forbidden. * Somewhat as a Roman Consul succeeded to most of the
functions of the Roman King, but was limited in his power by election
an annual tenure and the existence of a colleague, so the American
(4) 
President retained royal executive duties but was divested of such
appendages of royalty as an hereditary succession and irresponsible 
tenure*
The President of the United States is elected for four 
years, nominally by an electoral college, in reality directly by 
the people. o feature of the Constitution met with more 
approval in 1789 thaft the method of Presidential election and 
none has failed so signally to fulfil the intentions of its 
originators* Theoretically in each State a college of electors 
is chosen equal to the number of Representatives and Senators to 
which the State is entitled in Congress. l?ach elector -as
(1) SCjf^O/^K. * £10,000. (2) Lord Bryce.American Commonwealth.
Vol.1, p.40.
(3) Cf. Bryce ibid. (O I refer of course to the theory of
the English Constitution which however in the eighteenth century 
was not so far from facts as at the present time.
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intended to exercise his independent Judgment in the seleotien of 
a President* In practise each party in the State 'runs* its 
complete list of electors who will yote for th •*, party Presidential 
candidate, and their election by the people takes place solely on 
that understanding. Thus President Wilson's re-election was 
decided ineaatrovertibly in November 1916, by the choice of 
Bemooratio electors by the people of the states, although the electors 
Aid not oast their vota until January 1917. The President is also 
X pre-eminently a party man, he is run by a party machinery, 
elected on party principles and if he is successful, expected to 
reward along party lines* He may be re-elected for a second term 
of office but a custom as strong as law and more immutable 
apparently, forbids a second re-election. in 1921 Preside t 
Wilson will be corbelled to resign and uniaaa the war is speedily 
terminated he will be prevented from official participation in any 
organisation of the League of ??ation« which he would see established* 
During his term of office however the President is irremovable 
except on impeachment. Only one President, Andrew Johnson, has 
been impeached, and he was aqultted through the failure to obtain 
the necessary two-thirds majority in the senate f In case of the 
President's removal from any reason, he is succeeded by the Vice- 
President who is elected at the same time, and is ex-officio 
President of .the Senate, and failing him, formerly by the Speaker
of th- House of Representatives, now toy the Secretary of state.
(1) 
________In the President are vested all the cerennnial privileges
(1) See Constitution. Art. 11. ,,3.9. 2 & 3.
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and duties of the titular head of the nation, and all the executive 
power of the State, with the exception of that portion which Is 
shared by the Senate* His powers may be divided into four groups 9 
concerning foreign affairs, appointments, domestic administration 
and legislation respectirely*
The President represents the nation In foreign affairs, 
receives ambassadors, issues notes to foreign courts and up to the 
point of declaring war or making treaties, he is solely responsible 
for the relations of the United States with foreign countries* Like 
the German Bnperor, the President is COTnmandei^i^-Chlef of the army 
and navy and of the militia of the States when it is employed in 
the service of the tfnited States* The powers of the President in 
foreign affairs resembles Indeed those of the Genaan T^aiperor, but in 
practloe his power has heen much less owing to the remoteness of the 
United States from the centre of international agitation • In ting 
of war, however or during critical periods such as the present the 
President f s power rises to a high level and though he oannot 
actually declare war, he can do a great deal towards hastening or 
delaying Its declaration t or towards rendering peace Impossible. 
Congress alone can declare war, and the consent of two-thirds of the 
Senate Is necessary for the ratification of treaties* Moreover 
the House of Representatives may pass resolutions if it disapproves
(1)* As e.g. President Polk 1845-6* The present situation has 
afforded an excellent opportunity for an exercise of 
presidential power*
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of the direotion in which affaira are tending, and since both war 
and treaties, especially commercial treaties require suplementary 
legislation and financial means, Congres to some extent holds a key 
to the situation* The president therefore has not a free hand, 
trot he may ignore resolutions and though Congress can prevent him
from settling anything t they cannot prevent him from unsettling
(1) • 
everything*
The president possesses large powers of appointment "but he 
shares them with the Senate* *He shall nominate and by and with 
the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, 
ether public ministers and consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court and 
all other officers of the United States whose appointment herein 
are not otherwise provided forj but Congress may by law vest the 
appointment of such inferior officers as it thinks proper in the 
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Depart­ 
ments* 11 The President alone has also the power to fill vacancies 
in the Senate for the duration of the session*
The President and Senate have therefore power to appoint 
to most of the higher offices of the United States* In practice 
the President is given carte blanche in his 0 binet appointments 
whioh the Senate ratifies as a matter of course* similarly, by 
what is known as the 'Courtesy of the Senate*each Senator expects 
to control the offices of his own particular State, and thus secures 
a large patronage by means of which he may reward the members of his
(1). Of. Bryoe 1. p.54. {2). Const. Art 11* S*2. C.2.
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party* A good many of the lower posts of the civil service have 
been removed by legislation from the power of the President, and 
are now filled by competitive examination, but he retains a wide 
patronage which he is expected to exercise in the interests of his
party. Indeed a good deal of his time and energy is consumed in
(1) 
the satisfaction of office-seekers* Although nothing is said in
*
the Constitution on the creation, the President has successfully 
asserted his right to remove from office, and has often abused it 
in the spoils system,
In time of peace t3ie authority of the President in 
domestic administration is small, as this sphere is largely under the 
control of the States. in time of war, however, especially civil 
war, it may rise almost to the power of a dictator* Abraham 
Lincoln, for example, not only suspended the writ of Habeas Corpus oh 
his own authority, but in 1862 and 1864 issued a Presidential 
proclamation declaring the freedom of the slaves in the insurgent 
States. In normal times, the President is entrusted with the 
faithful execution of Federal laws, and It devolves partly upon him 
to maintain a Republican form of Government in each State and to 
interfere in case of the Invasion of a State or, upon request, of 
domestic violence. The employment of Federal troops was ordered 
en the insurection in Rhode Island in 1842, but it was not found
necessary to employ them* They were actually dispatched howeveri '
(1) Lord Bryoe (1.65) relates the story of a friend who meeting 
President Lincoln during the war observed "You look anxious Mr. 
President, is there bad news from the front? "330* answered the 
President, "It isn't the war, it's that postmaster ship at Brownsville 
Ohio."
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to Louisiana in 1873. The President, like the English Crown, 
possesses a remnant of judicial power in his right to grant pardons 
and reprieves, except in cases of impeachment, for offences against 
the TTnited States* AS a mere point of interest, it may be 
observed that the President and all other officers of the Federatiaji 
retain the rights of an ordinary eitiaen in their respective States.,
The President plays an important part in legislation, 
He possesses a right of veto which is comparable to, although not 
the some as, the right of dissent of the English monarch, in whose 
royal image he was created. In praotiee the King has surrendered 
this right f>ut the President exercises his with greater vigour than 
when it was first conferred. He nay reject all bills that come 
up to him from Congress and must return them within ten days with 
his objections* Unless they are re-passed by a two-thirds 
majority of both Houses, they fall to the ground. Thus if the BiB 
is supported by a large majority it may be passed 'over the Present 
Presidents veto 1 , and this is a wiser plan than to allow the 
Executive to delay legislation which may be urgent, by requiring
an interval to elapse between the first and second passing of a
(1) 
bill* The President also makes an Inaugural Speech in Congsess
assembled, and from time to time he sends reports on the state of 
the Union, In case of disagreement between the two Houses, he 
may adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper, and on 
extraordinary occasions he my specially convene both Houses.
(1) As e.g. in the French Constitution cf 1791.
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The President's "veto* differs from the theoretical royal 
"veto* of England, in th--.t the >^;lish Crown is admittedly part of 
the Legislature whereas the President is not* "He is a separate 
authority - the Executive - whom the people, for the sake of 
protecting themselves against abuses of the legislative power, have
i
associated with the Legislature for the special purpose of arresting 
its action by his disapproval1* He is neither chosen by Congress, 
nor responsible to it; he derives its authority independently, from 
popular election* It is this which gives him his strength and 
accounts for the extensive development of the fvet$ f power.
Indeed the ISxecutive authority of the United States 
differs as much from the real as from the nominal Executive of 
"Sngland, and the American President resembles an English Prime 
Minister as little as an English King.
Firstly, the real executive of England - the Cabinet - 
is collective » the executive authority of the United States is not. 
It resides in the President alone. It is true that the President 
possesses what is known as his Cabinet, consisting of Heads of 
eight Departments, who have indeed, owing to the physical limitations
of a mere human being, become rather his colleagues than his
U) 
subordinates* It is also true that the President ohooses his
cabinet from his own party, that he may now dismiss the members if 
he so desires, and what is more, if they do not agree with his polic i
(!)• Bryce American Commonwealth* vol 1. p.67. 
(2). Cf. Wilson Congressional Government, chap. 1.
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*
they usually resiga. Nevertheless no collective responsibilty or 
executive authority exists in the American Cabinet. Bach Minister 
conducts his departaient with little reference to the r< st, and all 
are responsible. to no-ona but the President who hae appointed them.
They resemble rather the group of Ministers which surround a Tear
a (2) 
or/Sultan. The *r*sident alone is constitutionally responsible
for all executive acts, his cabinet is merely an extension and
expression of his own executive authority.
(3) 
The American ftxaoutive is secondly itftii<*3>arliamentary.
Xt is neither chosen by nor cut of the Legislature. Six of Mr* 
Cleveland's Cabinet had never sat in Congress before their 
appointment and neither the President nor any offioer of the TTnited 
States may be members of the legislature after their succession to 
office* This prohibition destroys in consequence the
characteristic feature of an English Cabinet vi*s its
W 
responsibility to Parliament. Tha Cabinet continues in office
until it loses its majority in the House; it then either appeals 
against the Fouse to the electorate or resigns. The American 
Pre8ident y on the other hand, is irremovable except by impeachment 
during his four years of office. He is therefore not responsible 
to the dominant party of the Legislature, whioh cannot abridge his 
tenure of office, nor even reduce his salary t nor to the electorate 
except at the end of his first y^ar of office ?/hen he is seeking re*
, This was not so in the early days of the United States Cf.e.g. 
John Adams and his Cabinet in 1799*
2). Cf. Bryoe American Commonwealth VolJU.p.50 saq.
3). Cf. Dicey Law of The Const, chap 1.& Appendix
4)* Const. Art.l. s.6. o.2. (5). I speak of normal time.?..
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re~eleotloa« Heither he nor hia Cabinet may alt in oithar House 
of Congress f and they may, after the eleotlon of a new House of 
Bepresentatives in the third year of the Presidential term of 
office, be opposed to the party which has a majority in the more 
numerous house of the Legislature* The President is a party man, 
but he la ohosen not by the leading party in the House, b^t by the 
dominant party among the peo&U •
It follows from the separation of the legislature and 
Executive in this manner that neither the President nor his Cabinet 
can Initiate any legislation or support any proposals of their own
U)
in either House* The President muat give Congress information 
from time to time and he often recommends necessary measures» but he 
has no ' power to carry them further by debate in the House* They
(2) 
are merely »shots in the air and may fall wide" In fact the
President has lass influence on the course of positive legislation 
than the Speaker of the House of Representatives* He possesses a 
great though qualified negative power however by sieans of hie right 
of veto*
It is difficult to estimate th^ pcmer of the President , 
as It varies according to his own personal character and the times 
in which he lives. In quiet times it is not great and after the 
American Civil War and up to recent yeare the Presidents themselves
* President Lincoln made one attempt to submit a draft of a 
proposal but this seams to be the only instance - vide 
Congressional globe July 14th 1862.
» Bryoe America* €«w*omrealt3a 1* p.50 eeq.
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have not been men of great calibre* In times of internal trouble 
or foreign disturbances however, the President possesses "an
unfettered initiative by means of ^ich he may embroil the eroiintry(1) abroad or excite passion at home?
The legislature of the United States consists of two H
(2)houses representing the two necessary elements of a Federation. 
The first House - the House of Representatives • represents the 
Federation as a united and single whole , the second - the Senate *» 
as a* collection of independent states, and the proportionate 
strength of these two forces of union and separation bears an 
intimate relation to the respective parts played by the two Houses in
the Single National Legislature.
(3) Th* House of Representatives consists of members
apportioned according to the population of the States in a 
proportion decided by Federal law* It consists At present of
four hundred and thirty fire members f forty- three from Hew York,
(4) thirty-siac from Pe nn sylvan ia, one from Delaware and so on. Members
are chosen by the electors for the most numerous branch of the 
State Legislature; "they must be twenty-five years of ago, citizens
i
of the United States of seven years standing and residents of the 
State from which they are elected? The House is renewed
(1) Bryoe American Commonwealth. 1. (a) See supra Chap. 1. p*i7 sea.(3) wor nualificfttiorifl se« Const" of U.S.A. Art. 1. s.2,(4) See statesman's Year Book 1916.
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integrally every two years, and in practice the old House sits 
and legislates for nearly four months after the new Bepresentatives 
hare been chosen, and may thus in the days of its expiration pass
measures whioh the electors hare virtually condemned at the election
(1) 
of the new House. The American House of Hepresen tat ires differs
essentially from the Knglish Hous® of Commons to whioh superficially? 
it hears a certain ressiablanoe* It is not a defeating body like the 
latter , hut rules through and "by means of its Committees, and this 
is the distinguishing feature cf 'Congressional as opposed to(a)
Parliamentary Government* All legislation except that concerning.
taxation and appropriation is distributed among a number of 
Commit tees i and the unity of the Ciiamb*r is totally destroyed, for 
the House becomes merely a "huge panel from whioh Contittees are 
selected". 7h« Committee system moreover crises debate, gives
•
facilities for the axerciee of oorrupt influences and does not
..cOv .
necessarily provide for the application of the best available talent 
to each law* It enables a good deal of work to be overcome
however and appears at present to be the only way of coping with
(4) 
the ten thousand bills whioh ara introduced on the average every yea*
It is through the Goismittees that the Legislature comes into 
contact with the Executive, and receives from it necessary 
information, The Committees are appointed by the Speaker, and 
this power, together with his membership of the snail Committee whidh.
{!) See Bryoe American Commonwealth Vol.l, ohap.Xlll, 
a) Of* oV Wilson.Congressional Government Ch.l. 
3) Bryoe. American Commonwealth Vol.1. Ch.Xlll. 
'4) Bryoe. ibid.
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shape B the rule* of the House, and with his privilege of "recognising 
on the floor, give* him a position of prominence and of great 
political influence* Unlike the £peafcer of the Hotiae of Commons 
he is a party aanj he ie ohoeen by the dominant party of the 
House, and he ia ejected to benefit his party in the composition 
of the Committee**
The House of Representative* loses much of the 
inflraenee and power of the House of Commons owing to it» failure 
to represent or to affect the Government of the day* It is more 
exclusively a legislative , not as the House of CQszmens, a governing 
body. There are parties* in faot the isfcole administration is one 
huge party machine, "but no party government, no responsibility of
/
the Kstecutive to the dominant party of th«* legislature exists* 
Since the Ixeoutive is not represented in the House, nor allowed 
to initiate a legislative policy, thera are no "Geveraaent 11 Mils 
or "Coverajnent 11 Budgets to be passed* All propositions are, as 
it were, private nwpabers 1 bills; the nearest app»oaeh to a 
"aoverniBent^Bill* is one "breu&ht in hy a leading member of the 
majority in pursuance of a resolution taken in ths Oongreaslonal 
Caucne of that party*, tt ?h8re is no aovermiMint nor opposition j 
neither leaders nor whips* Since no number eits in the House, 
there is no official repreeentativa of the party which for the time 
holds the reins of the T5»ctitive. Heither is there any
unofficial Bepresentative; as far as the mjority has a ohiof , that 
chief is the Speaker •» _____________ 
(1) Bryoe The American Conlnonwealth, Vol.1, ohap.
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The Second House of the Legislature ~ the Senate -
represent* the several states in aqual proportion* It ia oouqpoaed 
at preaent of ninety-six members t consisting of two from each
State who are* ainoe 1913, choaen in nara« and in fact direotly by
(2) 
the people of the Stat^. Erery candidate muat be thirty year a of
age, an inhabitant of the State from which he is chosen, and a 
citizen of the United States of nine yeara atanding. Senators 
are re-eligible for election and in the small States are usually 
re-elected* Bach Senator is choaen for six years, but only one- 
third of the Houae ia renewed at a timei ao that the Senate ia a 
permanent body and ia Influenced leas by popular fluctuations of 
opinion. Lifce the House of Represantativea, it worka through and 
ia lad by ita Oousaltteea*
Baoh Houae decides ita own disputed elections, rul*a of"/I, •
procedure, and snail aaaenfta;e at leaat once a year* The members 
of both Houses are granted freedom of speech andfraaarreat except 
on charge of felony, treaaon or breach of the peaoe, and both 
BepreaantatiTea and Senators receire a salary from the Federal, not 
from the State Treasury. The Houae of RapreaentatiYea haa
•
in addition power to chooae ita own Speaker and other officers, 
The Preaident' of the Senate is ehoaen by the people, for he ia tha 
Vice-President of the United States* He ia therefore an exception 
to the prinoiple of Sanatoria! Membership and haa only the oaating
(1) Constitution of U«S«A* Art.l. s.3
(2) Amendment TV11» 1913.
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and not deliberative voto.
Both Houses together fora the Legislature of the United 
States and are eos8?et<snt to legislate on all natters assigned to 
the Federal Union 4 All laws mint receive tlie President** consent
however, nn-lese they are re-passed over his veto by a two-third*
(2) 
majority. The two Houses possess co-ordinate legislative powers
except that all money bills ra»i»t t in ISnglish fashion, originate i« 
the House of the Representative*, although they may be amended, 
in contrast to Australian practice, by the Senate*
The HOUBQ of the Bepresant&tives poBs^rsee th© Bole 
right of ij^peaehment , but witii this except ion, its powers are 
purely legislative- The Senate however , derives its chief
V
strength from its non-legislative functions*
firstly, it alona may try iicgpeachments. For iagpeaeh* 
men ts are conducted on lines nrich resembling those followed in
Bngland* They are reserved chiefly for political offences, which•
ar© thus r«wnoved from the cognisance of the ordinary Courts. Xo*t 
Senators moreover, have been lawyare and are therefore well 
acquainted with the principles of legal procedure. A two*third« 
majority is necessary for condemnation, and the Senate can inflict 
no punishment. It can only declare the accused r unfit for office 
and l^ave him to be punished by the ordinary Courts for any 
indictable offence he has committed*
Senate possesses no other Judicial powers, it; has no
Constitution of U.S.A. Art.l. s.8 
(21 See ante chap.11. p.81
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appellate functions snch as the ^mis* of Lords and the Bundesrat. 
The Senate, a» already described, shares the Executive 
po-war of the President in matters relating to treaties and
appointments* In the*'* functions it stands alone, a euriens
(!) 
anomaly among Second Chambers, Originally consisting of twenty-six
maiabar® only, it was indeed Intended to reproduce fcfrther the
feat ores of a Governor's Council or Wngliah Privy Council which* -
should restrain and advise the ^xacntive rather than those af the 
Houss of Lords* It hae been praised as the ^Haster-^ieoe of 
Constitution takers , w as the one thoroughly successful institution
t*.' i
which has beers 3&tabllsfhed since the tide of modern democracy
"began to flow* Partly fro*i its l&MKmtiv« and judicial powers,
(3)
and partly frcsra itfj perme^nent character and sinall siie and in
consequence greater corip'Crat^ spirit, it possesses , ooiapared with 
the House of Representatives, which is fiwe times as large and is 
constantly ehan;;ln# f a strength and Influence unknown tc most 
Second CHajatojr*. It- derives no power moreover from an hereditary 
or official character; there i« little difference of political 
or social cojaplexiorj Tsatween the twc Houses, and "both rest upon
election. The Convention which framed the Constitution had five
(3) 
aims in vl$w in their creation of the senate f and they have been all
more or les-* ccwrpletely realised. It stands for the State 
interests and conciliates them by equal representation, it is a
(1) Of .Marriott. Second Chambers* (2) U,8*A. Senate has ninety*six
members, tlis Kouce cf Lords 620, **>4 the P0*noh Senate SOO and 
(3) Bee Federalist, m.- LXV, ( ^he Blmdwa«.. 61
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Council <iuftlifi«d by fiM and experience to ohock and advise th« 
President in the exercise of his executive functions, and it 
an abuse of his power by iB^eaehjaont | It restrain* the papular 
House f and it provides an elemnt of stability in the Government* 
•The Ingltah Constitution IB frame* upon th* principle 
Ohooalng a »insl« aov«reign and making it good g th* American upon 
tli« prinoipla of hairing &any and hoping that thair maltitud* aay 
atone for thair inferiority*. Lord Bryo* «3Q>r««s«» the «an«>
8«ntira»nt whon he »ay» that the Govorraawat of the "United State« inW
t»asad tipon tht phlloaophy of Mont«»<|ui«n and theology of 0alYin*«» 
the theory of tha separation of powers combined with the doctrine of 
original sin. In imitation of *hat was falsely considered th* 
secret of Bngiish freedom, the three "branohes of federal 
the Judioiary, the Legislature and th« Kxecutive * wort made a» 
Independent as possible of aaoh other* The Judges were to 
offioe for life, and Congra*8 and the President to be chosen 
aeparat^ly T»y the people. "Saah how^rer has received power 
sufficient to enable nia to reetjrain the inherent tendencies to 
atonee of tha other two« federal tow determines the organisation 
of th« Coxtrts the President together with the Senate appoints the 
fudgefc and politic**! cases are removed fr«» their sphere and 
conferred on the Senate* Each House of the legislature ie 
restricted by the other and both are restrained by the President's
!l} 0 Bagehot. The English Constitution 2). Bryce* American Commonwealth.
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power of veto* The Presidential txecutlve is limited fcy the 
partielpation of the Second House of the Legislature, and lastly 
the federation and the States on a large scale exercise a mutual 
check upon each other* The whole system is a collection of checks 
and "balances*
The Constitution of the TTnited States is sometimes spoken 
of as if it were a *puddin& made to a recipe" and independent of all 
American experience* Both in its federal nature and in its more 
detailed provisions it is, on the contrary the issue of a
growth as nraeh as the English froverament* The men who framed the
were undoubtedly influenced by Xhglish Institutions,
and 'Pn^iidh Coiamon taw, and in sneh features as th« position of the
*
Courts, and the financial privileges of the •Jxmejr House* the 
American Constitution closely resembles that of the Mother Country* 
nevertheless it waa "based on Colonial rather than on "Hlnglish 
experience, and It was constructed rather on the model of the States 
than of England* The President is an »nlarged Governor, the 
features ^f the Legislature are reproduced from the bl*eameral 
I*egislatiute of man^ of the States, and adapted to a Federation* 
The Constitution itself i» an extension of a St^te Charter* The 
work cf the convention was one of selection rather than of creation, 
and"lti3 smoeess 1« not of invention, "but the success of judgment ,
/
selective wisdom and practical sagacity,*
(1)* Especially by Coiam^nta^iQB such aa
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The history of the United States of America illustrates 
the process of the formation and development of a regular 
federal State. The history of Switzerland is marked by a no 
less certain growth in federation. America, by its size and 
population, its commercial and international importance, in its 
connection with England and British Colonial policy, possesses 
many claims to prominence in the civilized world over the little 
Swiss commonwealth in the heart of western Europe, "but it was 
given the first place in a study of federation chiefly because 
it presents the earliest and closest approximation to the modern 
federal ideal. The American Colonies, inhabited by a people 
who have long boasted of their political genius, and sejarated 
by an interval of distance and time from most of the entanglements 
of European politics, attained rapidly to the maturity of modern 
federalism. The Swiss federation is nearly five centuries older, 
but it remained so much the longer in a rudimentary condition and 
did not become a real federal State until fifty years after the 
formation cf the United States. Its situation in the central 
watershed whence flow rivers of Germany, franee, Italy and Austria 
necessitated an intimate connection with the history cf Kurope, and 
exposed it tc a series of influences which have never directly 
affected America. Modern Switzerland has succeeded to a vast 
historical heritage which has moulded its present form, and 
consequently modified its practical application of the federal
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principle. In their histories must be Bought the eaqplanation 
of the differences between American and Swiss y«deration. lor 
not only do the States of Switzerland possess records of an 
intense local history resembling in some oases that of the Italian 
or ancient Greek City States, but they hare participated also in 
most of the wider experiences of Burop« f from the Roman domination 
of the first century to the French of the Napoleonic era. The 
birth and separation of modem nationalities which issued out of 
the conflict between Roman and Teutonic civilisations, had 
consequences for Switzerland, in view of its situation on the line 
of division, as vital aes for any other Kuropean State. It was 
incorporated in the Impire of Charles the Great and in the revived 
and more German Kmpire of Otto 1* In the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries some of its states took an active part in the struggles 
of Pope and KJmperor, on the side of the latter; in the fifteenth 
the Confederation aided Louis XI in the destruction of the middle 
Burgundian Kingdom of Charles the Bold, and in the sixteenth they 
shared in the victories and defeat of Jrancis 1 in Italy. Although 
Luther repudiated the doctrines of Zwingli, the religious movement 
which the latter reformer inspired in Switzerland is only an 
important expression of the wider European movement of the 
Reformation. The influence of the Counter-Peforaation was 
equally active in tha formation of the Borromean League and in the(r
alliance of the Roman Catholic Cantons *lth Spain. Switzerland
(1) Von Ranke. History of the Popes. Vol. 1. p*510
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like Europe had its religious wars, ending in a settlement 
essentially similar to that of the Peace of Augsburg; it had its 
aristocracies and peasant risings*
After the defeat of the Swiss armies at Marignano in
1515 and more especially after the confirmation of Swiss
/
independence in 1648, the Confederation began to withdraw from 
active participation in European conflicts and to adopt that 
policy of neutrality which it has since more or less pursued. 
In its persistence in this course it plays a role in modern 
ISurope for which it is by its geographical situation eminently 
fitted, and, to a limited extent, may be considered,to inherit 
the position of that middle Kingdom of Burgundy the aastern 
portion of which it now includes within its territory. Nevertheless 
although the Confederation from this time began to prefer 
officially an attitude of neutral independence, its soldiers, who 
had won renown for their military prowess, were hired as
mercenaries by foreign countries right into the nineteenth
(2) 
century. It was the Swiss Guards of the TAileries who were
«
massacred by the Trench mob in 1789. Moreover, even the official 
neutrality was strongly modified by the acceptance in the 
eighteenth century of what was almost a Trench suzerainty.* A 
small but significant expression of this dominance is contained in
(1). See Treeraan. Historical Geography Vol. 1.
(2). Prohibited by the Constitution of 1848 .
97 
Chapter 111,
the substitution of the Trench word "canton" for the German word 
"0rt» hitherto applied to a Confederate state. This Trench 
influence may be said to culminate in the democratic risings in 
1798 and in the formation of the Helvetic Republic. With the 
rest of Europe, Switzerland felt the will of Napoleon and shared 
in the reconstruction of Europe on hid fall. The events of 1830 
and 1348 in Trance found an echo in Switzerland as in other 
countries but from this time Switzerland confirmed still more 
strictly her neutrality, which was now guaranteed by the Powers, 
and withdrew herself to a still greater seclusion. Thus 
Switzerland has the appearance in many ways of a Europe in 
miniature, for most of the greater European upheavals have left
a deposit in Switzerland* s
The Swiss Cantons have attained Tederal unity by a 
slow and somewhat fortuitous process during prolonged historical 
association. There is no such thing as a Swiss nation in any 
but the political sense , and in that only from the fourteenth 
century. The cities and rural communities of which it is 
composed were until the end of the thirteenth century separate 
bodies, connected with each other in no other way than by a 
common allegiance to the Emperor. Tor, together with Germany 
and the greater part of Italy, the states of Switzerland all formed 
part of the Holy Roman Empire, and most of them were included
within the administrative district of the lesser Duchy of Burgundy
Tl). The Swiss do not in anyway"represent" tne tribe of ike————— 
Xelvetii of Caesar's time.
(2). See Map. Appendix 11.
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Cities such as Zurich and Basle won, in common with many other 
cities in the Empire, the privilege of n Reiohsfreiheit" or 
direct dependency on the Kmpire and, especially after the extinctiai 
of the Burgundian Ducal House of Zaringen, the same favour 
was extended by imperial grant to rural communities such as 
Schwyz and, in a modified form to Uri. Many parts, however, 
such as Unterwalden, Lucerne, Aargau, still retained the double
*
feudal relation of an indirect dependence on the Emperor and an 
immediate subordination to a local ecclesiastical or temporal 
lord. The significance of the connection of the Swiss Cantons 
with the Empire lies in the fact that the cause and object of the 
formation of the League was the endeavor to preserve or obtain 
this privilege of Heiohsfreiheit or immediate dependence on the 
, against the aggressions of local counts, particularly
of the Count of Habsburg* Somewhat in the manner of Prussia 
in later timis, the House of Habsburg aimed at connecting up, 
by the conquest or purchase of intervening territories, its 
original possessions at the Junction of the Aar and the Reuss with 
those in the Tyrol, more recently acquired with th^ Dukedom of 
Austria. It was to the frustration of this purpose that the 
first permanent League of the Three forest Cantons was formed 
in 1291. In consequence, many wars were waged with Austria
(1). This is the real object and attainment of their League but 
the alliance of the Three Torest Cantons in 1291 seems to be* 
little more than a mere League for self-protection "propter 
maliciam temporis" - see Text of alliance 1291.
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(1) 
during the fourteenth and fifteenth oenturies but by the middle
of the latter century the confederates, who had in the meantime 
been joined by other states, may be said to have attained the 
position of immediate dependence on the "rapire, to the exclusion 
of all claims of Austria. The Dukes of Austria had, however, 
often worn the Imperial Crown and the connection had the double 
effect of causing rival candidates to the Katpire to encourage 
the growth of Swiss independence, and also of weakening tha 
prestige of the Imperial name in the eyes of the Confederates 
themselves. Moreover with the actual decline of the Imperial 
Power a position of immediate dependence meant practical 
exemption from all authority whatever. When therefore in 1499 
the Emperor Maximilian in accordance with his legal right imposed 
a tax upon the Confederates in common with the rest of the Empire, 
the Swiss asserted claims to complete independence and successfully 
resisted him* The confirmation of the independence and 
sovereignty of the Confederation in 1648 was therefore merely 
the public recognition of a fact already accomplished for noro 
than a hundred years. Like the Netherlands at the other end of 
Germany, though, in a different manner, the Swiss Confederates had 
gradually broken away from an original dependence on, and 
connection with, the Empire.
The Confederation however has reached its present form 
and numbers only by a very gradual and slow development , or
(1). See Chronological Tablo. Appendix 1 3.
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rather by a Ion- series of developments stretching over five
(1) 
centuries. In its earliest condition it was merely a League
of the three Forest Communities of peasants on the borders of 
Lake Lucerne. These "Urkantone", the original cantons have 
formed the soul of the Confederacy and it is to them and around 
them that later members have adhered, and the significance of
their position has been recognised in the adoption of the name
(2) 
and colours of one of them - Schwys - by the whole Confederation
;
The three Forest Cantons remained alone for forty years however, 
until in 1332 Lucerne Joined them. Twenty years after the 
important city of Zftrich and within the next two years three 
other States were added to them. Tor one hundred and thirty 
years no new members were admitted to the League, and then their 
number rose rapidly to thirteen during, the next twenty years. 
This number of full members was preserved without alteration for 
over two hundred and eighty years down to the Revolution of 1798, 
and the Confederation expanded only by means of alliances and 
conquests. These allied (Zugewandte Orte) and subject states 
were united with thirteen governing states in the Helvetic 
Republic and on its dissolution were formed, in 1803 into six,
(1). See Table, Appendix 1A.
(2). Not officially however until nineteenth century, in 
practice from middle of fifteenth century. Until this time the 
nameHConfederatesHgidgenowren11 whence 'Huguenots 1 $ oath-bound 
was in common use.
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and in 1814 into nine, sovereign Cantons e<iual in position to 
the original thirteen. It is these Cantons which constitute 
the Romance elements of the present I ederal State, All the 
governing members of the Confederation were Germanic, and its 
first connection with Romance lands was in the way of conquest 
or protection. There were no sovereign States other than 
German until the Act of Mediation,
The Confederation moreover was only one of many similar 
leagues which were formed in Italy and in Germany during the 
ohaotic times of the decline of the Imperial power. The 
success of the Confederates against Austria at Morgarten in 
1315 or at Sempaoh in 1386 has points of resemblance to that of 
the Italian Republics against Frederick Barbarossa at Legnano in 
1171. The Swiss Confederation or as it was called the Old 
League of High Germany had connections with Mtthlhausen, Rothweil 
and other towns of the Swabian League. The League of 1291 
itself which is usually considered as the origin of the 
Confederation was only the renewal of former Leagues which had 
lapsed. Unlike the League of Hansa Towns, the Old High 
German League did not depend on trade for it» existence and was 
not therefore affected by the opening of new trade routes. Unlike 
other leagues too, it consisted of rural and civic communities 
and it had the additional great advantages of a continuous 
territory and mountain defences. The Swiss Confederation 
however was not without civil wars, such as the one between 
Zftrich and Schwyz in 1460 or the religious wars of the sixteenth
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and seventeenth centuries, though they did not permanently destroy 
the Confederation.
Nevertheless the preservation of Swiss unity for so long 
a period is extraordinary in the light of the failures of similar 
Leagues, for, down to 1798, th'j Confederation was only a very loose 
assembly of sovereign States. Its very looseness seems to have 
been its salvation. The members were not all of one kind, there 
were aristocratic cities like Zurich and Berne and rtral democracies 
like Schwya, and though all the members were allied to the Torest 
Cantons, they were not, until quite late in the history of the 
Confederation, all allied to each other. They occupied different 
positions even within the League itself. There was no uniform 
basis of membership to which all members had to subscribe; the terma 
of admittance were very different for powerful cities like Zfcrich 
and small rural cantons such as 0 larva.* The only law of the 
Confederation consisted of the separate treaties which the Members 
made with each other and the common chatters and conventions which 
from time to time some or all of them drew up together» They di 
not even all participate in the common undertakings of the 
Confederacy, and two or three frequently carried on war in the 
name of the Confederation. Moreover the so-called common domains 
were not common to th« whole Confederation but were held in 
subjection sometimes only by two or three members.
The only Federal machinery was a Diet which represented
(1). See Table. Appendix 1.
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the members and was held once a year at Basle and on other occasions 
in other places. It conducted the rudimentary judicial procedure 
of the Confederation , by m^ans of its power of federal intervention 
or mediation in disputes between the Cantons, It received the 
the reports of the bailiffs of the common domains and possessed 
a wide sphere of legislative activity. It directed foreign 
affairs, dispatched embassies and concluded treaties, though its 
power was limited by the right which some of the more powerful 
members retained of forming separate alliances. It appointed
frontier forces and defences, and after the system of the
(1)
•Defensionale* had been adopted it assessed the quota of troops
which each canton should contribute. It reflated trade and had 
regard to *•)«*<*«•-»»* public health and morals. It passed 
resolutions against vagrants, beggars, thieves and tinkers, as well 
as concerning the isolation of persons suffering from infectious 
diseases and the stoppage of traffic during prevalent epidemics; 
it prohibited swearing and indecent clothing} it issued orders for 
the repairs of the main roads of the Confederation, and its consent 
was necessary for the raising of all tolls or the introduction of 
new ones, and it frequently made arrangements on matters of coinage.
T<!ven religious questions were sometimes dealt with by the federal
(2) 
Diet.
In spite of its wide power of passing resolutions it had 
little authority. The delegates could only act according to their 
instructions and failing these, they were unable to conclude any 
definite business, but were oompellaA to r»r«r-
In practice the system failed.* (2) Cf. Amtliche Ahscheide.
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back to their respective States for acceptance. Moreover the 
resolutions which were passed were carried out or not "by the 
gtates according to their individual inclinations. Decrees 
were issued such as the one in 1515 declaring that the minority 
should be "bound "by the decisions of the majority, but they 
remained unexecuted. Tor the Swiss Central Diet shared the 
common weakness of most rudimentary Confederations^ there was 
no executive machinery. It had no power what jv«r of enforcing 
its enactments, no officers, nr judiciary and no federal array; 
there was no public treasury or national mint, aeKBly a central 
intermittent assembly of powerless delegates who passed 
resolutions which they were unable to make binding upon the 
Cantons.
The Confederation continued in this form with 
temporary ruptures down to 1798. In that year the subject 
states who had revolted under the influence of Trench nomocracy 
were liberated and added to the existing Confederated States. 
The whole was formed into One Single and Indivisible Helvetic 
Republic, with a two-chambered legislature and a Directory of five. 
The Cantons were deprived of their separate independence and 
formed into administrative departments of the Republic, and 
governed by prefects appointed by the Directory. It was the 
first time that the Confederation had possessed real unity and 
state machinery, but they were opposed to its inherent centrifugal 
force? and ware moreover associated with the arms and plunder of 
a foreign conqueror. They were resisted by all but the
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liberated States, until in 1803 Napoteon himself intervened and 
established a compromise by the 'Act of Mediation 1 . The subject 
states were formed into six new Cantons, and certain French 
democratic principles 7'ere proclaimed, but the old Cantonal 
sovereignty and the old Federal Diet in a modified form and 
with greater powers, were restored, and the Cantons themselves 
reverted to such aristocratic features of former times as guilds 
and patricians. In 1815 on the fall of Napolean the 
Confederation by the 'Federal Pact 1 restored still further 
pre-revolutionary conditions,and the neutrality of the 
Confederation was guaranteed by the powers on condition of 
maintenance of cantonal sovereignty. Nevertheless the 
emancipation of the subject states was confirmed and the memory 
and experience of union and of effective governmental machinery 
remained.
for over thirty years the federal Pact formed the 
sole federal connection of the Cantons* This connection was 
shaken in 1830 by internal democratic risings in the Cantons and 
finally dissolved by the war of the Sonderfcund in 1847. The 
success of the party of union however secured the establishment 
in 1848 of the first native federal State. The movement was 
opportune for neighbouring countries were engaged in suppressing 
internal disturbances. Even in this form the federation was 
far from realising a mature federalism such as that of the 
United States. Nevertheless the central Federal authority
V
constituted a real state with a legislature and executiv , and
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the important revision of 1874 and subsequent amendments hare 
proceeded much further along th<? Line of closer federal Union. 
The unification and consolidation of Italy and Germany hav* ' 
presented mor** forcibly to Switzerland her disunion and 
weakness and hare prompted her to entrust more and more power 
to the Federal Authority, nntil at the present day she affords 
an interesting variation of a we Undeveloped, centralized, 
federal State.
The history of Switzerland, though differing
*
fundamentally in many respects from that of the United States 
of America resembles it in the fact that both countries passed 
through a preparatory period of Confederation. A further 
resemblance may be traced in the civil wars which preceded the 
formation of closer union in the one and the establishment of 
the principle of permanent unity in the other. Religion In 
the war of the Sonderbund played a constitutional part 
essentially similar to that played by slavery in the war in 
America between the North and South. And in her present 
Constitution Switaerland was consciously influenced by the 
example of the United States. The two Federations differ 
however according to their different circumstances. Switzerland, 
like Greece, possesses natural features which divide hnr 
territory into many valleys and oaus« her population to be 
separated into small and isolated communities, more especially 
before the Introduction of modern means of locomotion. No
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physical factor suggests unity; Schaffhausen lies north of the 
Rhine t Ticino is situated south of the Alps. The greater part 
of her inhabitants are German in race and sp*®ch, but there is 
a large French minority;'one Canton is wholly Italian, and within 
the valleys of the Grisons are to be found the last remains of 
the Pomansch raoeand speech. Federal official documents are
published in Italian, ?-Yencii, and German, and the last two
(2) 
languages are officially spoken in the federal Assembly. Unity
is still further hindered by religious divisions, which do not, 
however coincide with racial differences, All thes^ elements 
of disunion make Switzerland more suited to a federal than a 
Unitary GovernAamt but they create difficulties which America 
almost entirely escaped.
The Swiss-Federal State consists of twenty two sovereign 
cantons* Of these three have separated'into two half-cantons, 
thus making twenty five divisions in all. In Cantonal votes on 
ammendments to the Constitution however, a half-canton possesses 
only half a vote, and it is represented by only one member in the
(IK Incidents during the present war have revealed the existence 
of a wide divergence of view between the two races* Both 
sections are however united by a common desire to preserve their 
neutrality and independence, though the Trench an4 German Swiss 
each fear its violation by Germany and France respectively*
*
(2), It is presumed that Italian members understand one or 
the other.
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(1) 
Council; of States. The object of thair union is declared
to be th« insurance of the independence of the country against 
foreign nations, the maintenance of internal tranquillity and 
order, the protection of the liberty and rights of the meirfbers 
and the promotion of their common welfare. . Their purpose 
is reminiscent of the preamble to the Constitution of the 
United States. Like the States of the large American ?ed«Taticn 
the Cantons of Switzerland have retained the principle of
sovereignty and independence except when it is expressly
(*)
surrendered to the federal Government. " The Cantons are
sovereign, so far as their sovereignty is not restricted ̂ fey the
Tederal Constition, and as such they may exercise all rights
which are not delegated to the Federal Power 1*. They are
prohibited from forming alliances or treaties of a political
(5) 
character either with eaoh other or with foreign countries.
An interesting survival of the old times of Confederation however, 
is expressed in the exception to this rule, which still permits 
the Cantons to make agreements with one another on subjects 
pertaining to legislation, justice and administration, and
in exceptional cases to enter into treaties with foreign countries
(4) 
concerning matters of public econorsy, of vicinage and of police.
Such treaties however must not contain anything contrary to the
(1). Preamble and Art.2, Constitution of 1874. 
(?.). Art. 3
(3). Art. 7
(4). Arts. 7 & 9.
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Union or the rights of the Cantons and must Tie submitted to the
Federal authority which may assist their execution or forbid it
4
if these rights are violated. Ho canton may maintain more than 
three hundred permanent troops without the permission of the
federal Government nor may it arm in ease of a dispute with
U) 
another Canton. All Cantons are required to extend the
legislative and judicial rights of their own citizens to oltiaens 
of other Cantons, mutually to respect and enforce validity of each
other*s<eivil judgments and to render mutual aid in case of
(3) 
attack in accordance with Federal directions. Ho Canton may
expol a Cantonal citison from its territory or deprive him of 
citizenship. All internal taxes on property leaving one Canton
for another and all rights of first purchase of citizens of one
(4) 
Canton against those of another ara also abolished* Finally
the Cantons must submit all disputes to the Federal authority
(5) 
and obtain from it a guarantee of their constitutions.
In certain matters, the rights of individuals are 
guaranteed by the Constitution and certain prohibitions are 
placed on both Cantonal and Federal authorities. A common 
citizenship is declared and the equality of all Swiss before 
the law. "In Switzerland there shall be no subjects t nor any
(1) Arts. 13 & 14. (2) Arts. 60 & 61.
•
(3) Art. 44. (4) Art. 
(5) Arts. 6 & 14.
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(1) privileges of place, birth, fanily or person." This clause is
directly oopiod from the Act of Mediation and ia a significant 
tribute to the influence of the French devolution. Every Swiss 
citizen who enjoys all the right R and privileges of Cantonal 
citizenship shall be capable of voting at federal Elections but 
he raay not exercise these rirhts in more than one Canton, and
each Canton raay determine certain regulations as to length of(2^ settlement and property rights* Freedom of faith and conscience
is declared inviolable; no citizen shall be deprived of civil 
rights in respect of his creed or forced to pay taxes for the
»uj»jport of a religious society of which he disapprove*. Butviwws 
religious/shall not absolve him from the performance of civil\3) 
duties. The free exercise of religion is permitted within the
limits of morality and public order with the exception that the 
Society of Jesuits and any other allied society are absolutely 
prohibited within Swiss territory. The establishment of new
or the restoration of old monasteries is likewise forbidden and
(4) no bishopric may be founded without federal approval. Marriages
between m^mb^rs of different churches are declared valid and(5) 
legal. freedom of the press is guaranteedi though the Cantons
ars permittad, with the approval of the Jaderal authority to
(6) provide against ita abuse* Exceptional Courts and ecclesiastical
(1). Art. 4 UK Art. 43
(3). Art. 49 (4). Arts. 50, 51, & 5S
(5). Art .54 (6). Art. 55
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jurisdiction are abolished, and no citi»en shall b« deprived of
.(1) 
his "Constitutional jndge". The right of citizens to petition
and to form associations is recognised and fre« emigration to
(2> 
foreign states is allowed as far as it is reciprocal. Imprisonment
for debt, corporal punishments and sentences of d«ath for
(3) 
political offences are abolished* finally, military capitulation
or agreements to furnish soldiers to foreign countries are 
absolutely forbidden to both cantonal and federal governments , 
and the establishment sof gaming houses is likewise prohibited
(4)
throughout the Confederation.
The powers of the Cantons are however further restricted 
and in the most important respect by the powers which they have 
surrendered and delegated to the common T e deral Government, 
The union has the sole power to declare war and to conclude peace, 
to enter into alliances, especially customs and commercial treaties- 
with the exception already mentioned- and to conduct relations 
with foreign countries, It alone may legislate on the military 
defences of the Union and the disposition and organisation of the 
army. It is forbidden however to maintain a standing army, 
The army of Switzerland consists of th*> small permanent contingents 
of the Cantons and of A citiaen militia,for all Swiss citizens are 
subject to military s rvice* To the federal Government is glvan
(1). Art. 58 (2). Arts. 5'?, 56 *• 62
(:<). Arts. 59 & 65 (4). Arts. 11 & 35
(5). See Arts. 19,20; 8,10,28-52,3^ t38-40,64.
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exclusive po *r to coin money, iBsme ban!-' notes, regulate weights 
and measures and control postal and telegraphic services. 
Customs and duties r,re assigned to the ?edera3 gov^rnm^nt. subject 
to certain general principles. *>f inter-Cantonal free tradi , the 
protection of home manufactures and low taxation of imported 
necessities an 1 ra^r material. It has supreme control of affairs 
involving tha extradition of criminals ->ith^r fron i;h^ &onfe deration 
or from eaoh Canton, copyrights, "bankruptcy and patents including
the whole rango of commercial law, and it is given a monopoly of
(1>
the manufacture afid sale of war powder and spiritous liquors,
though th'3 sale of absinthe is <>ow forbidden throughout the
(2) 
Confederation* *?ith the exception of the monopoly of the
gunpowder and spirits similar powers are possessed by the federal 
governments of tho United f' tales, but the Bwiss Pectoral authority 
exercises inany additional powers. It may legislate on the 
construction and management of railways; it aaay pass uniform laws 
concerning marriago, civil capacity^heiinatlosat" or IOBS of 
domic ilf , and the forfeiture* of i olitioal rights; concerning the
•
employment of children in factories, hours of work for adults, the 
protectior of employees in dangerous occupations; concerning
epidemics and episc&tl&s and wid* -spread diseases such as tuber -
(P 1 ) (4) 
It may also adopt regulations as to the game laws.
It may create a federal University or establish or assist other 
educational iBititutions or undertake other public wrorks at the
(1). Art. 41 and Ainmendraent of Art. 32 Oct. 25th 1885.
(2). Aramendment 1908. ^ (3). Arts. 34,64,54.26,& 6
(4). Art. 2 r >
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expense of the Confederation, and for this purpose it may exercise 
the right of expropriation on payment of compensation. It 
supervises the provision of education fcy the Cantons and may take 
measures against those nantons which do not satisfactorily 
confdrm to its regulations and it shall provide means for the 
granting of certificates: for t i« exercise of the liberal (r
professions, which shall Tie valid throughout the Confederation . 
I? inally the federal authority is given a general supreme super­ 
vision over the water and forest police measures in the mountains,. 
over the roads and "bridges in whos^ maintenance the Union may 
have an interest, and over the business of emigration agents, 
insurance companies and lotteries. It is empowered generally 
to look after the internal and external welfare, safety and
prosperity of the federation, and the preservation of the rights
(«l 
its citizens.
The Swiss Constitution , like that of the United 
States assigns to the Tederal Government enumerated powers, and 
leaves to the Cantons the nnenumerated indefinite authority. 
The actual division differs very much however in the two countries, 
The American Constitution lays down certain general principles, 
and assigns certain "broad spheres of activity to the Federal 
authority, leaving much to later Tederal legislation. The 
Swiss constitution encroaches on the domain of legislation, and 
contains a nurafeer of miscellaneous provisions which are rather
(1). Arts.'23 & 27. (2). Arts. 34,35,24,37,1? & Passim.
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within.the legislative than the constituent realm. The federal 
Government is given duties and powers on matters of special 
interest which would only be possible in a Tederation as small as 
Switzerland. Federal sovereignty makes itself f*?lt in numerous 
matters throughout the Confederation, such as foreign relations, 
the army, public works, weights and measures, means of communicant*! 
and locomotion, customs, public instruction and social and factory 
legislation. In fulfilment of its powers or In accordance 
with authority subsequently conferred "by amendments, the Federal 
GoTurnmont has established a national Bank and passed a Federal
Insurance Bill in 1908 which practically converts insurance
< 1} 
against accidents into a vederal monopoly. It has received
additional powers to pass laws relating to trades and professions
(2) 
and the utilisation of hydraulic powers. Although no Federal
University has yet "been created, it controls entirely the 
Polytechnic School at Ztirich and subsidises institutions of 
higher education in the Cantons, and in accordance with its
power* to legislate concerning railways, it has nationalised most
(3) 
of the railway communications in Switaerland. Moreover the
Constitution requires that all Cantons shall submit their Cantonal 
Constitutions and in practice each amendment to the federal 
Government, which is bound to guarantee them if they contain 
nothing contrary to the 4«-the-provisions of the federal
(1). Annual Register 1908. (2). Amendments 1908
(3). Small mountain and local lines still remain in private hands
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Constitution, if they provide for the exercise of political rights 
according to Republican - either democratic or representative - 
forms, and if they have T&een accepted fcy the people and can "be 
revised whenever an absolute majority of the citis^ns demand 
The tTnion moreover guarantees to the Cantons their territory, their 
sovereignty within the limits defined in the Constitution, the
constitutional rights of the citizens and th* rights and privileges
(2) 
which the people may have conferred upon their public authorities.
The maintenance of this guarantee has given the federal authorities
certain powers of interference which have even fceen exercised in
(3) 
favour of individuals against the Cantons themselves* It
possesses greater powers "fey virtue of article sixteen of the 
Constitution, In case of internal disorder in a Canton the federation 
is "bound to come to its aid on appeal "Hut if the Cantonal
^
authority is unafcle to ask help, the federal authority raay interfere 
on its own initiative and if the safety of Switzerland fee endangered 
it shall to© its duty to do so. In this case and in case of any 
foreign at&acl- federal troops shall have free passage through 
Cantonal territory. In this the federation possesses a power
which may "be an opportunity for great interference on the part of
(4) 
the federal Authority and a source of annoyance to the Cantons,
The activity of the Tederal Council during the present war indicates
(1). Art. 6 (2). Art. 5 ( 3 |. Se4 towell 11. p.186
(4). e.g. The threatened arrival of German troops to suppress 
strikes in Jrenoh Swit«erland}»s recently aroused considerable 
resentment*
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"both the extensiv«ness and ths elasticity Of the Federal Power. 
It commanded the mobilisation of the forces, prohibited dispensible 
commodities and established an Import Trust to regulate the supply oi 
imports and e^qporte from and to the "belligerent countries| it 
regulated the deficiencies of grain and created almost a federal 
wheat monopoly. In accordance with an order which came into 
force in July 1915, it has received power over individuals whc 
violate Swiss official neutrality; it has established a oensorship 
of the press, and taken measures to repress espionage. It has 
regulated the relation of debtors and creditors by enabling payments 
to be deferred in order to avert a financial crisis. To lessen 
unemployment it has made arrangements with workmen and employers 
whose trades were affected by the situation. It had specially to 
supplement the stock of silver coin, and to issue notes and 
Treasury Bonds of five t t«n, twenty, twenty-five and forty francs.
It has cremated a loan Bank and contracted two federal loans of
(1) 
twenty~fiv3 and forty million francs respectively. Lastly, to meet
the cost of mobilisation it has for the first time imposed a war
tax on all fortunes over ten thousand francs and incomes over two
(2) 
thousand five hundred francs* Indeed during the present war the
federal Government has received an increase of powers which makes itf
»
authority felt still further throughout the Confederation.
Although the federal Government possesses wide legislative
(1). See Annual Register 1914 } . 376 & 1915 p. 267.
(2). Annual Register 1915 p* 267.
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and supervising powers, the greater part of the government of 
each Canton is ii- the harida of Cantonal authorities who possess 
also vast discretionary powers even in auch matters a:: education 
and religion which ar« placed under the general control of the 
federation* Primary instruction is obligatory and gratuitous 
and independent of religious creed, tout the nature and extent of t|r« 
curriculxiia, the salaries of teachers and the gw.al organisation 
of elementary and higher education "belongs to the Cantons t who 
receive a grant from the Confederation only in res: ect of 
institutions of higher learning. Similarly there is n* federal 
State Church and violation of freedom of conscience is punishable 
"by the Confederation, but an;- Canton way interfere with the services 
of worshiper a whose proceedings endanger public ord^r, and may 
establish any Cantonal religion. In fact, Geneva alone, and onljr 
from 1907, has no Cantonal "Established Church. Borne Cantons 
have one, some two and Neuwkatel has avsn threa established 
religions. Protestantism, Roman an$ what is called, Christian 
Catholicism.
Moreover the Cantons possess great power from the fact 
that to them is entrusted the execution of federal laws. for 
though the Swiss federal Government has been entrusted with wider 
legislative powers than Congress, it possesses much srmller 
executive authority* The United States has been given executive 
powers to carry out its legislative decrees ^hich it therefore
(1). The Christion Catholics resemble the old Catholics of Germany.
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executes by means of its own officers. It taxes him through its 
own officers and judges him through its own courts and magistrates. 
The states and the federation work independently in different 
spheres, but both have the power of coming into direct relations 
with the individual citizen . The Swiss federation however is 
marked by greater legislative centralisation and greater 
administrative decentralisation. The Federal Government has f^w 
officers of its own but employs Cantonal authorities to execute 
its decrees. Foreign affairs, postal and telegraphie services t 
the administration of the Polytechnic School, yederal arsenale, 
and the powder and spirits monopoly are conducted by federal officeal
but apart from these th« Federal Government has scarcely any direct
buf> 
T^lxecutive functions/' act s by way of inspection and supervision.
The federal legislature passes the necessary measures but cantonal
(1^ 
authorities carry out most of them*
The army itself is not entirely under Federal Control. 
The American Federation is distinguished by its small standing 
army, the Swiss federation has no standing army at all. The only 
permanent troops are the three hundred which each Canton is 
allowed to maintain. In time of war, of course, these troops 
and the citizen militia and all military resources are placed under 
the exclusive control of the federal Government, and in time of 
peace all laws affecting military organisation , the disposal,
(IKSee Loweii rtovernm nts and Parties in ^urop^; VQ! 11. 1*55 
Adams ^ Cunningham. The Swiss Confederation, Chapter 11. 
See also Constitution. Art. 64
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equipment and arming of the troops emanate from the federal
(1) 
legislature. This "body appoints t oo the general staff and the
Commander in chief, "teut officers "beneath ths rank of Captain are 
still appointed T»y Cantonal authorities subject to general 
federal regulations as to qualifications and training* The Union 
regulates the composition of the army as far as possible on the
H
territorial system, its training and arming, "but the actual 
raising of the units and the maintenance of their numbers are in 
the hands of the Cantons. These too Provide the clothing, uniform
and subsl stance of the tjroops for which they are suTssectuently
(2) 
reimbursed by the federation which also compensates families who
have lost Aembers in federal wars* It is said that the coat of a 
soldier belongs to his Canton and his rifle to the federation* 
The Cantons also take the necessary steps to prevent the evasion
of military service and collect the fine for exemption, half of
(3) 
which goes to the federal and half to the Cantonal Exchequer*
Until very recently the federation had no power of direct 
taxation* In June 1915 this power was conferred upon it and
accepted fey the people "by a majority of over four hundred thousand
(4) 
a majority hitherto unknown In federal voted* Part of this tax
was paid Tiaok to the Cantons in proportion to the amount raised
(5) 
within their respective areas* Until this year the only direct tax
(1). See Constitution Arts. 18-22 and Military Law of 1907. 
Lowell 11. p. 185.
(2). Adams and Cunningham. f:hap. XI. (3) p.id,
(4). Annual Register 1915. p. 267.
(5). See Gazette de Lan gamin »c an ton Vaftdois 2 Mars 1917.
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which the Confederation may be said to have levied was the fine
which it substitute* for military service and even this is collected
^ 
T»y l&as Cantonal authorities. ' The Confederation levies no stamp
duties. Tederal revenues* are in fact derived from customs(3) 
duties, national iroperty, posts and telegraphs, railways, half
the exertion fines and powder monopolies. The entire net 
proceeds of the alcohol monopoly are divided among the Cantons on 
condition that one «t- nth of their receipts is spent in confoatting 
the causes and effects of alcoholism. This is interpreted 
"broadly and the mon .y is used "by the Cantoris for various kinds of 
charitable institutions. If the income of the Tederal Government
Is not sufficient, contributions may fee levied upon the Cantons in
(4! 
proportion to their taxable capacity.
The decisions of the federal Courts depend also upon the 
Cantons for their execution. The Federal Tribunal, unlike the 
supremv Court of the United States, does not possess its own
/
magistrates, and system of inferior Courts f Taut depends upon the
Tedoral council which employs Cantonul machinery for the
(5) 
enforcement of its judgments.
The £wi*s T«deration does not even possess a district 
such as the district of Columbia or a capital such aa Washington 
over which it has exclusive and absolute control, . The Federal
(1). Adams and Cunningham. Chap. 2. ( Year Book
(2). For statement of ?$ders.l accounts see Switzerland.Statesmanls
(3). Receipts from posts and railways are rapidly increasing every 
year. (4). Art. 4?, 'Amendment 1885. 
(s). nee Lowell 11. 185. A.?; C. V & X . ^inoheal^r Swiu ~ 
P. 114.
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Capital after many wanderings was finally fixed at Berne, and this 
difference between the position of the capitals of the two countries 
is a curious and significant indication of greater differences. 
The American Capital is independent of any State and under the 
direct administration of the Tederal authorities. The Swiss 
Dederal headquarters are established in the chief seats of 
prominent Cantons, for the Assembly and Council are located at 
Berne, while the sessions of the Tribunal are held at Lausanne in 
Trench Switzerland, With a similar purpose of conciliating 
powerful interests, thebranekes of the German federal Government 
are at Berlin and Leipsig respectively but the Tederal Government 
at Berne is not connected with the Canton in the same way as the 
Prussian and German Governments are at Berlin*
Since the federation possesses no executive power over 
the Individual it may well be asked how the Tederal decrees are 
enforced and what coercive machinery there exists for compelling 
a refractory'Canton* The Tederal Council has pover to summon 
offenders before a special Tederal jury convened' f ad hoc 1 . This
is a very expensive process and is avoided if possible by
(1) 
submission. The Federal Government may further proceed to withheld
the subsidies due from the Tederal Ch«st to a Canton for local
(2) 
purposes, and ultimately it sends troops into the rebellious Canton,
who "do not pillage, burn or kill, but are peaceably quartered there
1). Adams. The Swiss Confederation chap.IV,
2). Ibid.
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at the expense of the Canton-and literally eat/into submission. 
This is certainly a novel way of enforcing obedience to the law 
but with the frugal Swiss it is very effective* It is interesting 
from its resemblance to the German method of federal Execution" 
and is the only method yet devised of enforcing authority when the
judicial power is Imperfectly developed. In the case of Ticlno
(2)
In 1884 the mere threat of adopting this process was sufficient to
inspire a prompt obedience but were a Canton to remain obdurate 
and to take steps forcibly to oppose the ingress of Federal troops, 
the ultimate issue must depend on the fortune of war* Owing to 
the peculiar circumstances of Switzerland however, peaceful means 
have hitherto been sufficient, and a method which in the United 
States could hardly be anything but a failure, has worked well. 
In the first place the Cantons are very small, not only absolutely 
but relatively they are much smaller than the States of America. 
An area of not much more than fifteen thousand square miles is 
divided ftinong twenty-two Cantons, while only forty»elght States 
share the three million square miles of America. Tor this reason 
the presence of the Swiss federation is felt jmich more even by the 
outermost States than that of the federal Government of the United 
States. Moreover, Switzerland unlike America is surrounded by 
larger and more powerful States, and is less inclined to place 
herself at the mercy of these neighbours and sacrifice her neutral
(1). toweii ii." p.1^7. 1*4''1'•&".&., cnap"IV.'————————————-————
(2). See A & C. Chap.IV.
3.23 
Chapter 111. gygZTOLAaP
position by Civil War. Thirdly no Canton is allowed to keep 
more that three-hundred permanent troops, though since the 
Confederation is also forbidden to maintain a standing army this 
absence of military forces pulls in two directions. Nevertheless 
the greater organisation is on the side of the federation. The 
chances of resistance to the Federation are also decreased by the 
wide power of supervision possessed by the Federal Government. 
Moreover the Courts which do not stand in a position of equal
* \
independence of both Cantons and federation, must accept every 
Federal law as valid though they may declare a Cantonal law invalid; 
lastly^an efficient guarantee is provided not only against Cantonal 
insubordination but against federal aggression by the position and 
influence of the people, which is the ultimate sovereign of both 
Cantons and federation and the supreme political Judge of the 
actions of both authorities. The unhampered legitimate 
expression of their will and opinion secures the harmonious working 
together of Cantonal and federal authorities both of which are the 
servants of this sovereign power.
The infliience and manner of working of this sovereign 
power as wall as its task of safeguarding t and °s it were, of
testing continually the machinery of federation is illustrated by
; i 
the process of amending the Constitution. The great difference
between the American and Swiss federation is not only in the more 
extensive and more particular legislative powers which are assigned 
to the federal Government but also and chiefly in the relation of 
the federal and Cantonal authorities. Both these differences
111.
have V*en expr**flM in the power which haa fceen assigned to the 
Federal *s serial y to funend the Constitution, to alter the charter 
•by which Us very authority is determined. The American 
flonstltntion haw *een pln.o«*t In a position of alnoct unchangeable 
supremacy and rigidity ny the difficulties and restrictions which 
liar the *va to its alteration. The Swiss Constitution containing
:>Trtlcular articles rather than general principles is not so 
worthy to T»<I placed on a judicial pedestal and has "been made more 
arasna'ble to the ordinary legislative process* *The Itederal
Constitution saay >e revls«d at any time* Bach revision shall
(2)
tafce place >y the ordinary method of yederal legislation? In 
spite of this clause the method of ordinary legislation is not 
fcy Itself sufficient to pass legal amendments to the Constitution 
>mt ha* Veer modified *$jLth a view to securing a nore direct 
escpression of the sovereign will i.e» of the people* Kevlsion» 
may l>e initiated from tvo eourees althouglri the procedure is
%
cli^htly different far total or partial revision. A total. 
revision way "be demanded "by one ^ouse of the Legislature or >y 
fifty thoriBF-jnA qualified voters* In either casn a popular vote 
must be taken as to v/hether the Constitution shall "be revised and :
if the result Is in the affirmative "both Houses chal?. "tee re-eleot«d
(3)
to consider the revision of the Constitution. Since JS74 however 
no total revision of the Const itntlon has taken placa and this 
power is moh l«so likely to l»* used t>i^n th«if of procuring
J_M_ i_. _._ . iii j. — 1 H iMii . m, UJ ,, , j _ _ . t j , ^M ____
(1). See Supra chap. ll^p. 69(2)* Arts 118 & 119. (3) Art* 120
125 
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partial amendments* Until 1891 a partial revision could lie 
proposed only toy feoth Houses of the Legislature, *ut in that year
an amendment to the Constitution extended the right to fifty
(x) 
thousand qualified voters. This IB known as the popular
initiative • fh« demand may lie expressed in general terms or 
the amendment may fee presented in the particular form in which 
it is desired to lie incorporated in the Constitution, In the 
former cast the federal Chambers, if they approve the suggestion 
shall draw up a proposal in the sense indicated, which they shall 
submit, to the people and the Cantons, If however they disapprove 
they shall refer the question of revision along the lim»s of the . 
suggestion to the people, and on an affirmative vote shall proceed to 
a revision in accordance with the popular will* In the latter 
case, the Chamfeers must submit the particular proposal to the 
popular vote whether th$y approve or notj in case of their 
disapproval however they may also snfemit a contrary proposal to the 
people at the same time.
No revision however, whether partial or total, "becomes 
legal without the approval of a majority of the voters of che
whole Confed«ratlonf and of the majority of the Cantons, the vote
(2) 
of each Canton being determined fey the popular vote,
This process of revision diff«rs in many ways from that 
of the United States, It is more elaborate tout much easier to 
put into practice and provides for a much more direct expression
(1). Art, 121 as amended July (>th 1891. (£)„ Ibid.
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of the popular will. As In the United fltat^s -so in Switzerland 
the ultimate ratifying authority is one which is always dispensed 
with In th« T..«^i Nation o* Congress and may V? In thr.t of the 
Federal Assembly. As in the United Statue proj>o;: rls may proceed 
from a source other than tl\^ Federal letflfila^nv;*, The 
differ er>c« of the second source Illustrates a fundamental 
divergence in the whole question "teet^en the t^ro federations*
•
tn the. United Stats* It consists of the legislatures of two-third] 
of the several States, in Switzerland it is fifty thousand voters. 
The sane difference is expressed in the natrire of the ratifying 
"body which in America is th<* legislatures or Conventions of the 
states | in Switzerland the people independently of and as well as 
the riant ons give their vote, and the vot^ of the Canton Itself is
- V -'rjf
determined "by the vote of its electors.
The Swiss process is also distinguished "by ymch greater
flexibility. In America u tvo-thirde vote of both houses
* 
or two* thirds of the le^islatvr*0 of the States, are required for
proposals and three-fourths of th^ legislatures of the States are 
neceeflary for their ratification. In Switzerland one House alomi 
Tiy a siinplw majority, or not much more than on«-eightic»tii of the 
population may propose amendments and a siasple majority of the 
population and the Cantons are sufficient to ratify th-'^u The 
greater looseness and flexibility of the Swiss Constitution Is 
113ij0trat«d T^y the more frequent rre which hae >een road*? of the 
power of amendment. Since 1874 an asaencicient has teen added to the'. 
Bonstitutlon on the average every other year. They have all fceer
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in a centralising direction and with tha exception of laws of an 
absolute prohibitive character such as that forbidding the sale of 
absinthe, have all conferred axtra powers ofl the Federal authority. 
Both the united ^tates of America and Switzerland have i^n 
advancing towards *he unification; Switzerland has prooaeded fcy way 
of aiaending, A?aerioa ay stretching, the Constitution*
The process of amendment differs from tha process of 
ordinary legislation in three ways, firstly in the power of 
one House alone to formulate a proposal which must T»e submitted 
to the people, secondly in the obligatory referendum to the people 
and thu* the Cantons and thirdly in the popular initiatives This 
last right $f the people may Ts»e exercised in Federal mtters only 
in Constitutional questions, partly no doubt to render the 
Constitution more sensitive to popular influence and partly also 
to aozne extent to linit this vary influence ley restricting it 
within the sphere of th« Constitution. The result has "keen
i
however to add to the Constitution clauses which are not constituent 
in character fcut are pure legislative proposals. In 1893 for 
exaitiple an aswndznent forbidding th^ slaughter of animals "by "bleeding 
was passed fey means cf the initiative and added to the Constitution; 
in reality it waft a measure of persecution aimed at Jaws* The
initiative has Iwen used r«c«ntly with greater frequency than at
(1) 
first. Three times for example a demand for the adoption of
proportional representation in the federation has "been
(1). 1909, 1910, 1914.J land in 1917 but the issue is yet undecided)
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unsuccessfully formulated "by popular Initiative. In 1914 an 
Initiative proposing the prohibition of games of chanoe in the 
Casinos at tourist centres attained greater success. In the 
preceding year the excitement aroused fey the St*GottfiaTd Convention 
caused the formulation by popular Initiative of a proposal that 
in future all questions concerning the ratification of international
treaties extending over a period of more than fifteen years should
(2) 
fee subjected to the optional Referendum*
The Right of Initiative is closely allied to the Right of 
(3J 
Petition} the only difference is that the first requires the
compulsory submission of the proposal to a vote, the second depends 
for its deeisien on the will of the Chambers* The Right of 
Initiative supplements in a positive direction the power whieh it 
possessed fey the people in the Referendum* This, as already 
stated t is in Constitutional questions obligatory and means that 
every amendment must fee submitted to the people for their 
rejection or acceptance feefore it feecomes law* It exists also
however in ordinary Legislation in the optional or 'facultative!
(4) 
form* On the demand of thirty thousand voters or of eight Cantons
Federal laws and federal decrees - if they are of a general nature 
and are not urgent - shall be submitted to the people for their /
(5)
approval or rejection* On the whole laws thus submitted are 
more often rejected than approved, for the Referendum is not 
demanded unless strong opposition is expressed. The decision as to
nual Register ivjw p*3V*;IK9, Annul
The grewth of the right of the ?n; :*Parl$to driftBill«Tfrim 
it» right to petition. (4) Hot yet employed* (5) Art.89 Const.
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the urgency of decrees 13 e* with t>* ^ederp.I A* neatly and has 
•omfttimas >*3Y! expressed arbitrarily. It if usvsJLly accepted 
that ferei-v ?.ff?.irs, tVe ?.nnufcl Tr^eftt, mtsUon& of t:-.e conflict 
of anther 1ti<*a, or the approval ?f a Oar ten-? Cer»et.i-Uition are
d frcm th« -ix^roiFe of the Ref -srerdm* It h?.f.- also "been
to nuhventl^:-^ vot-?d fsr the rton3trncv.ion ">f roads and 
the dyking of «tr^air».R.and in l^l* or t';ie cr^t"corr--> of war, legislation
increasing the rates of telephonic co^wnivatione to meet the 
deficit oattsed tey the erisip, wae formally ^^clared vr^erit. In 
order tr. -niow a 4eman^ for the Peforerd <"Tr- to "be made, law© and 
deorA^e which are not urgent do not jo into effect until .nl-i^ty 
days after they are p^«*ed fey the *»»«wfcjLv,
Tluifl the Pefp.rendtJEi ie ae it w«re the nation f s 'veto 1 
on the lows of the federal Legislature. The people poesosis the 
»atne powere of arresting legielatiun &e &n " itglisii mont«.rcli at 
present in theory, and, in the tisne of ?li/s.beth iri practice, 
actually or^reii^d.. It differs however frott U.^ f ri f' t of veto* 
puch ae .'as established ir? St. gall in 1631 in the; fact that 
whereas fcy the latter a lav can only "be affected lr> a ribgative 
s«n«e ant^ that only when an aVsoltite majority of s.-.il vot* t s have 
voted against it, T»y the former a law amy Tt^j either approved or 
rejected according to the eimple wajority of the votes actually 
oast. The ration aasumss the }'Ojtl-tic?i of another ^ouse of the
(1). Se« lowell 11.
Annual Pegister 1914 p. 373.
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legislature and the t /o representative Cha ̂:>^rs are reduced to 
that of deliberative council. In so far as their actions are 
referable to the popular rvill the federal Assembly los^s its 
pow^r as a sovereign Legislature. And though a law proposed 
and passed "by the I/> 'lislatur-asmay tee r^j^ct d "by t/ie Referendum, 
a law formulated fcy the popular Initiative requires no correspondin 
sanction of the assembly. The situation becomes that described 
in the Constitution of Zttrich, "The p-jople exercises the 
la-vvoaking with the assistance of the State Legislature! It alters 
also the whole relation of the Legislature to t e Executive which 
become the definite agents of the people. At the same time it 
increases a statesman 9 s freedom since he is not expected to resign 
on the rejestion of a measure, and thus discourages the growth 
of party government,
The popular power of th^ Initiative and Reforendum 
is consequently declared to lesson th« responsibility of the 
Legislature} it is denounced for its spasmodic activity* It 
is -bused by liberal* for its conservative effects. There is a 
tendency to reject on Referendum laws in any v*ay radical, even 
including lasour laws t or of a comprehensive nature as well as laws 
involving expense such as the one for an establishment of a 
Secretary to the Lection at "ashington with a salary of £2000 a 
It operates moreover in favour of the German majority
(1). Lowell chap. xll.
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in the Swiss population to the possible sacrifice of the French 
minority.
»n the other hand it undoubtedly makes for the unity 
of the Confederation, emphasising the national as opposed to the 
Cantonal element of the Tederal State. Thus the marriage law of
Of, ^ * T.
December 1^74 and the Tiankruitcy la^iovenner 18-*9 w« re passed by
a majority of the people thovgh opposed by the majority of the
(2) 
Cantons as Cantons. It is --xtolled as the instrument and
expression of a pure democracy of the aneienh Athenian type. The 
Heferendura represents indeed in curious combination both ancient 
and modern democracy. In the small valleys of Switzerland, ^as 
preserved! as for example in che lands of the Forest 
Cantons a primitive Teutonic democracy such as Tacitus d^scrihes. 
In the cities a dominant aristocracy was introduced during the middfe 
ages, ard nowhere in Switzerland was any native representative 
system developed. The delegates from the states to the Central 
Diet were only commissioned 'ad audie'ndum et referendum1 and 
possessed no power to ^ind their Status in the measures of which 
they approved* Representative institutions were introduced 
in Switzerland with yrench democracy in the time of the Revolution 
At the same time however the absolute uovereignty of the T^ople 
and the "bondage of representative institutions was preached and 
an effort was made to give to the people a direct sharo in
(!)• Thus the law prohibiting absinth- v.nich ic drunk only in ""
Trench Switzerland was nevertheless passed chiefly by the German majority.
(2). Lloyd* The Swiss Democracy p.80.
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government in imitation of the ancient Greek democracy. In 
accordance therefore, not so much with historical tradition, as wi$* 
a "belief in the direct sovereignty of the people, by the end of 
the first half of the nineteenth century, the Heferendum had "been 
introduced for Constitutional questions both into the federation 
and into the Cantons* By the same dat# it had also been adopted 
for ordinary laws in most of the Cantons and in the federation it 
was included in the optional form in the terms of the Constitution 
of 1874.
To the Swiss belongs the credit of having first applied 
this principle to ordinary legislation* It had already been
accepted for Constitutional questions in the French Constitutions
(1) 
from 1793 to 1315 and in America even earlier* In 1778 the
general Court of Massachusetts submitted a Constitution to the 
people who rejected it and two years later the present Constitution 
of that State was passed by a two-thirds majority of the people* 
Similar procedure took place in Hew Hampshire in 1779 and 1784. 
Mississippi and Missouri had also submitted their Constitution to 
popular approval on their entrance into the TTnion in 1817 and 1820.
The same practice was followed fey Hew York and since tkat time it
U)
has become almost universal in Constitutional questions. In
Wisconsin it has also been extended to the creation of banks by 
state law and the Constitution of Minnesota, after the manner of
(D* via* J1793, 179$. 1802, 1804, ft 1815*
m —. % ^M «• ^ • • .w _[2)* Loweil op. cit;ll. p.244.
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Swisp rather than of American precedent, makes certain railways
and all appropiations from an Internal improvement Land Tund depend
(1) 
dependent on the popular vote.
Direct popular control has fflornover T»«en extended to 
ordinary legislation in many ̂ of the States. * Th* Swiss 
instruments of Referendum and Initiative hare "been adopted and , 
particularly in the cities of the Western States, the right of 
Recall introduced. By this process an official may be deposed
or * recalled f from office on the vote of a requisite number of
(2)
citizens*
In franoe also popular opinion has from time to time 
been takan on political measures, the most famous instance "being 
perhaps en- the coup d'etat of 1851.
In Switzerland however natural and economic conditions 
and the character of its people have combined to favour a natural 
and simple democracy, and it is in this small country that self* 
government may toe seen in its most perfect expression,
In the actual composition of the federal Government the 'Swiss have 
incorporated som*5 of the more essential features of the African 
yederal State. More especially they have adopted the .principle 
first formulated by the United States of the representation of
.'• •
the two distinct elements of a ?<*daration~nationaa Unity and state
'(!)• ^8 « Oberhalzer - Referendum in America oiiap.lll also
Lowell 11. chap.Xll.
(2)# T>« ^ilcox. Initiative and Recall. 1912,
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ir t,->re "hevV.circ of ';he T,c,;i<4atT?re, The national 
Council r"rr?3ent!* the r.^rla cf ?^itz^rl-?.rd in proportion to their 
foliation, *h" "c-.-ci.l rf -Abates represents the. C&ntona, their 
SOT vr«ji ;rr ld<.r»tl f y, nru? en;-?:} •' nc'eperdence. The to t;vo Chambers
ro^rr;3«ntfi';lv«e to the T !^tional Council Is apportioned
to «ach twenty-thoue^r-d o.f O 1 * population, *itr, the condition that
•» 
each nantor. rniASt have at I?;fi8t one r^pr«sentativ<3 a?: well aa
k .
fiactionw orer ten thousand. Ths Kepresantati Tr-,s aro chosen in 
?edor--3 distriotr '^ic1! tli'ir- \ r^ eludes flu;"h jracticos H.I 
gerry-mandering ^ t no electoral district :oay orosa tho borders of
a Carton. ?very nr^le S'-vlsa vot'^r, 7/"io is a layaaan, is
(1)
election, and «Tery adult ?ial i, who Tsy the law of this Canton
political ri^ht'j, la eligible to vote. The federal
ttovernnjent in constant to pass nnifor;a lavrs as to the
(2)
of voters. Ti* voting i fci in th-o hands of the Canton
and jirea^nts -inch variation; r/-»o c;antons, nt. Gall arid "f\rich, liave
^
adopted hh/* principle *f proportional r^pr^sentatl^ru The Council 
Is renewed Inta^ral?,^ ^^iry three years, th'.u- sitting Tor one year
then tho ITmuie of Represent at j.r -s ir the United ftatea* 
i receive a salary frMi the Federal Chest at the rate of
(4)
twenty fr^noe for every day of thoir aotual iroeeTio*; in the House.
need not as In tf.^TA. reside in the state
Constitvt^on ArtB.Tiv.U Arte. 72-79. (choeen. 
Tn 191^ & 1914 reupectlvelyi See Annual Renlat^r for theae year* 
(4). See ^dmans A Omnir^ii. • n op, cit, ohaj-.lll.
r in
(l)
The pras^t :toude consist** of r«ns V^vi: iid and ai^hty n
tfciniric', thirty t,,o fro.u Sarii?.. tv^nty f iv ; fro-i ~*'»ric\ "-rn* only
(2)
a.;j-Iand LUJJ ad-i^t--^ tho lyaiort^nt. ;» -irc:'.i»l^ of 
of ^ii% Ountc?ia in tha 3tut 4;s Council. r ^ch 
Cantor B^nds two delegates - tl:.« six ^a?>Cn.ntor?p tu-ndine only one 
^ac/x- *.Vio -like t^t i.-Ational '''oimcillors 'vote r.^t accordin^: to 
instructions Urt according to their individv.f.1 opinion. Their 
q^.t ilificatione, length cf tervre, r.^wti.o^ of ^a.-jctlor,, as well as t
their aal&rios ta «i d«";rra?v?d. not >y "he ^cng-oitntiori, as in the
(3)
United ^tattiC, "but V;;- tlie individv^l C- ntnrs ^her«?^lv<?s. There
a turKiyfioy to iiitroduc^ *, cf-rU.in nnif or.- .Ity in these oorditione an 
to la iti£j th<i?a aort in accordance vi'hh v.io;^c in forc« for th& 
liational council. Thuii r;ofot /«j»r rrntatir^s are now olaotctd for 
«-« years ar.ti taoy racoiva on <u^ a^rjro.gd a ealary °^ twenty franc
tJii3 varies fro;?. *hL'-\? francs ?.n c^r-evt* to fifteen
(4) 
in Uri and Untcr
i cha:fj ir 'c3ioosesi>s ™- fn Pr^svl-^T1; «' -ic . ^.fors -president. 
In v,:.irf Coimcil of 3t&tod '-ui endear oiir xs n .<l*? '.o jire^ei ••¥<•-. the 
rotation of Cantons in tin choice of th^ae officers, nfu* in the 
'iational Council four a:-- i ^leotod ^luring the triennial Session wHjfc 
the bama oteject. In naith^r TCona'j can the President "be elected to
3914
(2). State^'i:.n»s Year Bool: 
(2K feo ;ionfftitutior: Arts. BO, -/I,
Year ^ook
either offS.e* for the ensuing ye-.r, thniv-h the vifje-Preol-1«nt nay 
>* c.,nd i;svni1y IB !rt«eted to the Presidency. ?"th Charier e* moot 
at 1.-nrj* nncn ; ynnr, .-vid dofcat^ an a ru?e *n pnhlAc, Vr-th Trench 
and "4ra*n "b^-bv: t> n offic:l?-l Inn^nagf^H* A -T^rrit.""" of ^ach
cor)9t:'-t^t' j R a qnor^'^ fcr ^nalnHfsn r*.nd ft. hij-iy'l"-' r^t-jcs'ity is 
ol'^nt frr ^. l^^l vote. "ach Oni'Tici! and orf-r;/ taerab«*r aa 
?i5j the Cantons "»?v ^nrr-flnr^tideno^ hav^ th^ rif;ht of initiatingay
l^R?.f?lation. The HwioB T/^islftt' 1 ?'** 4? t)»« r ns ^icarmr^i
Legislature of ^uropenrj {>r»t*tutlonfl i rl which Tt«th Kous- s possess
absolutely co-ordinate ^ov-ere, ^either "Kouflr- ex--.rcis«s any
functions, l^gitl^tiv^, ex<»o-'»tive. or .judicial, u>?.ioh th^ o
may not «hare« "ach donnolT .^ivea as it ^/ere a ancond o
to the p^oposal<St cf the oth £;r v"^ 1 ^^. T^a t#o riharr'H^rs differ
efor^ not in ^.ny respect of powfsra or duties l»nt solely in the
•
ce of th^ «l«nent°. of the ^'-deration vliLch they raprescnt* 
'i "a^iona3 Council re^^B^nts th^ Ted';''atIon ••;-» a u/^itod nation, 
s » Council of °.tat-~ rip a ^r^n^er of independent and BOV'sreigii 
Cantons. rc ri9 for*n*r exprasa^s the -vill of th<i lar.^::r States, 
the latter the Till of the s^saller in comparison. In its 
representation of the federal ruinoiplB tho Go-uncil of Stat«s has 
the s^ma ^a3i55 of existence us the AT-wrtoali Senate. The; latter 
ho^^sYer ley itn organisation and th'j special powers rhich it has 
received ha« Veoome the raor-j powerful of tho tv/o Mouse8 of Congrass. 
"h^» council of Status howuvsu 1 Hus s^.nk into a position of
(1). Constitution Arts. 73 rr. :^ t
Arts. 86-94.
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•
consparative tnimportance; its smaller slse, ita lack of special 
functions, its rather anomalous composition, as well KB the fact 
that in a Joint Assembly the President of the National Council 
presides, hare all combined to redxice its influence, Vith few 
exceptions the chief men sit in the National Council and tend to
regard membership of the other House merely as a stepping stone to
(1) 
this Chamber.
The two Houses together fons the Federal Assembly which , 
subject to the rights of the people and the Cantons, shall exercise 
the supreme authority of the Union and shall have Jurisdiction of
all subjects within the competence of the Union vfoich are not
(2) 
assigned to other authorities. They do not exercise the executive
functions entrusted to the Executive Council though every decision
• • ^* ',
of this authority may "be revised fcy them, nor the Judicial duties 
assigned to the federal Tribunal, but there is no sharp distingtion
1 •
"between the "branches of the administration, and the authority of the 
lederal Assembly is wide and extensive. They legislate on all 
the numerous matters entrusted to the Union, including war and 
peace, foreign affairs, military and financial subjects, and 
exercise a general supervision over the whole of the administration; 
they possess also Judivial functions; they act as a court of appeal 
from the decisions of the federal Council, in administration 
disputes, they decide questions as to the competence of Federal
(1).Hee Wilson. The State p.323 Marriott Second Chambers p.127 sea.
(2).Constitution Art. 71 & 84.
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authorities and they may •xorciaa the right of anmeaty and pardon. 
To them hav-j b*«n entrusted also important powors of appointment
and in the sxerciso of those and their Judicial functions the
(1)
two Chambers sit together. They elect the members of the
federal Council and tha Pedaral Tribunal, and in time of war or
on the mobilisation of the array they elect the Commander- in -ehiaf
(2) 
and the ohief of the general staff.
The Jederal Assembly may also determine the organisation f 
mode of election, and the remuneration of the Federal authorities, 
and lastly they may revise the Constitution itself subject of 
course to the obligatory Referendum*
;•
The ohief difference between the American and "wla« 
federal Machinery lies in the r lation of the other "branches of 
the Government to the Legislature* The Swiss hav* not adopted 
any doctrttne of the separation of powers, aa it is understood in 
America, for the composition of both the Executive a^d the Judiciary 
are determined by the legislature. They do not stand apart with 
the authority of th« Constitution as their warrant.
The Executive rov/ur o* "^e Swiss T^deration is vested
(3) 
in a Fod»ral Council, elected by the two Houses of the Legislature
in joint session* It consists of sevan members who are elected 
from all Swiss citizens eligible for the National Council, in 
praotic e usually from the members of the Legislature, who imiat then
(1). Constitution Art.
(2). v .g. as in 1914.
(3). Constitution Arts. 95 - 104.
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resign from the A»se«»ly t for no sieu&er or th* y*di*rul Council 
fce also a usriiMir of eith«r legislative Kwwu flot »wa --liar* one 
«ewn»«r may fee ohosen from each Ctwtncn. *h* Germn C&ntone h&ve 
had on the whole t£e greater r presentation, though recently
of th* federation have reo«*ived «K>r<* frequ^i inclusion*
The Cannoil is el<*ot«d nominally for Uuree yvve* but if t
the w^antime th« new Aa»«m»ly prooeede to another 
electied of the federal counoil* At the »aiaa ti»a the A*a$mfely 
elects the President an4 a v.tc<?-Pr*»ident of t^id (^o\,moil wfco ar-it 
r^«peotiT«jly the Praaldent and vi00»?re*id*nt of tho' ^holt- 
Confederation* th<*y may hold of flee for one year and are not 
eliglfel* for vhe »^me position in the ensuing year* The ice- 
President usually succeeds to the Presidency* although the Preuident 
may not "®e elected Vioe*Pre01dent«
The work of the council ie heavy aiiti ineludtsu
W 
purely adainistratiTe duties f the preparation of legislation and
some Judicial functions. It i& for si^lici**./ aiviaed into the 
seven dwparUmnt* of foreign Affairs, Interior, %Tustioe and Polioo , 
Military organisation** finance and Custoidis f Indue^r^ and 
Agriculture and Postg and Railways* I>, watohes > WT the du^ 
observance of the provisions of the Constitution and of ?f*d*rfcl 
deorees and authorises their ©K«oution f and that of th* judgments
(1) *?, Calendar from Orisons l»l-"» President Hotta ^ho entered 
Council 1911 oa&K> froiu Tieino,
(ii) Thes« have now been lightened sy in ore as ing the funotione of the 
peraan <>it Officials. Hwor^anination of tha 7eder^l council law 
1914 which came into force January 1915*
I/O 
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of 'the Federal Tribunal.. It axamine* whether the articles of 
Cantonal constitutions ar* in harmony or not with the Federal
*
Constitution and federal laws, and reports upon them to the 
federal Assembly. It maintains the external independence and 
neutrality and the internal tranquillity and order of the 
Confederation and in times of danger it may of its own authority 
call out troops for tha preservation of either, irovided that they 
do not exceed two thousand in nwntoer ana are/required to serve for 
more than three we-Oks. It regulate* also the finances and 
national investments and the organisation of the Posts and 
Railways and prepare the "budget and statement of accounts, 
It has also "been entrusted with a wide domain of 
administrative law, which in Continental fashio# haB thus fceen 
separated from other branches of jurisprudence. It thus has 
Jurisdiction over such matters as disputes respecting the primary 
education of the Cantons, freedom of commerce and trade, validity of
Cantonal elections,th« rights of established 8wi?s and some religious
(2) 
questions* In fact the federal ' ounoil is as it were the fcalanoe
wheel of the whole Swiss Federal organisation and is ia relation 
with all its parts. In this it more nearly resembles the 
German Bundeerath or Second [louse of the Legislature, and in the
: 'i
nature of some of its powers it may tee compared with the American 
Senate. Tor the Swiss Executive differs very much from the
(1) ?ee A & C chap.XV p.198 Lowell Vol.11, cp.supra, p.20 
U) See Adama A; Cunninghara chap. V. Lowell Vol.11, chap. XI. Until 
1891 religious questions concerning the prohibition of Jeanits and 
similar matt* rs were decided l»y the Tederal Assembly, not seldom on 
party lines.
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American. The former is elected "by th« Legislature, is dependent
upon it and its membra are usually chosen out of 3t. . The
»
American Executive on the other hand is elected in practicej • s
directly "by the people t and is entirely independent of the 
legislature and of co-ordinate rank. Apart from the difference 
l»ased on the parliamentary source of the Swiss Executive authority, 
another distinction separates still further the tv/o gx^cutives.
ThQ Swiss -xecutive is collective, the American single, for the
(3) 
American "cabinet" is fcut an emanation from the power of the
President. It is thi« important function of the President of 
the United States which distinguishes him from the President of
the Swiss Confederation. The two Presidents are "both elected, y
(3) 
the Swiss President "toy the Legislature, the American "by the people*
They both hold office for a limited nunfber of years, the former 
for one year only, the latter for four or a possible eight. Both
are the titular heads of their respective nations, and perform all
(4) 
the ceremonial duties incidental to their office. The comparison
may be continued no farther however; the President of the United 
States is strong in the possession of large execi^tir jewers{ the 
President of the Swiss Confederation is so vraak thrt if for some 
reason his office becomes vacant during the year it i* not even 
filled up. He is not Commander-in-chief of the army, he has no
yor parliamentary and fton-Parliarasntary Executive*
Dicey- Law.of the Constitution.
See supra chap.11.p.84(3) Nominally fcy a college of electors. 
(4) "•".£. on the occasion of the visit of th3 German Emperor to 
Switzerland in 1912 it was of OOUTE* the President of the 
Confederation who received him.
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power, of appointment or right of veto. **> if in fact, merely 
•the chair/nan of the Executive Cornraittea of the nation" and as 
such he tries to keep himself informed of what hie colleagues are 
doing, but he has no greater power or responsibilities than any 
other member. For some time he took charge of th« Foreign Affairs 
department of the yederal council, but aa this involved a constant
*
change in a sphere which pre-eminently required continuity, he does
\ *; ; 
not even possess this distinction over his colleagues. Re now
retains whatever department h* held before hia election to the
Pr^sid ney.
the Swiss Executive differs from the American in tooth its 
collective nature and parliamentary authority and in "both of these 
qualities it, resembles a parliamentary Cabinet of the Knglish type. 
The resemblance disappears however with regard to one important
characteristic, in which the S*«S3 K»* out Ire approaches the
pr suastlcej * American rather than the FnglishjT The essence of the position
(3)
of the Tngliah Cabinet is its responsibility to Parliament. In 
bold defiance of the doctrine of the separation of powers, English 
practice establishes the closest connection between the legislature 
and the ~ xecutive. Switzerland however has accepted this doctrine 
in a much more modified form than America. AS in the
TTnite<5 State;-, no member of the Executive may also be a meriber of
(4)
the legislature during hit tenure of office. This at o£ce destroys
U) Lowell II. i. 1V5.
(2) See 7edaral Council fce-organisntion Ta-, 1914. Se« Annual R..-.t;iBteJrty
(3) I speak of course of normal, not cf war oabinot*.(4) fle« Tjov/tjll 11. p
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& connection such as that of an English Cabinet with its Legislature*, 
The separation is not complete however. The Executive is elected 
hy the T.egislfvtnre and its neznfcers may sit and defcat-, though not 
vote ^n "either ftouse. They too, like an English Cabinet, prepare 
legislation which t>iey lay "before the Houses, and at times the 
fssertbly requests them fey a "poatulaV to draw uj» a bill on special 
subjects ',nd in fact most measures not introduced by the Council 
are referred to it before they ar^ discussed in tho Assembly* It 
has no -power however to dissolve ths 'geyitWy, nor may it fce 
dissolved "by the Afiaemtoly. In OHB&S of disagreement "between the 
V-'O authorities, neither "branch has -urj $ower of appealing to the 
nation over the head of the ot.hor. Ee^l collisions therefore 
practically never occur for the federal Council always gives way, 
as it has no indapendent authority of its own* If -.he Erasures 
of the federal Council or of an Individual Councillor ar* rejected 
»y the ABsew'bly, neither the Council cr tha particular mamteer 
would think of resigning 'any mere than an English Calsinet Minister 
Tould thlnr of remaining in office in similar circumstances. If th< 
Assembly puts forward proposals which are opposed to th* syt^athles 
of the Council, this latter "body nevertheless does itw laost to 
carry cut its wishes loyally. Indeed a Tederal Coi.ncillcr Is
rat> rr ir t>e position of a lawyer or architect *ho ^.ives advice
to T/'-tir-'r (1)
it ret ol>ll.T©d/if >>ls advice is not accepted. Thus tha Counoi:
a Board of irfictf-rT; chosen >»y »\ large joint stock




ccmrany, **ul in practice th<* Councillors are almost without exoeptioi*
re-elected T&y each Federal Assembly. The Cotmcil is therefore 
practically r.. permanent "body and ii» members are ohoaen more for 
their administrative capacity th?ia for their prominence ir, any 
politics,! party. It follows too that tha mmstoers are not 
necessarily all of one party, nor evan of that party which posseaaea
a Majority In the Le&ialaturfi. The Council has habitually
(2)
contained nen from tvo, «oitt«timea from thr«^ parties and at ^
the dominant party in thQ ?oderal Council has been opposed to the
(3) 
dominant party in the Le^lelatvxr«j« There ie in fact no desire
to conceal differences, the aim "b^ing rather to giva open 
representation to divergent viev/a than to create a false appearance 
of harmony as in Coalition Cabinels* MeaB«r«e «r decrees of the 
Council e:mnat<i author i'iatiy-'3ly x'ro;:i the Council as a whol^ and 
receive the rotes of th« meml&era, Vuo Councillors ar« lenient 
towards th*? pet schesitsj? of their colldagues and are not ooinpelled t 
to ?.ct r.ift'-rward» in the Ohom"b^r in accordance with the YOta of the 
Council* Tri £r&ctic« 'J tey ioay e^en i;p'j.-f»j£ against proposals 
of the Connoll, though this ie avoided as much as possible* There 
is howevvr ro organ iaed policy or legislative campaign which is 
eondv.ct-cd ^y the Council and >-y the reception of which it stands or 
falls. Tie Council moreover no more resigns if its measures are
(1) Tr»-,..jll 11. ;,. 109 
TS.f. 1391.
?T->UL 1-376 - 1833 four'*):' sQvei DWEjbora of Council -'-^ 
duririg- a decided Li'beral minority iri/Legislature.
the
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rejected by the people on Referendum, than if they ar:». disapproved
"by the House. When ir» 1882 th••* people rejected a law on 
Education the r$eponei'tel& minister did not resign. On the contrary 
the papers of the opposite party congratulated the country on the
absence of the party system in accordance with v/hich the nation
*••*•/ 
would hav* lost the services of a capable and honest adrdnistrator.
It is obvious that Parliamentary Government which in 
"England means government "by party majorities no more exists in 
Switzerland than in America, in fact much Iss^ so. ^ho responsi­ 
bility of the American Bxeoutxvo to the dominant j>>;rt,y of the 
Legislature doss not sxist )»**cstus3 there is no -connection between 
the two, and 'beoause the tenure and qualifications of each "branch 
of the administration is aeflned in Constitutional or statvnory 
tena«, But the dep^ndbnce of •;/.« Gov<»rruaent on the dominant 
party in the nation in soured "'ithln tliese limits, and with the 
system of spoils, , and o-her party machinery, the influence
of parties in the national administration .la nctorlously active.
i 
It la interesting too to notice that th.-* Aiaerioan President like
VJ 0
the ^n^liBh Prime Minister chooses his cabinet of his ^m political 
colour,
In Switzerland though parties exist, party government 
in either the Fng?.lah or tho Araerioan sense is entirely afeaerit, 
"Tfhe T^jceontive dooe not resign vhen it is out-voted "by parliament} 
Parliament i» not dissolved when its measures are tiegativfjd »y the
(1) See Adnxaa and Cunnlnchaja L;:II ; . IV.
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people, and the electorate whilst constantly rejecting laws mads
*y their rej>resentatiYes usually sends took those same rcpresentattres
to senre for another term of years.* Many factors contribute to
*
thi* state of affairs of whioh perhaps the ehiaf are the presence 
three nationalities and languages which split up the nation into 
sections, and the small si*e of the whole Confederation and of?the 
electoral districts whioh facilitates a personal acquaintance with 
the Representatives and emphasises their choioe on personal rather 
than on party grounds.
Th« third sranch of tlia federal OOTernment differs 
from th« corresponding section of the federal machinery of the
United States* The American Judiciary owes its importance to
(2) 
three great causes* firstly it is the guardian and interpreter
the constitution»v Raised to the position of an arbiter »«twecn 
States and the federation it decides whether »oth State and 
federal laws are in harmony with the supreme law of the land* 
Secondly, the Supreme Court of the United States stands at the 
head of a large hierarchy of inferior Courts. It possesses 
its own officers, carries out its own Judgments and comes into 
direct contact with the indiridual. Thirdly its authority is 
independent of the legislature and is derired from the Constitution
(1) ' E.g.^. in 1914 when oren after the excitement roused fey the 
St« Ctotthard Conrention elections were only oontested in a few 
districts* See introd. to Daploige-Beferendum in Switzerland.
(2) See supra, chap* 11* p*
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Itbwii*, li-e Logicaature, may determine its organisation and the 
Executive may appoint its chief officers, fcut by tne Constitution
.d^ftB held •~'?fic<; during /voo»-. b?jhn.vionr, arid thcvir salaries may
altered :lurln^ tli'-l- t.^nur*.? of of £10*,
'."he y $«x c*al Trib'in^ ; cssessKa non* ^f these qualification^ 
It d^-os no-:: int-.rpr-ix. or guard -:;Jw ^-victity of th»s Constitution, 
Oiu;-»-.oiuil C«>iiao:.Vutioi;u art? ^Xo-dr:-^ -('•- by ';.t but fey the ^^deral 
Council. It KAfj "io y-o'v-^r to r^(!l^r^ T^d-^ral legislation 
unoonstit^itionuj, for every .j.a -- passed ;->y ohs Hf^ip.lature, suTs.Jeot 
to the rvoforeiitlv.;-.!. of course rt-'t. -b« ace opt -3d >r r it as valid. It
iaay /lo^t/Tir ^Ieclar« Canton-il lav/ft to b*» -.nconetltutional and
(1)
the r ti f o r< ? inval id.
TV* Federal Trih^.nal standu alone* There is no 
pi-^iinis-sd f^^l-.^L of inferior cot rtn t/. n£ ; h for criminal law It is 
dividociintQ «, aeries of Br-;cial courts.. It nay not carry f^ut its 
o -m Jud^s-j.-itB, for it htis. n~ cffio-'-srs, "but. mint depend on the 
'"edtiral 'Jouncil for their enf rrce/.i3nt. It n>J8t be added tnat
recont loi'.isl&tion has tended to devftlor and extend the organisation
^ U) 
of tha Judiciary*
Lastly not cr-ly ar« t.-ia meiabtira of t.a^ j?'-ed»r«il Tribunal 
choatiA o> the !3giel»vire but tlioi/ 3. -.^ng^h of .«?r^.. of office, as
vail ai. Uii coioi" -caition ard organisation nf tlx. cor-r-;;^
*
df-.ter.uirA.d i.,' r i.!-it: same av-.thority* Criminal trial B nust
*y /;uj ,--f a jury, and wio •'^dcr^l "rl'/unul IB -^IJio^ad >,y the
TT5 od'j : ;; r. ̂  t iTTtToB /irV7 » i i z » rTceJT-lT c-l : ffc^st'Tfl- 1 1 5ri."^oto~V
Wnt.on Coxa Judicial Pow^r and Unconstitutional Legislation p*86. 
(2) See T.erisla$rion of 1^ vl, v-v^ 1398, 1907, 1913 and 1^14,
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(1!
j ;ic;. to ox-g kvrii?;e its own Secretariat. Tiif iVle; .J.
il consists ^t present of t-^ntv-f;-vtr mo i, -r£ an' ni
(U 
?. \Tost itntes, ' TJu-' are -.l^cuec;. for si:* years j;v the >
r
Asav-iol: .^r. Joint oesnicn as dare re-eligible , /.r>y xaembe-' ..:ic 10
eli^iMjr *or the Ua.tlor.a3L Council i^y ;.,-», electee', tt- tht
^uf, ••;<ro must be taken to rtpre&emv. the three mitioi:
Ko -,191:10 ^r of •,..;•; ?t?d ;:-r'U Tribunal ;uc,y hold ^rj- cflioo i-ndor1 Li*e
n'.on or li.i any 'Je>,r>tvn -^r i:i.rsiie an^,- ot>i3r calling o
durinj Ai;i t-;ru of ofrica. He xaay not judge 7,asra his personal
rr C;\r. tonal ijvt-^rest i& inv^ly^oi or tha-. or ais betrothed or of
a r>oar rolativ-. . Th/- Judr^:ft ar : in pr-:tctii:» notisd for tnoir
(3) 
tli~.n for the i .-" • leg<*l irno *1 ;dgc .
;iic^ nf «-,h« court \a fur-f-Ii-.-r dlniniahed "by the 
henw o." certain jrc.iirl AtitctionB J^o ot.Ker bodies. 
with qu-sstloiifi of public lr,^, civil justice ^.nd einco the
ci" A cx-iforu civil c^-c'.e In 1£1£ its pcwsr in this
d'^pur t;n-.n : is now very extsnaivc; - cri-hinal justice in certain
'(*) 
io .i id i:i soui inii'taac^s it act.;; a-n a Court of Aj-v
In t,-:V doi,iai!j cf puTD^ic la--/ it has fO 
concurninc coni'lUota of aut/L^rity "betwea^ ?«»deral un-J\ Cantonal 
authorities;, and auca d.ldpvitus Tsei:v«&n Cantons a» ivra within the 
doroain of i ,:Liic lt»^. it ;u*.y deeirfe ooaplttintn cf -iliy ^/iclation Of 
the Constltv.t:U»nal ri^i-s c>; citizr: r,f«, r.&d p.i-peals of private
(1) See r.o/istituolon Ar"i3. 106-109.
a^ 1C1'-?. (o) -ee Aau^a ur:4 C-.. 
(4) ^RO f'orstitufcion Arts. 110 - 114 A & C ohaj-> V.
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oitzens on account of violation of concordats "between Cantsns or 
violation of international treaties* It is in its functions in 
public law, that the federal Tribunal most nearly resembles the 
Supreme Court of the United States*
In oivil law its authority extends to cases between the 
Union and *3«y Canton, "between the Union and corporations or private 
persons when such corporations or private persons are the plaintiffa 
and the amount in dispute exceeds three thousand francs* It is 
competent to decide civil questions between different Cantons, 
"between Cantons and corporations or private persons upon the demand 
of either when the amount in question exceeds three thousand francs 
It may also pass upon questions with regard to loss of domioile 
(Heimat-losat) and upon civil disputes between communes of different 
Cantons* It must also decide other caaea toy which the Constitution 
or legislation of a Canton are extended to its competency or where 
both parties to the suit demand it and the amount in dispute exceeds 
three thousand francs*
In criminal justice with the aid of juries its 
Jurisdiction extends to all cases of high treason against the 
Confederation, or revolt or violence against the Federal authorities, 
of crimes and misdemeanours against international law, political 
crimes ot misdemeanours that are the cause or consequence of such 
disturbances ae call for armed intervention on the part of the 
Union, and lastly it shall decide charges against officials 
appointed by a Tederal authority, upon the application of the 
letter.
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In cases where federal laws have to be applied by 
Cantonal tribtinals either party has by virtue of the Federal 
organisation law right to have recourse to the Federal Tribunal 
against the Judgment of the highest Cantonal authority, or th» 
appeal may be made direct to the Federal Tribunal without passing 
first through the highest Cantonal Court of Apraal. To this <K
• . '
category belong Federal laws respecting contracts, copyright, 
protection of trademarks, divorce and nullity of marriage.
Federal law does not regulate or interfere with the 
organisation of Cantonal Courts as in Germany, but on the other hand 
they are not entirely separate and independent bodies within their 
sphere as in the United States. Justice is administered by the 
Cantons with recourse in selected cases to the Federal Tribunal and
in some cases the Cantonal Courts are subordinated to the Federal
(2) 
Tribunal. Until the Federal Civil Code of 1912 each Canton had
extensive civil rights and perhaps in no other matter were the 
anomalies of the Canton and the influence of such forces as 
feudalism so clearly betrayed. The Swiss Constitution, in 
imitation of that of the United States, requires that full force and
credit be given throughout the Confederation to the judgments of the
(3)
Courts of each Canton*
t
The Swiss Federation is not only a union of democratic 
Cantons, but in a fuller sense than the United States of America
Adams and Cunnin^ham Law chap,V. Tederal Civil Code 1912V 
|2). 8<i*5 Wilson, The Stase. chapters VI! & XI. 
; 3). Constitution. Art.61.
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it is a democratic federation. Not only are democratic principle* 
expressed in the election of the national Council and in the 
eligibility of all citizens for the Executive Council and Judicial 
Tribunal, fcut more particularly by means of the Referendum and 
Initiative, Through these instruments is asserted, as in no 
other federation save Australia, an intimate and immediate relation 
•between the federal Government and the citizens of the respective-
Cantons. In tooth the TTnited States and Switzerland the political
(1) 
sovereign is the people, but in the former federation the monarch
\ 
slumbers and is slow to express his will, in the latter he is ever
wakeful and demands constant attention.
Cantonal democracy la likewise guaranteed Isy the federal
4
Constitution and in most of the Cartons it has ^een preserved or
'-\
developed to its utmost limits* In the old'Forest Cantons the
pure democracy of-ancient Teutonic tribes has teeen preserved in the
(2) 
lands gameinde and mass meetings of all the inhabitants • In other
Cantons legislative "bodies and in Borne even the Executive councils 
are chosen directly T>y the citisens, and the Referendum exists for 
Constitutional questions in all Cantons and for ordinary laws in 
all except yri>ofirie« Swiss democracy how0ver tuas its roots deep 
down In the Commune which IP the jinall^st unit of the Swiss 
federal State. It IB an a member* of fc COM&un® that v a Swiss
(1).C.f* Dicey T/iv/ of the Cons*itution« Chap.111.
(2). f5e« freeman's classic description in»Q*rowth of ths English
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oitisen ultimately exercises the privileges of cltiaenship and though 
Federal law regulate* naturalisation, full rights can only be 
conferred by Cantonal or Communal law*
Swiss democracy is, it is claimed, the most successful in 
Europe and it is the omly one which is of that pure
type which is more akin to ancient forme. Xt is natural to compare
(2) 
Swiss and Athenian democracy. In the ancient city state every oitUen
iy. _
shareo/ln control of peace and war, of finances, and military and 
naral defences, and foreign affairs, and in the trial of Judicial 
oases. He either exercised fflats powersdirectly or through Committees 
appointed for a short time. The lews however were considered 
normally permanent and unchangeable* Special formalities were 
attached to their alteration , and they were on the whole made by and 
placed under the guardianship of the aristocratic Court of the 
Areopagus. In Switzerland exactly the reverse is the case. The laws 
are under the absolute and immediate control - as far as this is 
possible * of the cltisens themselves, but administrative affairs are 
managed by a Council which is the most aristocratic feature of so 
democratic a Federation. But the subordination of the Executive to 
the popular control is in practice sufficiently secured* Switzerland 
Indeed seems to posaaas the mar it a of ancient democracy without the 
evils of its slavery, and tho advantages of modern institutions 
without their limitations of direct popular action.
BOTB Since this was typed there are indications that the French 
Inhabitants of the Jura district intend to separate from the German 
Canton of Berne and form a new Canton of Jura,
(1) 8e* Wilson. The State. (a) of. Lowell 11. p.333
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jSu>j»pt to two or threa states
TTtanach and Gaster 1483—'-subject to Bchaffhmusen and
ClaruB 
Me rat, Orlse Grandson f Eschallans and TJlens 1476
Bollinsona 1503 -—avibjeo!; to TTrl, ^c>r?7yz and
unterwalden
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) Subject to more than three States
Tree Bailiit'iks and Baden 1415 - The former under six or 
seven ssatse at first; divided 1712t- lower one* (Vilmergeri, 
Wohlen, Mellingwi and Bremgarten) remaining only under the 
reformed States Zurich, Berne and alitruaj upp :i ones ( 
(Hitakirch* Muri, Merisohwand) under the Bight Old States* 
BADTO at first under seven then xunder eight, states; after 
1712 subject only to Zurich, Berne and Glarus.
Thur^an 1460 - subject first to seven! later (1712) tc 
./•-. 'ight r.t
X483. - subject first to sovan, later (1712) to
States.
Rheintal 1490 - subject first to seven, later (1712) to
nine States.•
Bailiwicks of Ticinc (Lugano, Locaimo, Lle:idrisio and 
Maggiatal) *• subject to twelve States *
Allied States and Common domain* 'became sovereign Cantons in 1S03 



















separated into two 
half-Cantone
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B. CQH3TITUTIOIU& ACT POLITICAL EVENTS
1315, Nov. 15th. Three ?orest States win Victory at Morgartan
against Austria.
Tip to 1352 
1370 Oct. 7th. 









Separate resistance of Zurich, Glarus, Zug and 
Berne to Austria*
Monk* s or Priest's Charter - Common League of 
Old States except Berne and Qlarus.
1513
1515
victory of Seven Old States at Semrach against 
Austria*
victory of Seven Old States at Kflfels against 
Austria. darns rejoins Confederates.
Convent ion of Baispach - Eight Old States and 
Twenty Years* Peace with Austria* 
Confederates conquer Aargaa from Austria.
Civil war between Zftrieh in alliance with Austria 
and on the one side/Sohwya and the Confederates on 
the other.
In alliance with France Swiss defeat Charles the 
Bold of Burgundy. Defeat of Charles toy Swiss 
alone at Grandson and Horat.
Covenant of Staus » Eight Old states.
Swaliian "T ar « Kmanoipation of Confederates from 
German Imperial regulations.
Italian ^ars of Swiss Confederates in alliance with 
France.
Victory of Confederates at !3ovara. 
Defeat of confederates at Marignano.
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RgyOBMATIOfl
1519 Zwingli in ZUrich.
1528 Reformation aooeptad in Berne,
1529 *lrst war of religion - tflrst war of Kappel. 
jvna 26th. Peace of Kappel - liberty of eaoh State religion declared. 
League of fire Roman Catholic States with Austria* .
1531 Second War of Kappel. Second Peace of Kappel - separate 
Leagues dissolved - liberty of religion of eaoh State 
confirmed.
1536 Conquest of Va#d by Berne. 
Calvin in Genera.
1586 Borromean League of Counter Reformation*
Alliance of six Roman Catholic States with Spain.
164S Independence of Confederates acknowledged at Peace of 
Westphalia.
1653 Peasahts' war in Switzerland.
1656 Failure of attempt to tighten confederation*
War of Vllmergen - Protestents and Foman Catholics 
form separate leagues. Roman Catholics win supremacy* 
reversed in
1718 Second war of Vilmergen or war of Toggentourg. 
llth Aug. Peace of Aaron.
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1789 April 12th. First TTnlted Helvetic Bepu^lio.
T 'ay 29th. ".".cheats of K«a™*ison" - conqpromiso.
Oct. 24th New »oh^ne of > T<^lvfjtic ?>let with a view to
a TTnitafc State.
1S02 ?«b. 2^th The (Tadoralist) Scheme of Reading. 
Kay 20th P!«coi}d Helvetic constitution.
. 19th TIapolQOn»s wAct of radiation" and the *»C rsulta«. 
Constitutions '^f the v^d ration and the ninete«m 
Cantons.
1815 Aug. 7th"?ederal Pactw of the twenty-two Cantons.
1832 and 1333. Unsuccessful attempts at revision'of Federal
Pact
1847 'var of Sonderteund.
1848 New Federal Constitution - J^deral Stat^.
1866 l^irst r^Tisiort of constitution (not very successful) 
1872 Scheme for nev constitution rejected.
1874 Revision of Constitution - Present Constitution accepted*

Chapter HI Switzerland AppendixIE
Growth 'WISS FEsDEfiATlOlM up
131J 
Con f«l«r«tioi. in 1353
Tkt ?•>* f-w
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On Christmas Bay in the year eight hundred, as Pope 
Leo 111* placed the Imperial Crown on the head of the King of the
Pranks, there echoed through St. Peter's the shout of the multitude,
«
"Karolo Augusto, a Deo coronato, magnd et pacified imp^ratori, 
vita et victoria," Nearly eleven centuries lat«r a cheer which 
ranf- through the halls of Versailles proclaimed another coronation, - 
"Saine ttljAstat der T'aiser wiihelra le'toe hoch". The two scenes 
were very different. The King of Prussia stood in the place of 
th<^ King of the Franks, and no Pope annointed him Protector of the 
'*oly See, and disputed with Prankish followers and Roman people 
the honour of his elevation. The election of win lain 1. to the 
ne - dignity depended obviously on the might of his Prussian 
soldiers and the wish of the German Princes. The title itself 
conveyed two fundamentally different meanings on th^ two occasions.
In 800 the imperial nama represented a "European supremacy and the
<H
unity of the Christian World. In 1871 it neant the primacy among a
number of *«ttUU -erman states, the headship of a united Germany which 
as a nation hardly existed in t:ie time, of Charles the Great.
But outward differences - however many and great they 
may be and ar« - cannot destroy, not only the essential similarity
*
in the significance and nature of the two events, bnt thg 
prolonged and intimate historical connection between them. In 
both cases, a ne«? ]g*«# r&r&il nation were entrusted with the
(1) Cf. ^ryoe TToly Roman '-'mpire p. 63.
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guardianship and representation of an idea which they alone seemed 
able to defend. The creation of the Prankish -mpire^xpress^d 
• ^ion 'so long in preparation and so mighty in its consequence* 
of Poman and Teuton aid announced the entrance of the Barbarians 
into that frtitful heritage of the 3 ast, which the;/ had once 
helped to destroy and were no,- to aid in conserving. The 
institution of the German Empire heralded a ^nion of Prussia and 
Germany, which on a small scale was as long prepared and as 
momentous in its results* And the second "Empire v/as the 
historical consequence of the first,
The Roman Empire, as a name and a tradition has shown an 
obstinate it somewhat spasmodic vitality, Charles the Great was 
styled the sixty seventh successor of Augustus. Otto 1, when in 
962 he was crowned : :mperor of the "Ttoly Roman Empire of the German 
nation," merely claimed to be reviving the ^mpir^ of Charles the 
Great, and the institution he established * or renewed - survived 
nominally until the resignation of Francis 11. in i806. Even 
Napoleon posed as a new Charlemagne, a second Caesar. The 
German ^mpir H of 1871 ntv-.r claimed to be a restoration of th« 
leg tl position of the Tr oly Roman Empire, which had published its
extinction in 180'", but it recalled the Imperial traditions of the
(11 
past with a conscious recognition of its share in them. The
(1) Cf. Brycs ^oly Roman Empire. chap.XXlv; and Sor«l. Tr istoir3 do la 
guerre Eranco-Alleraande vol.H. p.137. "Lo wonlteur j rnssien de 
Versailles disait le 26 Mov. 1870.---- *Le Saint-":npir-H parait enfin 
vouloir revivre sous une forme plus pratique, et pourtant plus 
heureuse 1 "etc.
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creation of the German ftmplre is the last of a long chain of 
events connected by an historical sequence with the Prankish 
Of no other State my it mor© truly be said that the roots of the 
present lie deep in the past and that the understanding of what 
la, entails a knowledge of what has l^en,
Through all its vicissitudes, in its strength and ia its 
weakness the history of «The "Aspire" has been indissolubly
connected with the history of Germany, especially from the
(1) 
*revival » of Otto 1.
In the time of its greatness it gave to Germany of the 
tenth, eleventh and twelfth centuries, a splendour and renown far 
surpassing that of any contejraporary European Kingdom, lor not 
only was the ISmperor, as Temporal Head of Europe, entitled to a 
precedence and, according to mediaeval theories t a certain supremacy 
over all monarche, but his dominions stretched from the Tiber 
to the Baltic and included the Carollngian capital of Aachen as well 
aa the more ancient Roman seat. But beneath th© weight of the 
Roman ISmpire the German Kingdom itself was crushed. When the 
Empire had become only *a gorgeous anachronism, 11 the lure of its 
fame still tempted German Kings to neglect their native lands and 
waste their native energies on Italian battlefields In pursuit of It, 
'While France and England were being consolidated under strong 
hereditary monarshs, the elected King-'^mperors of Germany were
(1) See further Bryoe "Holy Roman TSngpire", esp.chaps.Vlll-Xlll.
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fighting their way to their Imperial capital, which, although the
in fact . -. 
theoretical centre of their power was/only a geographical outpost or
th«ir dominions. Between the civic freedom of the Italian . 
Bepublies, the hostility of the Popes, and the rebellion of German 
nobles, by the middle of the thirteenth century the Empire had lost 
most of its powor and a large part of its prestige. "It might 
indeed, and so far as its practical utility was concerned, ought 
now to have been suffered to expire; nor could it have ended more 
worthily than with the last of the Hohenstsufeg* . That it did not
so expire was owing partly indeed to the belief, etill unshaken,/
that it was a necessary part of the world's order, vet chiefly to
(1)
its connection with the German Kingdom.* It lingered on as a
German institution into which occasional "Emperors infused some of 
their own vitality, deprived like the Papacy, of half its allegiance 
by the Reformation, until after 1648 it became nothing more than a 
name, a 'piece of antiquarian ism hardly more venerable than 
ridiculous.1 By the eighteenth century it was, as Voltaire said, 
neither Sfbly, nor Roman nor a' Empire but merely an hononrary 
appendage to the hereditary dominions of the Austrian Habsburgs. 
On August 6th 1806 the last of the Roman Eaperors - Francis 11. of
t
Austria - resigned the imperial dignity in the face of the new 
Napoleonic Imperialism - new and yet invoking caiolingian traditions 
more ancient than those of the Austrian itself.
(1) Bryc*. "Koly Roman "^mpire.
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The decline of the rmpire meant also the weakness of the 
Royal power in Germany and the corresponding growth of the power 
of the nobles. The elective character of the Empire had leA each 
Emperor to barter away the rights of the Grown to secure his own
succession or that of his son. In practice the competition
"before 
had oaan confined to a few powerful families and since/the middle
of the fifteenth century, the Imperial office had "been held, with a
(1) 
brief exception, continuously by the Habsburgs. Their policy had
been dynastic, rather than Imperial, and the hereditary succession 
had not therefore strengthened German Unity, while their situation 
on the outskirts of Germany had prompted them to acquire large 
non-German territories*
Corresponding to the temporal aristocracy, there existed 
until the time of Hapoleon a spiritual aristocracy no less powerful, 
and the rise of "Inperial free cities" in the Middle Ages contribute! 
a further element to the heterogeneity of the Krapire. The 
excessive development of Feudalism in addition had caused the 
frequent division of hereditary lands and the consequent multipli­ 
cation of fiefs. At the outbreak of the Frencft Revolution there 
were in the "Implre*, which was approximately what was known by the
merely geographical expression of 'Germany 1 , three hundred and sixtjl
(2) 
states which were practically autonomous. At their head was
Austria which possessed the Imperial dignity and the nominal
(2.) Cf. T-r.A.Lc^i&her. Napoleonic Statesmanship. Germany p.7 
Hirnly Formation Territorials de l f Europe. p\ 290 seq.
(1) It had already been held by Rudolf of H-'.sIi.:^ t.* <*arly as 1273.
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euaerainty orer the rest, and oonstituted a shadowy bond of unity. 
Next to Austria and a close second was Prussia.
In 1415 the Saperor Siglssmnd conferred the mark of 
Brandenburg as an Imperial fief, together with the lleetoral dignity 
on Prederack of Hohans oiler n/EJurgrave of Sflfcnaberg. This inTosti-i
tnre established the connection of the Hohenaolierna with 
Brandenburg. This was a barren and Ill-favour ed land, and gave no 
promise of the future to which, the Hohensollerns were to guide It* 
In fact during the next two hundred years it is only a significant 
exception to the division and feudallaation of lands which prarailed 
among the Oonnan States* The Hie c tors preserved their lands intact 
and eren expended their tarrltories^but during these two centuries 
the Hohenaollerns of Brandenburg had noS&ing to do with Prussia* It 
was not until 1618 that the Duohy of Prussia beoaiae united for the
•
first time with the Electorate of Brandenburg. On the conversion to 
Protestantism In 1535 of Albert ,a mamoar of another branch of the 
Koh3n20llernsjihep,art of Prussia which he ruled as Grand Master of 
the Teutonic Order of Knights, was made on hereditary Duchy under the 
suserainty of Poland. The secularisation of ecoliasticaL 
or seml^ecoleslastical benefices was no uncommon feature of 
the time* Owing to the failure of heirs in the 
line, the Duchy fell the the Brandenburg Hohezusollerns In 
but until that year the Electorate of Brandenburg and the 
Duohy of Prussia were separate States ruled, aa It happened by 
different branohe* of the sazae family* Until 1657 when the Great 
Elector secured the independence of Prussia, the Electors of 
Brandenburg in their capacity as Dukes of Prussia, still receirad
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investiture from the Kin^s of Poland* The accession of the Great 
Elector in 1640 marks the "beginning of the growth in other ways of 
the power of Brandenburg * Prussia. Re rescued it from the 
difficulties into vfoich it had fallen during the Thirty Tsars War,
and stamped on it an illicit character "which was made explicit "by 
the measures of his successors down to Frederick 11« The success
•
of his worfc Is measured by the assumption of the royal title by 
his son in 1701* The royal title *aa taken from Prussia which lay 
outside the Empire, and the monarch with his own hands placed his 
royal crown upon his head as a symbol of his independence and 
political irresponsibility. Administrative consolidation, a 
liberal religious policy which encouraged the immigration of 
Protestant refugees especially from France, the establishment of an 
efficient standing army, and territorial acquisitions were all
measures and fruits of a century 'of %nlightened despotism11 , which
rival of the 
made Prussia at the death of Frederick the Great th^Austrian power
in Germany. From the middle of the eighteenth century begins the 
dualism between the Protestaafe Kohenaollerns of the North and the
'(
Roman Catholic Habeburgs of the South of Germany, and the policy of
.!
opposition to Austria which Frederick the Great pursued was resumed
by Bismarck, his successor in many respects, and led to
pantury 
and Sedan* Not that Prussia in tie eighteeriiy may be credited with th
A
consciousness $f any 'German Mission*. The aims ofWohenaollerns
(1) Of. Marriott and Robert son. -evolution of Prussia. p,96.
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were dynastic and Prussian. They had made themselves the brain 
of the state; the military and civil roaohinas had "been organised int0 
an efficient subordination to the co:mraon head, the monai^i ̂ vho was the 
impersonation of its unity; and thestat^ which they had ruled 
autocratically font with illumination according to the interest of 
Prussia, they had converted into a power in Germany, and under
•
Frederick 11, in Europe, But it was a part of the Germany of the 
day, an order of Princes and dynastic States, with particularistic 
interests and selfish aims*
Th* tide of Prussiafs greatness which had risen to a flood
under Thrtoderick the Great, ebbed rapidly under his successors .
f
"Prussia fill asleep on the laurels of Frederick, "the army stagnated 
in a self-satisfied complacency, and the second essential of the 
Prussian state • an efficient head - was equally wanting, for the 
first of the two successors of Frederick the Great w s a "mixture 
of debauchery and mysticism" , th« second though virtuouswas stupid. 
It is true that the second and third partitions of Poland during the 
raign of Frederick William 11. added large territories on the East 
to Prussia, of which nearly a half has remained a permanent possession. 
lut a period of decay and decadence set in which led v/ithin twenty 
years after the death of Frederick, to Jena and Tilsit* .
A new Prussia however arose , pho» ftix-like , from the
U!
ashes of defeat and humiliation. The work of Stein and
Hardenberg , Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, increased the revenue,
(1) nee further Feeley. Lif* and times of Stein. Vol. 11. 220 saq.
iv.
reconstructed the administrative system, re-organlisd the army,i* i
emancipated the serfs, abolished the old feudal economic basis of 
quit-rents and dues, and established a new social system* The 
reformed State became the instrument of that national uprising 
against the conqueror who was absorbing the life-blood of the 
people, and the leader in the War of Liberation (Befreinngskrleg).
Although much of the work of Kapoleon was undone by the 
Congress of Vienna, a large permanent contribution towards the 
unitjsr of Germany was made during the twenty years from 1795 to 1815 
The spirit of lib trails > had been awakened by the doctrines of the
French Devolution, and the spirit of nationalism by the domination
/
of Napoleon, Germany which had begun from the last quarter of 
thej1 eighteenth century to hare a literature of its own, received a 
great artistic and literary impulse from the patriotic wars. Bards 
of the ^ar of Liberation - ganger des Befreiungskriegss -,F&raer, 
Sohbnkendorf , R&ofcert, TJhland, Sang of the struggles of Germany. 
Arndt's *Wa& 1st des deutschen Vaterland?" , became -a&ocHrt a
national cry. Students' societies- Bursohensehaften - were
(1)formed with the aim of a national, liberal Germany. Fiohte in
1807 delivered his* Addresses to the Germany eoplev A "Prussian
Mschool 1* of historians arose - Dahlmann, B5hmer, Hausser, Droysenj 
Glesebrecht and later sybel and TreltsohJc* - recruited from all 
parts of Gemilny, who preached the doctrine of nationality, 
stimulated it by the study of the history of the Empire and called
(1) Cf. Sybel 1. p.57. (2) See Gooch Hisi. of Hist^a. Of the 19
c^r/wu
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upon Germany to rally round Prussia whose •Genaan Mission 1 they 
proclaimed in their histories.
The political situation had developed in the direction 
of simplification. Of the three hundred and sixty States only 
thirty-nine were left in 1815, after the absorption of the smaller 
principalities and the ecclesiastical states*
Prussia, in recognition of her services, was given the ?
U)
Rhenish Provinces, in exchange for the part of the Polish lands of
which she was still deprived* Hot only were the Rhenish lands Germaj| 
thus increasing her German at the expense of her non~Genaan 
territories, but their geographical position marked h«r out as the 
guardian rf Germany on the \vest ,as wall as on tho east,and therefore 
the future antagonist of Prance* It caused the Pnisslan Kingdom to 
be divided but this proved rather an advantage than a disadvantage, 
for it gave an additional Justification for the annexation in 1866 
of Hanover ,?Ta»s*u and *,he lands which lay between the separated piesa^
The non-German character of Austria was increased by her 
acquisitions in 1815, for although she had lost the 3*le»ing8 f she 
h-u! c-sln^d Italians. The Holy Boman -npire had also disappeared 
and its place was taken by a Confederation of States in which Austria 
was given the Presidency in virtne of her traditions, and Prussia
the Vice-Presidency as a tribute to her services. The States
(2) 
agreed not to make war on each other, and to submit their disputes
to the Impartial judgment of the Diet. This assembly was a body
As well as part of Saxony and Pomerania.
Bee Hertslet. Map of Kurppe by Treaty. Vol. 1, p.202.
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of ambassadors representing the States, and constituted the only 
central machinery of the Confederation* It had the power to 
declare peace and war, to organise the Federal army and to make 
laws for the application of the Constitution of the Confederation. 
It had no executive powers»however, or administrative officers. 
The States had surrendered no portion of their sovereign powers and 
the Diet became merely an International conference. The States 
had formed no 'Federal State) but only a »Confederation of States 1 . 
They were not represented equally in the Diet and the delegates 
voted according to instructions, features which have both been 
retained in the present Bundesrat. The procedure of the Diet was 
double. "For constitutional questions and thoss relating to 
peace and war, as'in plenum* arrangement was adopted, by which six
of the largest States had four votes, five had three, and three had
(1) 
two, while the remaining- twontyflve had one each. For other iaatters|
the Diet proceeded by sections called 'curiae', in which the eleven 
largeat States had one vote each, and the/tweht^r»elj,ght were divided 
into six groups with one vets to each group, A unanimous vote was 
necessary for all amendments to the Constitution. In accordance
t
with the newly-aroused democracy it was declared by the Article 
thirteen that Assemblies of ̂states should be established in all the 
States. -
Both the nationalist and liberal hopes which ere based
(1) See infra p.133
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',
th.3 
on/Confederation were doomed to disappointment. The Diet became
the instrument of the re-aotionary policy of Metternich, the Austrian 
Statesman ,-'1% settled down into a slothful Impotence, and resigned 
itself to the investigation of the olairas of individuals against 
the old Empire. Prussia followed In the wake of Austria.
In 1848, however, the revolution in Paris once more 
roused the latent democracy in Germany to action. Rebellions 
"broke out* in the States, p«*nuularly in Berlin and Vienna, A 
Parliament elected by universal saf^age met at Frankfort in an 
attempt to realise the national unity of Germany. It turned in 
despair from the Diet, whose futility was universally recognised, 
to the only other power which seemed to offer any promise of a 
fulfilment of its aims - Prussia.The members wasted precious months 
in discussion and it was not until March 1349 that they took the 
atep of o fferlng the Imperial Crown of Germany to Frederick William IV 
King of Prussia. By this time the risings had been put down In 
Vienna and Berlin - and it is of interest that Bismarck^ first 
entry into political life is associated with their suppression - and 
the re-action was triumphing. The Imperial Crown was declined! 
"because of the revolutionary, or at any rate, the parliamentary 
source of the offer, and because of the Frankfort Parliament's lack
of a legitimate mandate owing to the want of acquiescence on the part
(2) 
of the ruling houses.* With the refusal of Frederick William IV.
(I) Cf .The orriolai document issuelTTrrIB1V by the Prussian Govt. "To" 
the question what has the Confederation accomplished since Its birth 
32 years ago during an almost unprecedented era of peace,for the 
strengthening and advancement of Germany.no answer can be given*. 
A.W.Ward.Germany.vol.1, pp.47 £ 347. (2) Bismarck.aedenken rmd 
Brrlnerungen. 1. chap.Ill also chap.X111.
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«
to 'merge Prussia in aermny", ended th« last attempt to tmlto Gonnanj 
en the basis cf ft liberal democratic nationalism. The Germans wore 
unaccustomed to popular institutions and thay had used them unwlBeljl 
They paid the penalty of their fs.ilurs; th« antidemocratic reactlo*|
increased mor3 strongly ihAn cv«?r* Tlie nsvr Austrian rinieter 
Sehroraerfburs only follo't^d i.>? the steps cf Kstternich.
In 1S61, ^illiamf who had "been n^c'^^ f' since October 1858, 
"booam« King of ^ruaefia, and the next year, Bismarck, - th« man whom 
fo^teen years before Wllli^o, then Prince of Prussia, 5.s said tr» 
have dubbed f a red reactionary smelling of blood f - was me.<te 
Minister-President . Bismarck^; appointment awrJced tho est^liehmont 
of a new regime in Prussia which ^ag *.*> lead in ten years to 
th^ Institution of the Terarcan Pnipir^, Bismarck's i-TOgrarsti© howertr, 
vra.s not "based *n the w ^-ross DeTitsch3,a^dtt of vhe- professors and 
men of letters, nor on the plan of ?rederiok ¥111 lam IV, for a
dual leadership of (^raariy "by Austria, and Prussia, \vith Austria 
Iirgperial Head and Prussia as
nor on the scheme of the ?ran>fort r-iet cf Prince s in 1863 "by 
which Austria tt would havtf "bo?!! the single apuac ?«nd Prussia(a)
probably reduced to the run): nf :, middle ^tatv., 1* 1/ut on ttoJ-.
less than the exclr^lon cf Anr.tria fro-; a unlt?'l Germany "based on 
th^ eupreaacy of !Pm*Jsla» r-iciaarck lia,*8 repreeont^d Trnasia 
for souie yeare in the Diet at }?rr-rkff>rt and had acvdr«rd a hearty 
oontezsipt for it and for the .lad: of Independence ^r ..' ^n^r&y which 
had char&etorised &ha policy cf Prussia, up to, in, and eince 
humiliation of plnftt» - a rollcy. vhlch. as he declared,
sr Cf* ^Tard or»oit. r,347. 8) Of* Bisaarok Oedanken und Errinerungen. ohap. XV11.
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"had been made in Vienna" . He had no more respect for democracy 
whether *in the press, in Parliament or on the barricades. * "The
German problem cannot be solved by speeches, associations and majority
U) 
votes but by blood and iron,* by the forcible exclusion of Austria »
the head of the German political system for over three centuries *(2)
from the new united Germany under the leadership of
The political hegemony of Prussia was preceded and prepare!! 
;by her commercial hegemony* A customs &nion originating in 
1819 In a treaty between Prussia and Schwarsburg - Sondeishausen , had 
developed especially during the thirties until by 1860 it included 
the whole of Germany except Austria. It was purely German and 
Austria was excluded on the ground of the difficulty of either 
Including or excluding her non-German dominions* The several State* 
had entered the Zollverein for short periods at a time, but the 
advantages which they derived from it, secured Its permanence* Brea 
after 1866 when the Southern States were excluded frora the North 
German Federation, they continued to maintain the economic connection! 
Thus by 1860 Prussia was at the head of a commercial union of all
Germany from which Austria was excluded*
« 
The political supremacy of Prussia in a united Germany was
brought about in three ways* The military power of Prussia was 
strengthened) Austria was isolated by the diplomacy of Bismarck, and 
then, in a war of a few weeks she was thrust out of Geraanjrf
Speech to the Committee on the Budget. Sept*30th 1862. of* also 
Gedanken und TCrrinerungen chap Xll and XI11. 
(2). Cf .Bismarck Gedanken und Errinenr^e- chap 111 & X711 e 1; passim
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King William had from his accession determined on a 
reorganisation of the army and it was to support him in the struggle
with the Lower House of the Prussian Landtag which this involved,
M 
that Bismarck was called to his flounoll. For four 'years of
conflict* the Lower House consistently withheld supplies, while
Bismarck and the King carried on the Government in the face of
(2) 
their opposition in accordance with the monarchical theory, . They
increased and reorganised the army and aTter its success in 1866, 
Bismarck gracefully asked the Chamber for an indemnity for the 
action of the Government during the four preceding years. It was 
granted with enthusiasm*
An occasion for a dispute with Austria soon arose. The 
two rivals had in alliance occupied the Banish Duchies in 1863 and 
in 1866 they quarelled over their disposal. Austria however when 
she was confronted with war, found herself unprepared and without 
allies. By a skilful diplomacy Bismarck had isolated her in 
"Europe. Italy's adherence* to Prussia was won by the promise 
of Venetia. After the ingratitude with which, in 1856, Austria 
had rewarded the help of Russia in 1843, she could look for no 
help from that quarter. Russia, in fact, preserved a friendly 
neutrality towards Prussia, in return for the sympathetic 
attitude which the latter had consistently adopted both in 1870 
she so far profited by Prussia's sucoass in the Franco-German War
II! Cf. Bismarck ibid. chap.XI.It was during this time that Bismarck made his famous
statement about "Blood and iron*. Cf. Memoirs. chap.Xlll.
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as to repudiate the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris of 
1856. To Napolaon the chief causa of fear lay In the oonsolid* 
ation of aenaany, either by the union of Prussia and Austria or in 
the supremacy of Austria alone - for he seriously co»t eclated no 
other possibility* He was not unwilling therefore to see Germany 
dividsd by civil war and Austria weakened by a struggle with Prussi 
If, as was the most he eaqpect^d, the combatants proved well- 
matehed, he could play the arbiter or incline the balance 
according to his wishes. Moreover his raepeet for nationalities 
which required tlw surrender of Venetia to Italy, and a hint • at 
least - of fune petite rectification d<*» frontiers* thrown out 
by Bismarc^ helped to seours the neutrality of France until it 
was too late to remedy the evils of Napoleon's Miscalculations*
The military superiority of Prussia in the war with 
Austria was quickly proved to an astonished world. The desire 
of Bismarck not to irritate Austria umiocetaaarily or lo prevent 
the posaibility of future reconciliation, together with the fear 
of French intervention, brought Prussia to a hafv^aVtar the 
battle of Konlggr&ta, and a t'ruoe <vas aiads cu v»::<lch the later peace 
waa based* Austria surrendered Yenetia tc Italy "out she made 
no territorial oesaion to Prussia. Prussia annexed Frankfort 
and the Banish Buchias and Hanover, Nassau, and Ifesae-Caseel 
which divided her dominione* The old Confederation was 
dissolved; a new ^federation was formad - from which Austria 
was of course excluded - of all the States north of the M&in. Bavar
ft and ^aden remained outside and independant although they
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were 0jg>r«s01y left free to make treaties with the North German 
F*deration* Th»y renewed their membership of the Zollrerein and 
their delegates attended the Federal Parliament for the discussion of 
commercial questions* This oonm«rolal union whose organs were the 
Bundesrat and Reisohtag of the north ^errmn Federation together 
with the members of the Southern States pared the way to the later 
political union*
*£hat a war with ̂ ranee would succeed that with Austria
(1) 
lay in the lo^io of history.* The dismay of frawee at the partial
unification of Germany and her claim for 'compensations* aroused 
the fear and strengthened the .national feeling of tho Southern 
States, while the removal of the dual system no longer presorted them 
to look for support out«ld« Germany. They made secret military 
treaties with the Horth German Federation and the war of 1870 saw 
the troops of Bavaria and the Southern States fightixag against 
Prance on the sid* of Germany* The defeat of Franoe completed 
the unity of Germany, On January 13th !071 t one hundred and 
seventy years aftsr the as enaction of th*» royal title "by the first 
King of Prussia, William 1« lay the choice of his peers was crowned 
German laperor in the Hall of Mirrors of Versailles*
From the new Germany are excluded the Germans of Austria 
and those of Switzerland also remained outside* With these except­ 
ions it is based an the principle of nationality* It la not a 
Hnitary tout a Federal State, a partial union of separate States
(1) Bismarck's Memoirs. 11. p,40« (TraneK Cf.also 11. 56.
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with a central organised machinery. As a Federal State it is 
anomalous in many ways, in its composition and in the construction 
of the Federal Governmant. Its chief peculiarities lie in the 
dominance of &he laonarchial principle which characterises it
•
throughout, and in the primacy of Prussia*
Prom the members to the head, the German Empire ,with
(!..) 
the exception of the three tfree cities, is a Federation of monarchies
The Preamble to the Constitution declares that *His Majesty the 
King of Prussia, His Majesty the King of Bavaria, His Royal 
Highness the Grand Duke of Baden etc. conclude an eternal alliance** 
The people, both of the Federal State and of the part-States are not 
mentioned* The States are not democracies either in the American 
or the Swiss sense. In 1848 Frederick William IV. refused to aet 
without the Princes* In the new Union which has been attained not
*
only have the Princes been given a predominant influence, but the
•
incorporation of the dynasties in the Federal Constitution has also 
strengthened their position. Alone of all Federations, the
German Federal State is both a monarchy and a collection of monarchies
(2) 
It is true that the Constitution was accepted and
ratified by the Legislatures of the States, and that in Bavaria a
certain popular r^sist»nce was shown tfc the Union. But the
the 
measures had already been agreed upon by Governments before they were
(1) Not all are 'Kingdoms 1 . I use the :ord 'monarch 1 in thegermanfi : 
sense f one-mler ! .
J2) Annexations such as that of Hanover 1866 or of Al«a«e-Lorraine 
J871 were not carried out according to popular votes.
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submitted to the people. For both the federal and State Constitutions
of Germany differ from those of other Federations in the fact that
(2) 
they were granted from above rather than formulated from below.
And although in all the States except Heoklenburg , the people are 
represented^ &iSeiSrpu^h their rapresen tat ires exercise a certain 
influence on the administration, it is in the Prince that the
guiding and governing power exists; the Governments are, in the
(3) 
strict sense, f limited monarchies' , that is to say, the monarehs
rule subject to a certain control by the Chambers. The 
monarchial principle in fact prevails throughout the Federation.
The popular House does not govern, it only restricts the bureaucrat ie
(4) 
administration of "Smperor, or Prince.
j the presiding and controlling State of the 
"Federation, possesses a Constitution which was issued by the King in 
1850 as a result of the risings of 1848. It is not so liberal 
as wae desired, but it contains such a democratic /as a two-chambered 
Legislature (Landtag) with a popular House. The lower House
(Abgeordnetenhaus) is however elected on the three-class system so
according 
that the franchise is apportione<yto property qualifications, and the
Upper House ('lerrenhaus) whose composition is controlled by the
(1) Cf. Lowell 1. p. 240 Note 4. Malleson. Refounding of Germ. Kmp,p.3i5
(2) Cf. Borgeand F!tabl is semen t et Revision des Constitutions, chap 
)(3) Etf. Seignobos. Contemp fturope.
(4) The relation of a German monarch to the Parliament resembles the 
position of an English king before the Revolution.
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King, consists of Princes of the Blood, Heads of Royal Families 
whose territories hare been annexed by Prussia, and representatives
i
of landowning and official classes* The consent of the Landtag 
is required for all laws, taxes, loans as well as the annual budget,
but in practice its power is limited to a certain restricting
(2) 
influence on the Government of a negative character. "A Prussian
Minister is, "besides, so likely to hava the nation on his side 
wh6:i he makes an appeal to it in the name of the King and feels so
»
confident that even if he defies the Chamber without dissolving, the
nation will not be greatly stirred, that he sometimes refuses to
\&) 
obey the Legislature*. As in 1862 the theory still prevails
thai* in case o^ conflict between the Crown and the Legislature, the 
King has the right to carry on Government in accordance with the 
permanent laws and to make the necessary expenditures. "Thus the 
Legislature is prevented from gaining ground on the Executive not so 
raucli by the Constitution as by the occasional refusal of the
Executive to obey the Constitution - a refusal ma£e in reliance on
(4) 
the ascendency of the King".
i 
The ministers are moreover not responsible to the
Legislature and they do not resign on an adverse vote. They are
responsible to the King alone, and the King has taken his crown
(5)
from God. The position of the whole Government is expressed in the
(1) Prussian Constituion. Arts 62, 63, 99, 100, 103 .
(2) Cf. Lowell 1. p.298 se >
(3) Bryoe. American Constitution 1. 220.
(4) Bryce. ibid.
(5) Cf. Coronation Ceremony of niliam 1. Seignobos op. cit.
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decree of the lat; King. "The monarchy in Prussia is, after the 
Constitution, what it was "before the Constitution, a monarchy of 
deed----. The rig:1 it. of the King.to conduct the Government and 
policy of Prussia according to hie Judgment is restricted not 
abolished by the Constitution, The * Government documents of the 
King 1 require the counter-signature of a minister and must be, as 
was the case before the Constitution was issued, represented by 
the Kins f s ministers, but they remain: "Government documents of 
the King" from whose decision they proceed and who constitutionally
i
expresses his will through them. It is therefore not admissi-lala 
and tends to obscure the constitutional rights of the King when the 
exeiwisp of these rights is represented as though it proceeded from . 
the ministers for the tine being and not from the King himself. 
The constitution of Prussia is the expreseion of the monarchial 
tradition of this country, whose development is based on the living 
relationship of,its King to the people. These relations cannot
be transferred fro the King to an arpointed minister sUnce they
£ ar*j attached to 'the : arson of the King. It is my will that no
doubt shall be allowed to exist as to the constitutional right of 
myself and my successors to conduct the polioy of my Government 
personally, and that the idea shall always be contradicted that-----* 
tlrj necessity of responsible counter-signatures has taken away the 
character of my Government'documents as independent royal decisions."
*
This is indeed the present situation of Prussia, but reforms in a
(1) January 4th 1882 decree of William 1. See Dawson. ^volution of 
Germany. p*440.
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democratic direction have been promised.
The distribution of powers between the Federation and 
the states is irragular and its Irregularity emphasises still 
further the influence of the Government or Princes as compared 
with the other organs, particularly the Legislature, of the States 
of the Empire, For the German Federal State , like the Swiss, is 
marlced by great legislative centralisation, and great administrative 
decentralisation. The Federation does not work in a separate 
sphere, independently of uh> States', it has few executive officers 
of its own axid employs almost entirely those of the States.
Ho express mention is made in the Federal Constitution oft 
the assignment of the definite or indefinite powers. presumably 
it is to the Federal Government that the definite pov/ers are given 
but the limitation which this imposes is Inconsiderable in view of 
the extensive sphere which is entrusted to Federal control, and of 
the ability to amsnd the Federal Constitution, with which, subject 
to certain re a frictions, 'the ^ed^r ,%1 Government is invests U The
. * t
States hi!»vevwr may, it must be supposed, exercise any rower which 
is neither expressly forbidden to them nor conferred on the 
Federation* jfoey'have, in fuct retained certain peculiar 
privileges of negotiating with foreign countries on special matters 
and subject to the rights of the Empire and even of maintaining 
ambassadors at foreign courts. This right is comparable to that 
possessed by the Swiss cantons, although in the case of Germany, it
(1) Cf. Low«3ll 1. 1.247. Wilson The State. p. 371
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is exercised largely with reference to the personal relations 
and priTate affairs of the dynasties of the State. may States 
haTe in the same way zaade treaties among themselves, such as the 
military conventions with Prussia.
In general however, the control of foreign affairs,
peace and war, consular and diplomatic services, inter-state and
(1)
foreign commerce, posts and telegraphs, patents and copyrights,
weights and measures and coinage is assigned to the Federal
Government. Wide additional powers havtj been entrusted to its
(2) 
care, railways as in Switaserlana, roads and canals, citizenship,
(3) 
the change of residence, trades, insurance and poor relief , medical
and veterinary police, criminal and since 1873 the whole domain 
of civil law.
*
Even power to amend the Constitution has been conferred 
on the Federal Government. The German Federal Constitution is 
the most flexible, the most easily amended, that IB theoretically, 
of all the Constitutions of Federal States. »Amendments of the 
Constitution shall be made by legislative enactment. They shall be 
considered as rejected when fourteen votes are cast against them 
in the Bundesrat. The provisions of the Constitution of the Bmptre 
by which certain rights are secured to particular states of the Union
(1) """xoept in Bavaria anci
(2) Except in Bavaria.
(3) Except In Bavaria.
(4) Peichsverfassun^ 11.
(5) Amendment 1873 December
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in their relation to the whole,shall only be modified with the conse*
(1)
of the States affected. The Constitution is not, therefore
entirely flexible, for eaoh State possesses an ab;50lu 4;^ veto on 
a question affecting Its own privileges, while fourteen votes of 
the Bundesrat - the Federal Chamber - are sufficient to negative 
an amendment, which is not required to be submitted either to the 
people or to the Legislatures of the States, It must be passed 
like an ordinary law by the popular representatives in the Reichstagf 
but no additional po\ver of affecting tliB alterations of the
Constitution is given to that House as to tlie Bundesrat. Prom
(2) 
1871 to 1906 nine amendments were passed, which though considerably
fewer than those of Switzerland, are proportionately inor^ numerous 
than the amendments to the constitution of the United Rcatos. 
Both in Germany and in Switzerland however, ths extensive powers, of 
t;ie Ped'sral rrovernmsnt hav>* facilitated centralisation and 
development "by legislation.
The States have therefore boon deprived of wide 
legislative authority /hich has been conferred on the Federal 
Government. The power of the ".-xeo-ntivy og the State, i.e. the 
dynastic Governments, has been little curtailed, for to them is 
entrusted the .carrying out of Federal laws. TScoept for foreign 
affairs and the Havy t and 10 some extent the army and postal 
service) the function of the Federal Government in Germany as in 
Switzerland is limited to-regulation and srpervision. The customs
(1) r eiohsverfassun£ Art. 78.
(2) See "Dareste. Constitutions Moderns.
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duties are collected by State officials who are inspected by 
Federal inspectors and must act in accordance with Federal laws* 
Even the coining of Imperial raoney is entrusted to State mints, 
which are provided with the necessary amount of metal.
The states also partly bear the cost of the administra-
(1) 
tion of the federal laws, and their expenses are included in the
contributions to the Imperial revenue (Matrieular-beitrage) which
(2) 
the states make, A similar rrovision exists in the Swiss
Constitution, but it has hitherto never been acted upon. In 
Germany however regular contributions have been paid by the States
to the Federal finances. In addition, the Federal Government
(3| 
replenishes its Exchequer from the tariff dues, posts and railways,
And in these matters the Federal Government possesses indirectly 
the taxing power over the individual which is essential in a
Federal State. The immediate relation between the Federation and
(4) 
the State is also secured in the composition of the Federal
Legislature but in the two other channels of direct contact between 
the individual and the Federation - defence and judgment - the 
Imperial Federation is irregular.
The military organisation o£ the Empire is peculiar, it 
is neither wholly Federal nor left entirely to the States. It is 
in harmony however with the general principle of the German 
Federation, - legislative centralisation and administrative
1) Wilson. The State. chap.Vll. (a) Art. 70.
3) See Statesman's Year Book. (4) See introd. pp.17-22.
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decentralisation. Very elaborate arrangements are made in the 
Constitution concerning the army, for it was characteristic of 
Bismarck to devote himself to practical details of this nature 
rather than to theoretical generalisations. Universal obligation 
to military service is d-clared throughout the Empire and every
recruit upon enlistment takes a joint oath to his territorial
(2)
sovereign and to the Emperor. But there is no Imperial army in
(3)
time of peace. There are four armies belonging to Prussia, 
Saxony, Bavaria and Wurtemburg respectively, A certain uniformity
of organisation on the Prussian model is demanded, and the armies are• ^
inspected by the Bmperor and are under his command, their composition
(4) 
disposal and regulation is determined by Imperial laws, and the
expense of maintaining the array is borne by the Federation. The
Emperor also appoints all officers commanding troops of more than
(5) 
one contingent and the appointment of generals is subject to his
approval, but the subordinate officers are left to the choice of each
State, In all other respects the management of the troops is
(6) 
left entirely to the control of each State. In time of war,
however, the armies are placed under the direct authority of the
The navy however is on quite a different footing. Prussia 
alone possessed a navy of any importance in 1871, which she had
(1) Peiohsverfassung XI. Art. 57. (2) In Bavaria only in time of
! 3) See infra p«133 peace, 4) "Except In Bavaria and to a certain extent in Wurtemburg in time
of peace,
(5) TUxoept in Bavaria. (6) ^ee Const. XI. Arts. 57-68,Treaty 
with Bavaria November 23rd 1870 and Convention with Wurtemburg 
November 21-25, 1870.
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bought by auction in 1852,from the Confederation, and this she 
transferred to the Knf>ire. The merchant vessels of all other 
States were likewise federalised. The navy is therefore underID
$he supreme command of the Emperor, who is charged with its 
constitution and organisation and the appointment of its officers, 
and in whose name the seamen are sworn in. The harbours of Kiel 
and Jade are Imperial harbours. The conditions of the commercial
marine are in the same way Imperial and Federal affairs. The navy
(2) 
belongs therefore to the Federal Empire and not to the States,
but the army is not directly an Imperial force, but is chiefly
controlled and managed by the four States, although subject to
(3) 
Imperial laws and in time of war at the disposal of the Federation.
In the same way justioe and Federal laware administered 
in the first instance by the State courts, as in Switzerland* There
is only one Iiaperial Court - Heiohsgerioht - with a hundred judges
i 
located not at Berlin but at La&psig. Thus as in Switzerland,
the Imperial tribunal does not stand at the head of a large Federal 
Judiciary such as the Supreme Court of the United States. In this 
latter regular Federal State, the Federal Stat^ Judiciaries work in 
separate fa*** independent and complete spheres of their own. The 
Courts of the separate Statos of the United ntates are in no sense 
organs of Federal justice4 they have an independent standing,
(1) Seastitution IX. Arts. 53-55. (2) like that of the U.S.A* 
(3) 'Except in Bavaria.
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organisation and Jurisdiction, and ar* not in any way except that 
of limitation affected by Federal law* The Swiss Federation 
employe the State Courts to execute its decrees, but it does not 
rule its procedure. The German State Camrts although In the same
'way Federal agents, ara also regulated in their organisation and
(1) 
rules of practice by Federal statutes, and moreover the whole field
of civil| criminal and commercial law is codified by Imperial law* 
There are therefore in each state "a similar series of courts 
.organised on an Imperial or Federal plan and expounding Imperial 
laws in accordance with Imperial forms of procedure, but whose
members are appointed by the local sovereign and render their
U>
decisions in h.is name. 11
Thus in Germany as in Switzerland, the ultimate 
enforcement of Federal laws depends not on the subjection of the 
individual to the ordinary federal law courts, but on the coercion
of the State which IB largely the agent of the Federation. The two
(3) 
processes of Switzerland and Germany are not dHUIimilar. The
German method of 'Federal Execution/ ordered by the Bundeefat
and carried out by the Emperor, is an armed attack on the delinquent
State. Xt has not yet been necessary to employ this means of
s o co-eroion, for the Imperial or Federal power is/closely united with
the 
Prussian, that Federal execution would also mean Prussian coercion
and no State possesses any reasonable hope of a successful issue to
(1) Cf. Clerichtsverfassunggesetz of January 27th 1877,and CiTil 
Prozessordnung of January 30th 187*7,and Strafprozessordung of 
February 1st 1877, the administrative courts however are left 
largely to the discretion of the several States.
(2) I owe 11 1. p.2^1. (3) See supra ohap. 111. p.-108.
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a resistance to Prussia,
The Imperial federal State of Germany therefore 
unusually wide legislative powers, "but the execution of the Federal 
laws is entrusted almost entirely to the State Governments, that 
is in reality to the Princes and Monarchs of the States. In the 
Constitutions of the Separate States and in the administration of 
Federal laws it is therefore the monarchs and dynasties who 
exercise the supreme governmental authority. In the composition 
of the Federal Legislature their influence is also equally great*
As in all federal States, one house of the Legislature 
represents the States in their corporate and independent capacity* 
In Germany as in no other Federation, the delegates to this house 
are appointed by the governments of the separate States. In 
addition, the members do not vot'j according to their individual 
opinion, but collectively according to the instructions of their 
respective governments. Thus one delegate raay cast the whole 
number.of votes for his State, in fact several of the smaller States 
were in the habit of commissioning an agent to represent them in the 
Federal Chamber* Since 1880 however the procedure of the 
Bundesrat has been divided into two parts, in the first of which 
important measures are passed, and in which every State must be 
represented by its own members. In the second half the members 
may depart, and any agent may be authorised to deliver the vote of 
the State* The delegates are recalled and paid at will by the
(1) By the Senates of the Fr-je cities.
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Governments of the Statea and the ambassadors are guaranteed safe-
(l) U)
conducts by the Federal Constitution. *Th« true conception of the
\
Bundearat is an Assembly of the Sovereigns of the States, not 
actually present but acting through their Representatives." This 
fact together with the great powers whioh as an organ of the Federal 
Government the Bundesrat possesses justifies a German jurist's 
statement that w The "body of German Sovereigns together with the
Senates of the three Free Cities, considered as a unit - tanquam
(3) 
unura corpus - is the repository of Imperial Sovereignty. 1*
The composition of the Bundesrat illustrates the second 
guiding principle1 o* the German Federation, - the inequality of 
the States. The German Kmpire differs from all other Federal States 
in the fact that it is a Federation of Monarchies; it differs no 
leas vitally in its being, not a union of states with equal rights, 
but att association of privileged members* The United States is 
based on an equality of parts, and the decided preponderence of any 
one State would wholly destroy the character of the Union. The 
German Federation is organised on a plan that can only work 
successfully, in case one member is strong enough to t?ke the lead 
and to keep the main guidance in its hands.
The^ express ion of the inequality of members is contained 
the r^prfjfcjentation of the States in the Bundearat, the Federal
(1) Reiohsverfassuns 111. Art, 10
(2) Lowell 1. p.267.
(3) Laband Deutsohes Staatrecht p.40 Cf. Wilson. The State p.258
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Chamber, and in this feature Germany may be coapared with Canada 
which has alao apportioned unequally the members of the provinces 
in the second Housa of the Legislature.
In t'le Bundesrat, th^ »ln plenum' arr-^sraent of the Diet 
of the old Confederation has bean preserved, except that Bavaria 
was giren six votes, as in the Bundesrat of the Zollverein from • 
1866 - 1871,and Prussia acquired/votes of the States she annexed in
(•T '
1366. Of the sixty-one members, Prussia.has seventeen votes, 
Bavaria six, Saxony and Wurtemburg four each, Baden, Kesse and 
Alsace-Lorraine three eaon, Brunswick and Mecklenburg-Schwerin 
two each, and the remaining fourteen States and three free Cities 
one each.
Besides this expression which is allowed in the Federal 
Legislature to the inequalities of the States, more direct privilege! 
have been granted fcc-tkem by exceptions to the uniform application 
of Imperial laws which have been made in their favour.
Hamburg and Bremen were declared free ports and excluded 
from the operation of the Imperial Customs tariff. Both cities(i)
have since how^v^r surrendered this privilege.
More extensive* privileges were granted to the Southern 
States to secure their adhesion to the North German Confederation 
in J871.
Bavaria has the entire control of her army in time of
(1) See infra Chap. 1. p.224 (2) 13 in nuab«r i- Hanover 4, 
Hesse-Cassel 3, Holstein-Lanenburg 3, Nessau 2 and ?rankfert 1.
(3) since 1911. See infra p, 190.
(4) Hamburg 1333 Bremen 1885
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peace, except for the stipulation that it must conform to the 
general organisation of the Federal array • The exemption from 
Lqperial control does not in addition extend to the universal 
obligation to military service. In every other way, however, 
the Bavarian army is independently controlled by the Ptat'-i itself v
and is subject only to the right of inspection which is.retained by
(1)
the "Emperor. In time of war it is of course placed under the
exclusive command f the Super or. Bavaria is also exempt from
(2) 
the Imperial ©xctfcse on beer and may impost* its own duties on ^hie
commodity. It is excluded froir Iniperial railway legislation, 
except with reference to those tailways which are of a strategic 
importance. Imperial laws on matters relating to marriage and 
domicile and settlement do not extend to that ?>tate f and It
organises its own postal and telegraphic services, subject to certair
(3)
Imperial regulations. Bavaria is also entitled to a seat on
ohe Committee of the Bundesrat on the army and fortifications and
tin the Presidency of th-; Committee on foreign affairs, in which
(4) 
Saxony and ^tfurtenftrarg must also be represented* Saxony in addition
possesses the privilege of having the seat .;f the Federal Judiciary 
located in its territory.
Wurtemburg possesses, besides, the seat in the Committee 
on foreign affairs, equal privileges -ith Bavaria with regard to 
posts and tolegrapho, and to the Imperial excise on beer, from which
(1) See supra p.178. (S)'TTntil 1877 on Brandy also,
(3) Reichsverfasaung XI. Treaty of November 23rd 1870. Arts. 46& 
4 s.l.Art. 52,
(4) 111. Art. 8.
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Baden is also exempt • Wuttemburg has also been granted special 
military privileges, although not so great as those of Bavaria,
It is however in the relation of Prussia to the 
Federation that the most important and oonsplcuoi's example is 
afforded of the privileged character of its composition. In si«e 
and population Prussia alone Is greater than all the other States 
of the TSmpiro put together, possessing two-thirds of the territory 
of the whole federation and containing three-fifths of its entire 
population* It is therefore natural that in a compact of sueh 
a nature, Prussia should play the lion* part*
Besides its Imperial position, the power of Prussia has 
been also increased as a separate nsmber by an exercise of the 
rights of concluding treaties on local matters which the federal 
Constitution permits to the States of the Knap ire.
Thus the Prince of Faldeek, desiring to retire, from the 
financial burdens of government, sold his rights, with the exception] 
of a few prerogatives which he retained, to the King of Prussia, who
•has bought the goodwill of his trade, and carries on the government
\*/ 
as his successor* 11 With the government of Waldeck, Prussia
acquired also the vote of that Principality in Bundesrat, and in 
1886 she secured the appointment of a Prussian Prlnoe as Regent 
of Brunswick, and thus gained virtual control ov*«r the two votes 
of this State. These three votes, together wit 1 the three
(1) Cf; Lowell 1*. pp.249 & 353.
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. * 
of Alsace-IiOrKaine, have given her command therefore over twenty-
throe votes in the Bundesrat out of the sixty-one.
Several States have in a similar manner transferred their 
postal administrative rights to Prussia, and the Jurisdiction of the 
their Courts, while Baden and all the members of the old North 
German Confederation except Saxony i.e. all the States of the 
Empire except Saxony, Bavaria and ̂ urtemburg have transferred their
military organisations to the control of Prussia. As has been
(8) 
already described , the "Empire exercises a supervisory and legislative
regulation of military affairs, but has left the organisation of 
the armies to the States themselves* As most of the smaller 
States found it too expensive to maintain universal military 
service and the requisite amount cf efficiency, they transferred 
their armies to Prussia, on a condition that they should not be 
removed from the it respective States , except in case of actual 
necessity. But for all practical purposes they are recruited « 
drilled, commanded and organised by Prussia, and in fact form an 
integral part of the seventeen corps which she contributes to the 
twenty-five active corps which constitute the Federal army*
These are however 'private 1 or State privileges of 
Prussia* She possesses many more by virtue of the Federal of 
Imperial Constitution*
In military affairs her organisation, military code, 
even to the out of the soldiers 'uniform, is established as a model
(1) See however infra p. 3.90
(2) See supra p. 178.
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(1)
for that of the other States. With her twenty votes in the
Bundesrat she possesses an absolute veto on all changes in the 
Constitution. She is, in addition, given the Presidency of that 
chamber whioh gives her a casting vote in case of ties and tha 
final decisions on all laws affecting the army, navy or the customs, 
or upon the rules and regulations for the execution of the laws of
the TSmpire, whenever it shall be pronounced in favour of retaining
(2) 
existing arrangements. The power though negative is important.
She is also chairman of all the standing committees of the Bund® era fa
(3) 
except that in foreign affairs,
Finally the Prussian Capital is the seat of the Federal 
(4) 
Government, and Berlin has become the first capital of Germany
4 
•
for "neither Aachen nor Dresden, neither Tfcims nor Heidleberg, 
Frankfort nor Munich, Cologne nor Augsburg were capitals as London
t
or Paris were capitals" - expression of the unity of the nation* 
The entry of Napoleftn into Vienna did not mean what the entry of the
Germans into Paris in 1871 meant, but the occupation of Berlin by
(5) 
a foreign foe would now involve the whole Empire in its downfall*
The Prussian King, tha Arch-Monarch of the Federation of Honarchs 
is also declared perpetual President of the Federation. He is 
given the Imperial title , and the chief executive power of the 
Federation; and the Imperial Presidency is regulat d solely
(1) Reiohsverfassung XI. Art. 61. Her education laws have also been 
largely adopted throughout the ^itpire. Statesman f s Year T^ook 1916* 
» Arts. 5. 35, 37. (3) Cf. supra r.1^4
4) "Except the Reichsgaricht.
5) Cf. Marriott and Robertson 'Evolution of Prussia 1 p. 14.
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according to the laws of succession of the Prussian Boyal House, 
and is in fact a hereditary and ex offioio appendage to the Prussia
f
Monarchy*
It is of interest to notice that Prussia as a member of 
the Imperial Federation has not demanded exemption from the operatior 
of Federal laws in the same way as Bavaria or Wurteraburg. Such 
an immunity would indeed be of little use, f r the Government of 
the "Empire is to a great extent conducted in accordance with the 
will of Prussia. Not that her wish may not be and in conspicuous
41)
instances has been defeated but the organisation of the Federal 
Government gives to her the supreme controlling power in the 
Empire* It is in recognition of this fact that the exemptions 
from Imperial laws already described, have been granted to the 
Southern States. For the German Federal State is a triple 
complication of privileges and inequalities.
Firstly certain States in the Federation are distinguished 
by their possession of comparatively large areas, or numerous 
populations, and in this respect alone Prussia rules more than half 
the Federation! secondly the prominence of these States is expressed 
and confirmed by the parts they have been assigned in the Government 
of the Federation itself* Their rank in the Federal hierarchy 
which has thus "been constructed, is not apportioned, however f in any 
exact ratio to their individual worth for Prussia, although she is 
given all the Executive power of the Federation (except that which
(1) <:.g. The Imperial Railroad 3ili of 1875 and in the fixing of 
the Judiciary at Leipsig rather than at Berlin 1877.
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vested. 
is/in the Bundesrat) and this as already stated is small compared
with tht Federal Legislative authority, is only entitled
T QQ<3 fhfl.Tl
conatitutionaly to/one-third, and actually possesses a little more 
than one-third of the votes of the legislative Chambor which ^ 
represents the States. Thirdly, in addition to particular power 
as individual States, and to relatively privileged positions in the 
Federation in respect of their individual greatness r and "both of
these factors have given Prussia a pre-eminent position in the
(1) 
German Empire - certain of the other States viz:- Bavaria,
wturtemburg and so on have "been specially favoured as it were 
against the Federation, or -in reality against the privilege in the 
Federation which lias been accorded to Prussia as the largest State* 
This third concession of privilege la therefore of the nature of an 
exception to f or even contradiction of, the result of the operation 
of the first and second causes. Bavaria, itself privileged in 
respect of smaller States such as Schaumburg-Llppe IB, in addition, . 
specially protected against the extension of the same privilege in 
the case of Prussia, the largest State of the Federation* Of 
course in practice all the powers possessed by all the States 
excluding Prussia act or may act, as checks upon the ascendancy of 
Prussia, and it Is therefore perhaps of little point to discriminate 
between the cone ̂ ssions which have been granted to Bavaria for 
example, in respect of its siae or historical position, and those 
which have been #iven to it as a protection against the greater
(1) I»e, distinguishing between Prussia on the one hand and all the 
/ other States of the Federation on the other.
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powers which were accorded to Prussia in respect of its siae and 
historical position. It is nevertheless an interesting Federal 
example of a complicated inequality of privilege within privilege.
The irregularity of the federation is still further 
increased by the position of Alsace-Lorraine4 The province 
which was part of the price v/hich France paid for her defeat in 
1870 was not formed into an autonomous State on the model of the 
other members of the Federation, nor on the other hand was it 
annexed to any one Stats of the "Empire. Indeed Prussia alone 
could have incorporated it without danger to its internal
tranquillity and it has therefore been made an Imperial Province,
(1)
f Reichsland f . The Government is vested in the Emperor who carries
out the administration of the laws which he enacts with the consent 
of the native 'Landesaussehlues 1 , a legislative assembly consisting r 
of two Houses of which the first is of a popular, the second of an 
official and nominated character. The Emperor exercises his 
power through the Statthaltsr or Governor whom he appoints and may . 
remove. Alsace-Lorraine possesses some share in the Government 
of the Federation. It sends fifteen members to the Beichstag,
and three members to the Bundasrat, who, since the Constitution of
(2) 
1911 have been allowed to vote, except on questions effecting an
alteration in' the Constitution or when,added to the votes of Prussia 
they would create a majority in the House. For the Emperor who
(1) The Constitution of Alsace-Lorraine Is based on the Imperial 
laws o» 1371, 1872. 1873, 1879 & 1911.
(2) See Annual Register 1911 p.328 seq.
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appoints the Statthaltir, who nominates the delegates^ virtually 
controls the votes of Alsaoe -Lorraine in the Bundesrat.
The position of Alsace-Lorraine is therefore anomalous. 
It is not an independent State for the "Emperor possesses the 
executive power, but on the other hand it exercises a reasonable 
influence in the Federal noverament. Before 1911 in its 
organisation and its relation to the Empire it resembled a 
"f^rtitory* of the United States, but, sines 1911 it has taken 
a "• step towards 'Statehood 1 , although it still does not possess 
the full autoaomy whioh is accorded to the 1131; members of the 
American Federation, It differs still nor^ vitally in its 
history from the now States of th« United States, for Alsace-
%
Lorraine was acquired by conquest and although the larger part of 
ites inhabitants are of German r^ce, they have acquired, during their 
association of thre« centuries with France, a deep sympathy with 
French institutions and ideas, which the forty years of German 
rule have apparently not boon able to undo,
The composition of the German Federal Stat<9 is therefore 
distinguished by two characteristics; firstly by the power of the 
Princes, who exercise the governimg frmctions in all the ntates, and 
whose position is strengthened by t}ta nature of the distribution 
of authority between the Federation and the part-Statos, and 
secondly by the irregularity and inequality < f the lumbers of the 
Federation . The express Ion of both these features in the 
Bundesrathas already been described and the connection of Prussia - 
the most Important example of both prinoii l^s - /1th the Federation
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briefly indicated* A description of the construction of the 
Federal Govsnaent and the relation of its parts, enable the 
importance of the two characteristics to "be more accurately
f
measured*
The chief Executive power of the Federation is rested 
in the Emperor, who however as a separate Federal Officer does 
not exist, for the Imperial functions are exercised by the reigning 
King of Prussia, who, in the capacity of President of the Federation^ 
bears the title of German Emperor. His title is therefore 
official and not territorial; he is 'deutscher Kaiser* and not 
'Kaiser von Beutschland 1 . The duties of the Federal Executive 
consist in the publication of Federal laws and the supervision of 
their execution. For the administrative authority of the Federa­ 
tion or Empire is small, and the Kmperor as Federal ftxecntive 
Officer possesses powers considerably less than those of the 
President of the United States in virtue of a similar position. 
Whereas the American President executes the Federal laws, the
German President supervises their execution by the States. Like
(1)
the President of the United States, the Emperor is Commander-in- 
chief of the army and navy} he controls foreign affairs; declares 
war, subject to the consent of the Bundesrat, except in the case 
when German territory or coasts are invaded, makes treaties for 
which so far as they refer to matters of Imperial legislation, the 
consent of the Bundesrat and the approval of the Eeichstag are
(1) See ReichsvMrfaBSimg iv. Art. 11-1S.
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necessary; he accredits and receives ambassadors, and represents 
the Federation in all its relations with, foreign countries. As 
the President of the United "Hates may send troops into a State in 
case of invasion, or,upon request,of domestic disturbance, so the 
Emperor is charged with the carrying out of the "Federal Execution" 
against a State when it is ordered by the Bundesrat. Like the 
Rupublican President, the Emperor possesses a power of appointment| 
he may appoint all Imperial officials subject to a certain right 
of confirmation which has been given to the Bundesrat. He may 
summon and adjourn the Houses of the Legislature and,with the 
consent of the Bundesrat,may dissolve the Reichstag.
The authority of the Emperor as Executive officer of the 
federation is therefore small except in foreign affairs. As 
Emperor he possesses no right of pardon, or of veto on legislation, 
such as is exercised by the President of the United States; and his 
consent is not legally necessary to the passage of a lawj he has no 
initiative in legislation, nor is he represented in the Reichstag
at all, for the Chancellor strictly speaking is only there as a
(1) 
member of the Bundesrat. As Emperor he may not confer titles 9 nor
does he enjoy an Imperial civil list, or possess' an Imperial 
household*
The powers of the Emperor are however largely 
supplemented by his powers as King of Prussia, and it is in his 
Prussian and not in his Imperial capacity, that the influence of
(1) Cf. Lowall. Governments and Parties Vol,l. p.275
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the Emperor 4s dominant in the Federation. Thus, although as 
Bmperor he has no. veto on Federal Legislation, as King of Prussia 
and director of the Prussian votes in the Bundesrat he has a very 
extensive veto. His functions as King and Emperor are indeed so 
closely interwoven that it is difficult to distinguish them. As
•
Emperor his Majesty William 11. carries on the administration,
»
through the Rtatthalter, of Alsace-Xorrain^j as King of Prussia he
three - 
governs in addition/fifths of the whole population of the Empire
and is sovereign of two-thirds of the territory. As Kmperor, he 
supervises the execution of the Imperial military laws throughout
all the States of the Federation except Bavaria and Wurtemburg,
(2) 
appoints the highest officers of the several armies, and inspects
them from time to time. As King of Prussia, he has absolute
command throughout, of the troops of all the States except Bavaria
(3)
Wurtamburg and Saxony, regulates their organisation and appoints thej
lower officers. "As Emperor he instructs the Imperial Chancellor 
to prepare a "billj as King he instructs him to introduce it into 
the Bundesrat and directs how approximately one-third of the votes 
of that body shall be cast. Then the Bill is laid before the 
Reichstag in his name as Emperor and as King he directs the
4
Chancellor what amendments to accept on behalf of the Bundesrat t 
or rather of the Prussian delegation there. After the bill has 
been passed and become law, he promulgates it as Emperor and in
(1) See supra p. 183 & 186. 
(21 xcept in Bavaria ani 
(3) See supra p« 178 & 184
Chapter
most cases administers it in Prussia as King, while finally as
(1) 
TSmperor he supervises his own administration as King?
The ^raperor's position is however not so confusing as it 
appears. The situation is not so much that of a double position 
or dual personality; William 11. does not as King act in one way 
and then, having; divas ted himself of his Kingship assume the 
"Emperor and act in i|noth«r way. But as King Of Prussia he is 
German Emperor, and as head of the Hohenaollerns i.e. of the Royal 
Family of Prussia^ he is the I2xecutiv« Officer of the Federation* 
For the German Federation is fcased on the inequality of the States 
and on the monarchial principle of government, and Williara 11. as 
Monarch of the greatest State is ex-officio President of the 
Federation and German Emperor.
There is one ether Executive Officer of the Federation 
viz:- the Imperial Chancellor rfhoae counter-signature ie in fact
required for the validity of Imperial decrees, and"who thereby
U) 
assumes responsibility for them*" In fact he represents the
"Rmperor in the Federal Government and performs most of his Imperial 
duties* His functions as Chancellor ar % however, small, and like 
his Royal Master he derives his powers chiefly from his Prussian 
connection, for as Chancellor he represents neither the King of
Prussia nor any of the other Monarchs of the Federation. In
(3) 
practice, - and only once has the practice been departed from -
the Imperial Chancellor is at the same time Ministsr-Prasident of
|1) Lowoll op, oit. l. p.276. (2) Keichsverfassung Art.17. 
,3) In the c se of Von Caprivi in 1892.
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Prussia and chief of the Prussian delegation to the BundesrRt. 
Indeed owing to the peculiar connection between Prussia and the 
T5n$plre such an identification seems necessary. Although the 
Chancellor Is President - as representing the Emperor - of the 
Bundeerat it is in the fact that he controls the votes of Prussia 
.that his Importance lies. In the Reichstag oh the other hand, 
utiere he appears nominally as commissioner for the Bundesrat or one
of its Prussian raeirfbers, his importance is really due to hie position
(1) 
as chief of the federal Government. There he is flubject to
interpellations, but he does not resign on an adverse vote, For 
the Constitution provides no means of securing his political 
responsibility to the Reichstag* If such a responsibility were
established, It would sever the connection of the Imperial
*
Chancellor with Prussia, for no minister could he responsible to
two chambers one of which might on one d^y call opon him to resign, 
whila the other ordered him to remain in office. Even were 
ministerial responsibility introduced in one - either tha Sarplre or 
Prussia - and not in the other, the same difficulty would arise. 
The Chancellor is in fact responsible to the Emperor alone, by whom 
he is appointed. The Chancellor - as the Federal Executive - is 
not represented in the Lower House, he is non-parliament -ry and 
Irresponsible. The Tfcnperor may however, with the consent of the 
Bundesrat, dissolve the Keichstag and appeal to the nation over 
its head. This method has so far be^n successful in case of
(1) T,<r.'79l! 1. i-.S
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(1)
opposition, and the new Chamber has been more sympathetic. The
fall of a minister may of course be brought about by popular 
opposition, but there exists no political compulsion. In no 
one of the three Federal States therefore, - the United States, 
Switzerland and Germany - has the principle of the political 
responsibility of the executive to the Legislature been adopted in 
the Government of the Federation.
The first Imperial Chancellorship was held for nearly 
twenty years by Bismarck, who moulded the office larrcsly according
to his personal wishes. He had wished indeed to ma.1^ the
U>
Imperial Chancellor a Prussian officer, but although ha was over*
ruled in the theory of the office, he practically succeeded in 
carrying out his intention. It waB also owing to his dislike of 
colleagues, that no Imperial Cabin it has been developed. There 
are "substitutes 1* who were created taqprarily to reli^v ?. an over­ 
worked Chancellor of sotae of hia duties, and who have since become a 
rermenant bodjr of officials, but they ar^ subordinates not colleague 
they are subject to his 'orders, and the Chancellor alone remains 
the sole head of the Government and morally responsible for Its 
whole policy.
The federal Legislatire consists of two Houses, based,
in the usual manner of a Federal State, 6n the two Federal elements.
(3) 
The Reichstag, or national House r^pr^sents tue States
(1) Cf. In the case of the array bill on 1892 - 1893.
(2) Cf. Lowell P.277
(3) See ReichsVerfastfung V. Arts. 20-32,
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In proportion to their population. The number of three hundred 
and ninty-Beven members of vhicli it consists, v ras fixed in 1871 and 
since that dat«* no redistribution of seats has taken place. The 
to /ns therefore which have grown rapidly in the interval are far 
from adequately represented; Berlin, for example, only sends six 
members instead of about thirty* T^reryman who is twenty five 
years old, and not on active service or otherwise disqualified, may 
vot^, and any voter who is a German citizen of one yearte standing 
is eligible for election in any constituency in the Ernpire. The
electoral districts are fixed by Imperial law, as in Switzerland,
(1) 
and members are chosen by the syst^n of ballotage, since 1888 for
five years. Prussia by virtue of her population possesses two 
hundred.and thirty-five seats, Bavaria comes next with forty-eight,
and so on. If a member of the Reichstag accepts a higher office
(2) 
he must offer himself for re-election, in English fashion.
In 1871 universal suffrage 7/as a novel experiment and
(3) 
Bismarck insisted on the non-payment of members. This was even
extended to prevent the payment of Socialist members by their cwn
(4) 
Unions or organisations. The article of the Constitution
prohibiting remuneration was however repealed in 1906 and members
(15) 
now receive three thousand marks, per session with a deduction of
twenty marks for every day's absence.
(1) I.e. an absolute roajority is required for election at the first 
ballot, and failing this another vote is taken between the first and
second candidates. (2) Wilson. The State. 
(3) Art. 32. (4)
(s)
 Cf. Lowell 1. p.253.
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The members possess t}.^ ordinary privilege of freedom ; 
of speech and from arrest, ^,lth''vi^h scrio little opj edition has been 
offered to thsir exercise, and the House may elect its own officer*, 
draw up its own rules and decide its own disputed elections. Th« 
pwar of the Reichstag appear also in theory very great. All laws, 
loans, t1.« budget, and all treaties involving legislation require 
its consent. It may initiate legislation, interpellate the 
Chancellor, and on the deiru'.nd of fifty members may force a debate. 
OVJF taxation however, it has no such hold as the TTcmse of Commons, 
it possesses no exclusive initiative in financial affairs, and 
the revenne laws are permanent or passed for long periods at a time,, 
and cannot be changed without the consent of the Bundesr^t. The
military appropriation law is in practice determined by the law
(1)
fixing the number of $roops and this is passed some years , Jiead.
Some lavs, and notably that extending the competence of the 
Federation to civil lav, hav . been passed on its initiation, but it 
does not direct the legislative policy of the State, and its chief 
function lies rather in the consideration of bills which are 
submitted to it by tho Chancellor an<l the Sundesrat. It exercise a 
its power of amendment frooly , but ib is a negative rather than a 
positive activity. It chsclcs and restrains, but it does not 
govern. ?lo mini?-t^r is responsible to it, the 'government f of 
the day ir; neither chosen fro n it nor may "be dismissed from office 
by it. The TSxecutivo however, ^osseBses a power to dissolve thef «.'- *-
(1) TiOv/oll' 1. p.25G.
Chapter IV* ffBBMpY 200
House, with the consent of the Bundesrat, a means xhich is used 
to break down opposition and is no*; tlie complement of ministerial 
responsibility as in countries of Parliamentary Government. The 
rriinist^r 13 not htr.^v^r responsible to the nation* (for he would not 
be "bound to resign were the new House hostile to his rlans. In 
practice, however * this has never happened, and the question has 
therefore not yet been forced to its ultimate issue. It Is a 
curious provision, and in no other State may the Lswer and larger
House be dissolved by the ITpper and smaller. The Reichstag may
and \ 
not be i rorogued for more than thirty days/in case *f dissolution
a new House must be elected and meet within ninety days.
The Second House - the Bundesrat - is perhaps the most 
interesting institution of the Eng>ir^. It represents the States
but unequally and the members ar- appointed by the Governments of
(1) 
the several States and vott according to instructions. Therefore,
although it expresses ".he supremacy of PrtAssia, it on the other har«i
V
r$3"resent3 the centrifugal element of t-'.e Federation arid is the
' T
champion of State independence at̂  .inst ohe unification or 
Pr"?s^ianisati«".n of Hermany. it is the 'central and characteristic 
organ o- the r^iipir^*, the nost thoroughly native .feature of the
*
Constitution* It pos^sss^s v/ide and hetero^eneaBS powers and 
a peculiar vit^lifcy. In i ;:s f^.?ic lions it is as -'inert ar- executive 
council ae a le^iolativ^ chaiaber, and in this it nomewhet resembles 
the Henat^ of tl'.e ^riit -xl ntat-JS. v ^ Ii^.lBla^.ure of th ft German
(1) Sea supra pp. 177
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(1)
IBmpire has in fact been called unioameral. It is however based
on the ordinary Federal principle of the representation of the two 
elements of a Federation, and in this respect may legitimately be - 
compared with the bi-crijneral Legislatures of other Federal Statue. 
It is not however a deliberative Assembly, because the delegates 
vote according to instructions from home. On the other hand it 
is not an international conference because it is part of a 
Constitutional system and has power to enact laws, b^t it is 
unlike any other legislative Chamber in as much as the members
do not enjoy a fixed tenure of office, and ar« not free to vote
U) 
according to their personal convictionsI
Like the Senate of the United Sjrates it is organised on 
the Committee System* The Constitution in 1871 provided for 
eight standing Committees, but these have now been increased to 
twelve; - on the army and fortresses, maritime affairs, foreign
affairs, taxes and customs, trade, railroads, posts and telegraphs,\
accounts, the Constituion, Alsace-Lorraine, civil and criminal law
A ' \
and on standing orders, respectively. The members of the first
\
two are appointed by the Emperor, and Bavaria constitutionally, 
and Saxony and Wurtemburg by a special convention, are always
represented in the Committee on the army and fortresses. The\
other Committees are elected annually by the Bundesrat itself, and 
must represent five States, of which one must be Prussia ..except in
(1) Dtaoi&ynes. Cf. Marriott, Second Chambers p.116 seq. for 
discussion of question*
(2) Lowell op* oit. p.264.
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foreign affairs - who is ex-offioio chairman. A further 
illustration of the ambassadorial character of the Bundesrat is 
afforded by the fact that the TSmperor or Bundesrat merely 
designates the States to be represented, and the State Government
appoints its own delegate.
(1) 
In the committee on foreign affairs, Prussia has no
seat. Bavaria is the constitutional President and Saxony and 
Wftrteaburg must be represented as well as two other States. 
Prussia's absenoe is however of not much importance, for the 
committee can only listen and take action according to the reports 
of the Chancellor who is in practice a Prussian minister for 
foreign affairs* The Committee does not report as other 
committees do, and is really a means of securing that the larger 
States of the Empire shall be legally and permanently consulted on 
foreign affairs.
The consent of the Bundesrat as part of the Legislature 
is required to every law. It possesses an initiative in 
Legislation, as well as every State, and it has succeeded in 
making its power far more effective than thr Reichstag. In matters 
not common to the whole !?mpire only the States interested can
vote. This provision also extended to the Reichstag, but was
as 
repealed for that House in 1873/it was inconsistent with the
Imperial and National Unity which the Reichstag represents.
Although the legislative powers of the two Houses are
(1) Heiehverfassung 111. Art. 8
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co-ordinate, the Bundesrat is the main source of Federal legislation.
This is partly due to the fact that the Chancellor is its President
(1)
and chiefly to its large additional functions.
It may order 'Federal Execution 1 against a State and 
with the consent of the Emperor, may dissolve the Reichstag. It 
has power to make regulations for the conduct of the administration, 
and to issue ordinances necessary for the execution of the laws 
of the "Empire so far as no other provision is made by law. Its 
consent is necessary to declarations of war except on invasion and 
fio the conclusion of treaties (with the Reichstag). It confirms 
the appointment of the Judges of th<^ Imperial Court, the Consuls 
and the taa>collectors, and elects the members of the Court of 
Accounts. In some ways it acts like a ministry, for it appoints 
one or more of its members to represent it in the Reichstag and to 
support its measures. Any member may attend the lower House and 
speak even against the proposals of the Bundesrat.
The Bundesrat possesses also large judicial powers. 
To it is committed the decision of disputes between the Imperial 
and States* Governments concerning the interpretation of Statutes. 
In this power it resembles the Federal Council of Switzerland, 
as in some of its other functions. It also acts as a Court of 
Appeal in cases where there is a denial of Justice by the State 
Court, and it decides controversies between the States in the 
domain of public law, or it may appoint some other body to decide 
them* Constitutional questions in the Sfrates may also be_____^ 
(1) Reichsverfassung 111. 7 & 9; IV. 11 & 19j V. 24.
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settled by the mediation of the Bnndesrat upon the request of onetiy
of the parties*
The Btmdesrat Is therefore a combination of Legislative 
Chamber, Executive Council and Court of Appeal. "It is a nullity 
if regarded as an Independent part of the Constitution for its 
impulse is from without. Yet it is the most important organ
in the IBmplre, as is the instrument whereby the larger States
(2) 
(especially Prussia) rule the Rmplrs,* And in its relative
position in the federal Government and in its composition it
demonstrates the truth of Bismarck's statement thafthe dynasties
are the true guardians of German unity, not the Reichstag*ndits jart lest
The organisation of the Federal Judiciary has already 
(3) 
been described;and it is obvious that the judicial powers of the
Bundesrat have deprived it of a large province of jurisdiction, 
Like the Federal Tribunal of Switzerland it does not possess the 
power which accrues to the Supreme Court of the United States from 
its position as interpreter of the Constitution. As in 
Switzerland there Is no pervading and fundamental distinction in
< • •
Germany between Constituent and legislative enactments. The 
decision of the validity of Statutes lies not with the Reichsgerictt^ 
but with the Bundesrat as with the Federal Council in Switzerland* 
Though the Federal Council does not represent the Bundesrat, yet 
in both cases the States of the Federation are given a more direct 
share in decisions respecting Federal laws that in the
(1) Cf. Arts. 76 & 77 (2) Lowell 1. 872. 
(3) See supra p|17.8-.'0.
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States where suoh desiftions emnate from a Federal Court whoee 
Judges are appointed by the federal Executive. Every law of the 
German Federation as of the Swiss, must probably be accepted by the 
Coutts as valid, although State legislation can apparently be
treated as unconstitutional. Both of these last two points remain
(2)
still a matter of dispute.
The Imperial Court exercises original jurisdiction in 
case of treason against the Empire, e.g. espionage, and appellate 
Jurisdiction from the Federal Consular • Courts, and from the State 
Courts on questions of Imperial law. It is t in addition, a 
general Court of Error for all cases arising under the ordinary 
Imperial civil and criminal law.
(1) S
(2) $
(1) ee Dicey Law of the Constitution. Appendix .Vote 2. 
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The British Empire, with its rich constitutional history, 
must be ^iven a prominent place in the development of Federalism. 
Two of the f Self*governfcng fI)orainions - Canada and Australia - are 
Federal States, The Union of South Africa, formed in 1909,a 
is a legislative and not a Federal Union. For the Parliament of 
the Union is supreme over every legislative Assembly of the 
Provinces, *The Government and the Parliament of the Union 
shall have full power and authority within the limits of the 
colonies," ( Cape of Good Hope, Natal, Transvaal and the Orange
River Colony)—— "and shall have full power to make laws for the
(2) 
peace, order and,good government of the Union,» "In addition, the
Supreme Courts of the Provinces shall become provincial divisions
(3)
of the Supreme Court of South Afriea"
It is of interest to notice however t>r>t certain
temporary features pertaining to the Union and of a Federal nature, 
The composition of the Senate, or Second House of the Parliament, 
for example, whioh is fixed until 1919, olosely resembles the 
construction of the Second Chambers of Federal legislatures on thfe
basis of the equal representation of the part-States. For each
(4) 
Province has received eight Representatives in the Senate, The
Parliament of the Union is besides limited for at least ten y^ars
!1), See Supra p.23, 2). 
I
South Africa Art 9. Ed,;.7. Preamble and Arts 4 & 89, of, also 
Lucas. The British Empire. p,172. Brand. The Union of South Africa.
3). Ibid, Art 90,
4), Art,24,
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from the date of the formation of the Union in respect of this
(1) 
and other teaforary arrangements f while the special enumeration of
(2) 
subjects within the competency of the Provincial Legislatures,
although it does not thereby restrict the legislative sovereignty of 
the Parliament of the rnion, bears a certain resemblance to the 
division of powers of a Federal State, The concentration of 
Legislative authority,however, in a Single Parliament places the 
Union of South Africa in the class of Unitary rather than of 
Federal States.
The States of Canada and Australia afford further 
examples of the application of the Federal principle,and in many 
of their characteristics they have added to the rich diversity of 
Federal history and practice*
T&e history of Canada is of double import in the grawth 
of the British Empire, For not only was it the first of English 
Colonies to adopt a Federal form of Government, but it was a 
pioneer in the evolution of Colonial self-government without
.['
which Federation seems hardly possible. The Provinces of the 
present dominion of Canada, combined for the first time the Imperial 
tie with self-government and with Federation,
Canada is the only instance of a Federation which was 
formed by the looseniig of a previous connection. This statement 
must be somewhat qualified however. Of the present nine
(1) Arts. 84, 33, 152.
(2) Art. 85.
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provinces, two only - Quebec and Ontario- and those only for a 
little more than a quarter of a century - had previously been 
bound together in a single legislative Union, Of the four 
provinces which federated iu 1867, neither Nova Scotia nor New 
Brunswick were connected with Ontario or Quebec in any other way 
than in their common allegiance to the British Empire. Kova 
Sootia • originally the French*Acadie f - had been an English
possession since the beginning of the eighteenth century, and
(1) 
•inoe the expulsion of the French Acadiands in 1755 had become
completely a&gliaised* In 1769, St. John's Isle, later known 
as Prince Edward Isl**, became a separate Stata and similarly New 
Brunswick, originally also a part of Nova Scotia and largely 
comprised within the County of Sunbury, received an independent 
government on the immigration of the Loyalists from the United States 
in 1783. These separations due to the growth cr increase of 
population, cannot be cited, with any reference to Federalism, as 
steps in a process of political disintegration*
Ontario and Quebec must be treated in greater detail* 
The issue of that age of Colonial rivalry between England and
Prance from the end of the seventeenth through nearly three*
(2) 
quarters of the eighteenth century, was decided in America as in
India in favour of England. By the feace of Paris in 1763, Franta, 
whose claims in North America were based on exploration and
(1) Cf• Farkman* Montoalm and Wolf. 1. ohap.Vlll. Bourinot. History 
of Canada, etc*
(2) Cf. Seeley. Expansion of England* chap.11.
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settlement surrendered to England Louisiana and the disputed 
territory between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi, as well as 
modern Canada, except Nova Scotia and Ruperts Land round Hudson's 
Bay* At the cession, the population of French Canada consisted 
of about seventy thousand, of whom sixty thousand were concentrated 
on the Lower St. Lawrence in the three towns of Quebec, Three Rives* 
and Montreal.
Until 1774 the Colony thus acquired by conquest and 
inhabited by an alien race wash its own language, traditions, law 
and separate religion was ruled by martial law. In 1774 
however, on the outbreak of the war with the American colonies, 
attempts to anglicise the colony which had previously been made 
Mere abandoned and martial law was withdrawn although the inhabitants 
0tiil continued under a military government* The guarantee of 
the Roman Catholic Religion was confirmed and French civil law 
was restored, but English Criminal law was retained. This 
conoiliatory policy secured the loyalty of the French Canadians in 
the war of American Independence. It was not in fact until this 
war and especially on the conclusion of peace in 1785, than any 
considerable English settlement was made in this part of Canada. 
On the severance of the Imperial bond between Great Britain and the 
United States, over thirty thousand "United Empire Loyalists" as 
they were called, formed new homes in the lands of Canada which the 
Imperial Government offered thenu Over twenty thousand went to
ths maritime Pr^vinces^ ten thousand settled on the Upper St.t
Lawrence and founded "Upper Canada: 9
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In 1791 the French and English settlements were 
separated into Ufcper and Lower Canada, and in rather an apathetic 
spirit, after the loss of the American Colonies, were given represent 
ative institutions. This grant is also of interest, as. for the 
first time, a Colonial Charter rested not on royal concession but 
on an Act of Parliament. Each Province received a separate 
Governor and a separate Legislature of two Houses. The Lower 
House was chosen by the people of each Province, the Upper House and
>
the Executive Council were nominated "by the Governor* The 
Executive was not therefore responsible to the popular Hous^ of 
the Legislature*
1 With the increase of expenditure due to the American 
war of 1812, conflicts broke out in both provinces, culminating in 
small but open insurrections in 1837. The situation was not 
unlike English constitutional quarrels of the seventeenth century. 
After the "Canadian Rebellion11 , Lord Durham was sent as High 
Commission§r*for the determining of certain important questions 
depending in the provinces of Tipper and Lower Canada respecting the
form and future government of the said Provinces«* The trouble,
(1) 
he declared, came from two sources. In both Provinces the
principles of the British Constitution must be consistently 
extended, and responsible as well as representative Government granted 
In Upper* Canada political power had been restricted to a 'Family 
Compact». but in Lower Canada, the political difficulty due te the _
(1) See Lord Durham 1 s Report. Eng. Part. Papers* February 1839 now 
published separately* edited by Sir Ch* Lucas.
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absence of executive responsibility, was aggravated by racial 
antagonism. "I expected to find a contest between a Government and
a people; I found two nations warring in the bosom of a single
(1) 
State". The Lower House or Assembly was overwhelmingly French,
the Upper House and Executive Council exclusively English*
The two remedied therefore whioh Lor* Durham suggested 
were responsible Government and Union. In the first, whioh was
granted in 1840 and established securely in the governorship of
(2) 
Loid Elgin, Lord Durham was right beyond dispute. The second,
by which he hpped to assimilate the French in the English population 
of Canada, was unsuccessful. In the legislative Union whioh was 
formed, eaoh Province was represented by forty-two members in the 
Lower House. At first the English tongue was adopted as the sole 
official language, but in 1848 the demand for the use of French was 
satisfied* The racial hostility whioh this incident Illustrates 
increased. Upper Canada, whose population and wealth had 
rapidly increased, claimed greater representation in the Legislature, 
and complained that while it contributed the larger part of the 
revenue, Lower Canade provlted most by the expenditure. Lower 
Canada protested rightly enough that in 1840 it had received no more 
members in the Lower House, although its population was at the time 
larger tha-n that of Upper Canada, and it accused the English Province 
of attempting to reduce the French nationality to a position of 
inferiority. The Union had wholly failed to amalgamate the two
1) Lord Durham1 s Report. Lower Canadn. 
'2) 1847 - 54.
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races* Kot only were the two peoples different in national 
character, but they spoke different tongues, professed different 
creeds and enjoyed different rights relating to marriage, property 
and inheritance based on different laws* To this day the Prsnch 
of Quebec hare remained a distinctly non-English element in Canada, 
"but although they have toot been racially absorbed, they have 
become incorporated in the political system of Canada and the 
"Empire, and as recently as Sir Wilfred Laurier 4fe4« they have given 
loyal statesmen to the Dominion*
The solution of the difficulty was found in Federation* 
The Legislative Union was dissolved, but the desire for separation
•
oo-inoided with the realisation of the neel of some union not only
of the two Canadas but of all the British Provinces in North
(1) 
America, which had also been granted responsible government* The
United States was a near neighbour and had already been an enemy 
«pnd in 1664 its united strength had been shown in the suppression of 
a civil war* A conference of delegates from the Canadas and the 
maritime provinces met at quebec in 1364 and passed a series of 
resolutions expressing their opinion that "The system of Government 
best adapted under existing circumstances to protect the diversified 
interests of the several provinces and to secure efficiency, harmony 
and permanency in the working of the Union would be a General 
Government charged with matters of common interest to the whole
country and local Governments for each of the Provinces charged with
(2) 
the control of local matt era in their respective sections .* They
(I/ ifrew rrunswicK, >TovaH£c: r: tla "18^ 8. Prince 'W^ard. Island 1851. 
(2) Quebec Resolutions No. 2 .
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further added that "In framing a Constitution for the General 
Government, the Conference, with a view to the perpetuation of our 
connection with the Mother Country, and the promotion of the best
interests of the people of these provinces, desire to follow the•
mod 1 of the British Constitution as far as circumstances will 
permit. The combination of "English Parliamentary Government 
with the federation are the two leading political characteristics 
of the Dominion of Canada.
The Resolutions were submitted to the Imperial Government 
and passed without awch alteration or without much interest. They 
ware accepted at the time only by the four Provinces of ITpper and 
Lower Canada, afterwards termed Ontario and Quebec, UovA Scotia and 
Hew Brunswick f but the Federation now include* in addition Manitoba 
British Columbia, Brines Edward Isle, Saskatchewan and Alberta* 
Newfoundland has hitherto remained outside*
The first Parliament of the new Federation was opened in 1867 
It was the first federal experiaMnt in the British Empire, and its 
originators were influenced in the direction of a reaction by the 
recent civil war in the TTnited States* They endeavoured - 
hitherto successfully - to obviate such catastrophes by strengthen* 
ing the Federal bond and reducing the sphere of Stats rights. The 
undefined margin of power they entrusted to the central and not to 
the Provincial Governments, The very substitution of the name 
"Province" for "State* illustrates the difference between the
(1) 
(3)
Resolutions !?o. 3 
See supra p.
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federations of Canada and the United States. The 'Dominion of 
Canada* is the sole example of a Hipjit* federal State. "It shall 
"be lawful for the Parliament of the Dominion to make laws for the 
peace 9 order and good government of Canada irt relation to all
matters not coming within the classes of subjects by this Act
(1 ) 
assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces* The
*
residuary power rests therefore with the general and not with the
(2) 
local Governments, The subjects which have toen assigned
exclusively to the Provincial Legislatures include direct taxation 
far Provincial purposes, licencing for local revenue, the borrowing 
of money on the credit of the Province, the regulation of public 
lands within the Province, the establishment of Provincial offices 
and the maintenance of charitable and other municipal institutions 
other than marine hospitals. It may undertake works of a 
provincial nature but not such as are declared of 'general 
advantage 1 , it may incorporate companies with provincial objects, 
solamnisa marriage, protect property and civil rights, administer 
Justice and inflict punishments within the Province. It is in
fact generally charged with *all matters of a merely local or
(3) 
private matter in the Province", With regard to education each
Province may exclusively make laws subject to certain conditions 
protecting denominational schools, the rights of religious minorities 
in each Province. Bach Province is, in addition, given power to
?ritish Korth America Act.30& 31. vict.c.3. Art. 91. 
2) Ibid. Art. 92. 
Art. 93.
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Certain concurrent powers of legislation respecting
agriculture and Hanazl ̂ ration are conferred on the Provinces, "but 
such laws shall only hav^ effect so far as they are not repugnant 
to any Act of the Parliament of Canada. The Parliament of the 
Dominion may also make uniform laws relative to -property and
civil rights in the Provinces of Ontario, 1'cvr, Scotia and Hew
(3) 
Brunswick, Quebec retains exclusive control over her o-.vn civil law
To the Dominion Parliament belong all the ^o-./ers which 
are no-; entrusted exclusively to the Provinces or retained by the
Imperial Government. They are specially enumerated not in
(4) (5) 
limitation "but mroly as examples. The authority of the Dominion ;
extends to the j.ublio debt and ] roj ertyj the regulation of trade and 
commerce; taxation direct or indirect; military and naval defence, 
and matters relating to the conduct of the two services, posts; 
census and statist ics; navigation an 7 shipping; sea-coasts and 
inland fisheries; currency and coinage} banks and paper money; 
weights and measures; bankruptcy, patents and copyrights; Indians 
and Indian lands i naturalisation and aliens^ marriage and divorce^ 
criminal law and procedure, but not the constitution of Courts of 
criminal jurisdiction; and the establishment of penitentiaries* 
The Parliament of Canada may alno alter the boundaries of any
(1) Art. 91. (S) Art, 95. (3) B.N.A. Act. Art, 94.
(4) See TOdd. Parl. aovt. in Colonies. 'This right has not yetp. 424 & 561. btj^n exercised.
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Province with the consent of the Province concerned, establish any
new Province and provide for its constitution as well as for the
(1) 
administration of territories not included in any jPr evince.
The Dominion possesses two other powers which si^e it 
a unique place in the history of Federation. $h4 Governor- 
General in Council appoints the lieutenant-Governor of the 
Provinces or a deputy in case of absence, and the Dominion 
Parliament fixes his salary* No Lieutenant-Governor however 
shall be removable within five years of his appointment except
•for cause assigned, which shall be communicated by message to the
\&t
Senate and House of Commons* at the earliest possible. date*' Thus 
the Governors of the Provinces are neither elected by the Province 
nor appointed by the Imperial Crown like the Governor of the whole 
Dominion* Theyreceive their commissions from the Governor- 
General and under the Priv£ Seal of Canada, although in the name of 
the Crown, and must be considered as f part of the Colonial 
administrative staff* responsible to the Governor-General. They 
do not therefore exercise the royal prerogatives of mercy and honour 
although on the oiifcer hand they represent the Crown to some extent
in provincial ̂ legislation, where they concede and may even with*(*) 
hold the f assent of the Crown 1 . They therefore play a double
part federal and Imperial. In their Federal capacity they are
(1) -i.N.A. 1871. 34 Vie. 0.28.
(2) ->.r.A. AC'U. Arks. '3^, or & . ; >7.
(3) Dispatch of Col. Sec.(?)arl Carnavon) to Gov.-Gen. of Canada. 
( ~ari Dufferin) January 7th 137?).
(4) B.N.A.Act. Arts. 55-^7, & 90. Cf. Todd op.cit. pp.581,583,586.
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comparable to the Statthaiter of Alsace-Lorraine, whioh is a 
federal Province with a Governor appointed "by the federal Executive
The second oharaoteristic whioh distinguishes the 
Canadian Federation is the power of disallowance exoeroised by 
the Dominion Government ovsr Provincial Legislation. In the 
Swiss Federation Cantonal Constitutions with their amendments must 
be guaranteed by the Federal Government, The Dominion Government 
exercises no control over the Constitutions of the Provinces 
except with relation to the office of Lieutenant-Governor, ffcr with
this exception the Provinces ar^ given exclusive power to amend
(1) 
their Constitutions. But it possesses a power of disallowance
(2) 
of Provincial Legislation. A Lieutenant-Governor of a Province
may "according to his discretion" reserve any bill "for the 
signification of the pleasure of the Governor-General,* and no 
reserved bill can go into operation within one year of its being 
reserved until it has received the consent of the Governor-General 
in Council* In addition any Provincial bill which has received 
the assent of the Lieutenant-Governor in the King's name, may be 
disallowed within one year by tho Governor-General in Council* In
the exercise of this power the Governor-General acts with the
(3) 
advice of his ministers 9 not on his own responsibility as an
Imperial representative. The Iiriperial Government has therefore 
with regard to the Provinces surrendered to the Dominion the royal 
power of disallowance -which it exercises with regard to Colonial
!) Art. 92. s.l. (2) Arts. 55, 56, 57 & 90. 
Todd. r*451 seq.
Chapter 7, THE BRITI3T? mCPIRE 218
legislation, including that of the Dorainior itself. For the 
authority for determining upon the expediency of disallowing 
Provincial statutes, &r vitVioldin^ royal assent frcr:< reserved bills 
to the G ̂ v^rnor-Genernl in Council and not the Imperial Government.
In no other 1?e*eral State does t?ie federal Government 
posse?® a similar control over ^hs legislation of the part-States* 
It resembles the subordination of local law-making bodies to the 
Parliament of a Unitary r>tat^ f and illustrated the rmitary bias 
of the Canadian federation, but thapoiwr must only be exercised in 
conformity with the letter and spirit of the British ?Torth 
America Act. »This f Great Charter of the Canadian Constitution 1 
recognises and guarantees to evary Province in the federation 
the right of local self -government in all oases within the 
competency of the Provincial authorities. And it does not 
contemplate or justify any interference with the exclusive powers 
which it entrusts to the Legi^latr.ros ^f t:.3 several Provinces; 
excoj-t with regard to acts which transcend the lawful bounds of 
provincial jurisdiction or which assert a principle, or prefer a 
claim, that might injuriously affect tlie interests of any other 
portion of the Dominion, or in the case of acts which diminish rights
of minorities in the particular Province in relation to education
(1)
that had been conferred by law in any Province prior to Confederation,
Acts hav > been in practice actually disallowed, although many 
hav3- been objected to by the Dominion Government and in consequence
(1) Todd. op. cit. 2nd. rid. p.456 Cf. Rep02^. of Sir John MaoDonald 
Minister of Justice 1363. ibid. p.515-6.
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by the Provincial T/^isl/'.
The Dominion Gov-riinent exerci*>> s a double p^.rer 'over the 
Provinces. It controls th-* &xycu ;,iv'3 ^mm^n th«j arp''tnt:nent 
Of Die Lieutenant-Governor, a,nd the Legislature by means of Its 
capacity. to disallow Provincial laws.
Mot only in ths Legislature and Executive, "'Hi ( . even in 
the Judiciary of the Provinces the influence of t"ie Federation is 
felt. The Provinces are ^iv^n the <;xolnslve j-ower of constituting, 
maintaining and organising th« Provincial Courts both of criminal 
and civil jHirisdiotion, and each Province has 'as y«?t detained its 
own law relating to civil property rights. The Criminal law is 
federal and uniform howev-;rf as well as the laws relating to 
bankruptcy and insolvency. ?' rore important is the power of
*
appointment -which is vested in the Oov^rnor-Cfeneral. The salaries 
of the Superior District and County Courts in each Province are 
fixed by the Dominion Parliament, the judges themselves are 
.appointed by the Governor-in-Council from the bar of the Province of 
Quebec, and at present, of Ontario, J^ova ^cotia and New Brunswick,
and they hold office during good behaviour, but are removable b^
(2) 
the Govyrnor -General on the address of both Houses of Parliament.
The Dominion Parliament waa also empowered *to provide for t e 
Constitution! maintenance and organisation of a General Ormrt of 
Appeal for Canada and for the establishment of any additional courts
1) *V'.A. Act. Art. 92 'ft 94.
2) Arts. 96 - 100.
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(1)
for the better administration of Canada," A Supreme Court was
established in 1075 and an Exchequer Court (which in also a Court of 
Admiralty) } obsessing original jurisdiction in revenue cases and 
other oases in which the Crown is interested. The Supreme Court 
whose organisation is leased not on the Constitution but on Statute, 
has appellate Jurisdiction from all the Courts of the Provinces, It 
may decide controversies between the Dominion and the Province or 
between two Provinces if the respective Legislatures agree, and it 
may examine the donstitutionality of a Statute. It is interesting
to notice that no provision is made in the Constitution for conflict^
for 
its own interpretation. Owing to the English legal practice
tfhioh Canada has inherited, of deciding not on a law but on a case 
under a law, the Court has developed an interesting advisory power,
The Governor^General ia Council may refer to it 'for hearing and
• 
consideration 1 any important questions of law and fact affecting the
interpretation of the British 7'orth America Acts, the constitution* 
ality of any Dominion or Provincial Act, appellate jurisdiction 
relating to educational matters, the powers of the Provincial a^nd 
Dominion Parliaments or any other matters which the Governor-
General sees fit to aubrait. The decision is merely advisory, but
(5) 
it is treated as a final Judgmant.From the Supreme Court of tha
Dominion as well as direct from the Highest Courts of the Provinces 
appeals, except in criminal matters, lie by special leave and as of
101.... .
(2) supreme Court. Act. (c.139 Revised Statutes 1906) 
(?) s*<: Tc^. >. P;<rl. ~ovt. in Colonies. 2nd :;d. p.5.>8 saq, also
Cf. Keith Responsible Government in the Dominions, 'The Judicial
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right to the Judicial Commit^** of tlie English Privy Council which
\JL/
is the final Court of Appeal of the Empire for Colonial questions* 
The supram« Court or Canada and uiu Court of Kxche^uer 
ar^ the only two Federal Courts; t-lio ]~aderal functions ar>j 
exercised "by the Stato courts as in the Continental Federations*
•
The Judges however, ar^ not left to the Province as in the-other 
four Federal States, but ar^ appointed from above by t!.-.« Dominion 
Executive.
Two powers arw withheld from the Dominion Parliament 
and are not conferred on any other "body within the federal ion, Thew 
are the regulation of foreign affairs and Mie amendment of the
Federal Constitution, both of \vhioh are retained by the Icroerial
12)
Parliament*.
Th« Imperial parliament has conferred on the separate 
Provinces pow^r to amend the Provincial Constitutions, except with 
regard to the office of Lieutenant-Governor, but has invested the 
Federal Legislature with no such right* It possesses a limited 
discretion vith regard to wertain provisions of the British Horth 
America Act, suc& as the salary of Governor-General, tlie constitution
of a cmonann of the Henate, and certain matters relating to the
(3) 
electoral franchise of the House of Commons. By later Acts tu«
Parliament of Canada may make provision for the government and
(1) See infra p.
(2) Tee infra p. 49 fc 50 Vie* c.35. 1886. cl. •!• & 58 & 39 
ir. c. 3B. 1875. ol.l.
B.^.A. Act. 105, 35, 41 & 47.
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representation of territories in the Dominion, and may define *
%'ith certain restrictions - the privileges, immunities and powers
(1) 
to "be enjoyed by the members and Houses of the Legislature*
No other articles of the Imperial Statute which 
constitutes the Canadian Federation may be amended by the Federal 
Legislature. They can be altered.only by the Imperial Parliament 
which will t however, act in response to addresses of the Provincial
and Federal Governments, in accordance with the wishes of the
(2) 
people as a whole and neither at Federal nor Provincial bidding*
The Constitution is not therefore rigid in the extreme sense of tha^ 
of the United States* The amendment of the Constitution, as in 
all other Federations, is not entrusted to the ordinary legislative 
process of the Federal Parliament, but Canada is peculiar since 
there is no other body within the "Satire with the required 
competence* The rigidity of the Canadian Constitution is in fact 
based on a different principle from that ron which it rests In the 
United States and Switzerland. It is not the expression of a 
Bbderal limitation but of Imperial sovereignty - not Federal but 
Colonial. The Parliament of the United Kingdom therefore, 
embraces the original,creative sovereignty of th*j people of the
United States a« well as the dormant, amending authority of three*
(3)
fourths of the Legislature of the States, In the case of
(1). B.N.A. Act. 105, 35, 41, 47.
(2). Cf. Keith. Resi n^Ible Government in th« Dominions p.771.
(3). See supra p.69. seq.
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the Australian and South Africa, the Imperial Parliament has 
surrendered its power of allowing the Constitution to the Colony
itself. In Australia, v/hich ia a federal State, the rigidity of
(1) the Constitution has been secured by other m«?>,ns, but in the
practically unitary State of South Africa, the Parliament of the
Union has b--*en given constitutional power and the flexibility of the
(2)Constitution retained.
Subordination of the Federation to the Imperial (3)
Government, is expressed not only in judicial affairs by the appeal 
to the Privy Council and in the rigidity of the Constitution but 
in ordinary Legislation and in the copposition of the Federal 
Government, The Federal Legislature consists of two Houses and 
the Governor-General who is appointed by, and represents, the 
Crown and every law requires the consent of all three. Any bill 
passed by the Dominion Legislature however, and to which the 
Governor-General has assented in the King's name, may be disallowed 
by the King-in -Council within two years. The right of disallow­ 
ance is not exercised unless the law ia in direct conflict with an 
Irrqperial Statute or ith Imperial Treaties. A bill may also be 
reserved by the Governor-General for the assent of the King-ln- 
Counoll, in which case it has no force unless and until royal assent 
has been signified within two years. The relation between the 
TSrqpire and the Dominion is therefore reproduced in the relation
(1) See infra p. 229
(2) South Africa. Act of Ed.Vll. chap.9 Art. 152
(3) See infra p. £31.
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of the Dominion and the Provinces.
The construction of the Central Government Is similar
in principle, as the preamble of the British Forth America Act(1) 
declares, to that of the United Kingdom, The Provincial
Governments are likewis ? "based on the same principle, except that 
in all the Provinces except Quebec and Uova Scotia unicsnaeral 
legislatures have been introduced* Its chief features are the 
Governmental authority of ths Lower House and the responsibility*
of a Parliamentary and collective Executive to it. In the 
adoption of Parliamentary Government- Canada differs from the three 
Federal states already described, and consequently the relation 
of the Federal and national elements which are necessarily 
represented in the centred Government, is modified* Fori-
Parliamentary Government means the dominance of the popular l*e«.«*«**""'
the Katlonal House and the comparative insignificance of the Upper 
House, i.«. the Federal House. The composition of the Canadian 
Senate is in fact curious. As part of a Federation it represents 
the Provinces, although in .unequal proportion. Ontario and 
Quebec hav^ each twenty-four members, NovA Scotia has ten, the 
remaining six States have four or thr<-:e each. As } art of a 
Legislature modelled on that of the United Kingdom, it is of an 
unpopular character. It does not however, possess the ancient
prestige of a HOUSQ of Lor^s. Its members are in fact nominated
(2) 
by the Governor-General, on the advice of his Council. Its
il! 0f. B.N.A. Act. Arts. 17-54. Art. 24.
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character is rendered of little effect, however, owing to Its 
dominant position of the other House. The weakness of the 
Federal element is however of less Importance in a tight Federation 
such as Canada, than in a loose federal State auoh as Australia, 
which has also accepted the principles of Knglish Parliamentary 
Government. Australia affords a contrast to Canada in most of 
its Federal characteristics and resembles far more the Federation 
of the United States.
It differs from it also in its history. The one point 
of resemblance is the common complaint which both Canadian and 
Australian Colonies made of the sacrifice of Colonial and Imperial 
interests. The binding force of Australian Federation was the 
deliberate recognition of the commercial benefits of co-operation*
There were no 'grinding necessities 9 of war. Independence or
(1)
defence, no compelling force of nationality urging Onion, nor oh
the other hand racial antagonism to prevent its completion. 
Australia is the sole instance of a whole Continent inhabited 
(excluding aborigenes) by a single race and owing a single 
allegiance, although united by no other political tie. The chief 
factor and al»o the chief difficulty of Australian Federation was 
Inter-colonial trade, but it was also stimulated by the Oceanic 
policy of foreign countries- especially of France and Germany. 
Thus in 1870 an inter-colonial conference discussed the subject of 
defence and the Pacific question. Common action was also
(1) Cf« Motion of Sir Samuel Griffith (Queensland) in Convention 
of 1863.
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desired for marine defence, the prevention of the influx of
(1)
criminals and quarantine regulations*
Federation was slow of accomplishment however. It 
was introduced by the Imperial Government as early as 1847, when 
Earl Grey, then Secretary of State for the Colonies suggested the 
Union of the scattered settlements under a oentral authority for 
the consideration of "questions which, though local as it respects 
the British possessions in Australia collectively,are not merely 
looal as it respects any one of those possessions.* The idea 
was not accepted with muoh enthusiasm by the Colonies themselves
and it was not until the second half of the century, after the
(2) 
Colonies had been granted self-government, that Federation entered
into Australian practical politics at all. The tariff question 
created immense local difficulties, and State feelings ran high* 
Nevertheless the first step towards union was taken by the 
formation of the "Federal Council of Australia" in 1885, due in 
fact to the course of external affairs* As may be expected 
the Council had no executive or financial powers* It had 
legislative control over the relations of Australia with the 
islands of the Pacific, the prevention of the influx of criminals, 
fisheries in Australian waters outside territorial limits, 
extradition of criminals and certain other matters* No
(1) Cf* Motion of Sir Samuel Griffith (Queensland) in Convention
of 1883. 
(a) Hew South Wales and Victoria 1885; Tasmania and South
Australia 1856; Queensland 1859; Western Australia was not
made self-governing until 1890.
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efficient T^ion was formed however for three States at last 
refused to participate , Including Hew South Wales which was the
•pivotal State 1 of the Australian Group and whose accession to
^
the later Union was gained "by a special privilege with regard to 
the Federal capital*
The Idea of Union grew, however, with the increasing 
consciousness of the futility of the existing machinery. In a
»
series of Conferences a new Constitution was drawn up and accepted 
by the people of the States on Referendum - a new experiment in 
British Dominions* It was proclaimed with one slight 
alteration "by the Queen in 1900 and came into foroe on January 1st. 
1901* The Federation of Australia was a popular act and an 
expression of the free will of the people of every part of it, or 
as the Constitution declares, the people of the Colonies agreed to 
unite*
Many features of the United States Federation have been 
reproduced, but In no slavish spirit of Imitation, in the Australian 
Commonwealth, - the assignment of the definite powers to the 
Federation, and not to the States as in Canada 9 the position of the 
Judiciary, the rigidity of the Constitution and the equal 
representation of »h» States in the Federal House* In the number 
and character of the matters assigned to the Federal Government 
Australia follows the example of Canada rather than of the united 
States* They include marriage and divorce, invalid and old age
(1) Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Aot 63 & 64 Vie.c. 12 
Art. 106,
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pensions, the- service and execution of the civil and criminal 
process, railways with respect to naval and military transport,
conciliation and arbitration for the rrovention of indn: trial
(1) 
disputes. Comparatively few power© toe 'exclusively vested 1
in the federal Legislature; certain PC era may be exercised, with 
the consent of the State concerned, such as the acquisition of Stats 
railways, railway' contraction and extension in any State, and "ih 
formation of a new State by the alteration of existing Stata
aries and on reference by a State or States, but so that the law
(3) 
shall only extend to the States concerned, and lastly at the request
or with the concurrence of all the state* directly concerned. It may 
axecclse Any power "which can at the establishment of thi« 
Constitution be exercised only by the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom or by the Federal Council of Australasia. The sphere 
entrusted to the Australian federation is therefore* larger and more 
ext^nsi"hle than that of the United Spates.
The wide powers of the Legislature qualify the rigidity^
of the Commonwealth Constitution which is also in several other
f
respects more flexible than that of the United States* Australian 
Statesmen have combined the ideas borrowed from the Federal and 
Republican constitutionalism of the United Ptates with ideas 
derived from the Unitarian and monarchical constitutionalism of 
England. The Constitution is in fact flexible In oar tain of it*
i). Ibid Art 51. (2). Arts. 51 (XX111 & X71V) & 124, 
. Art 51. (XXXV11).
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articles* With regard to the others no amendment shall become law 
unless it has bean passed by an absolute majority of both Houses
b
and has been ratified not only by a majority of the petpl* in each
(2)
of the States but also by a majority of the whole people* Thi
Federal Parliament possesses the sole iniative for amendments,
j
and neither the State Legislatures as in U«S«A« nor the elector* 
aa in Switzerland have any direct means of setting the machinery to
work* Provision is mde against daaa-lock between the two Houses,
(3)
which differs from that allowed for ordinary legislative conflicts
its greater siaagplioity and in the greater privilege which is 
accorded to the St*imo«. The rigidity of the United States
Constitution is modified by the substitution of an absolute 
majority for a two- thirds in the Houses an'd a sinqple majority of 
elector* for the threa -fourths of the State Legislatures* As In 
Switaerlttrrti there must be a najority of the whole electors as well 
eta of the States* In imitation of the United States a clause Is 
incorporated, which is omitted in Switzerland, protecting the rights 
of particular States, unless the State affected consents to their 
alteration*
The Federal Parliament of Australia has like Congress 
constitutional power to establish a High Court and inferior Courts. 
but it may also invest State Courts with Federal jurisdiction, and 
an appeal lies from them to the Hi&ii Court* The two systen» of
, Cf* Art 51 (XXm)| 1* 7 I 9*10.14.2?. 89. 30. 1. 4': . 47 eto.
2). Commonwealth Act* Art 133*
3). See Art 57.
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Court s are not therefore &ept separate and independent like those 
of the United States,
In addition Australia differs from the United States in 
the cOiMpoaiticn cf the T«5d*?r».l Government andinits relation to the 
British TUaplr^. Australia liVe Canada has accepted the principle 
of Fngllsh Parliamentary Goverraewnt with the supremacy of the jT*Pir*r 
House and tho insinnifieanc^ of the Upper* In Australia the 
convention of "English Parliamentary Government is incorporated in tht 
Constitution which declares that the Senate may psither initiate 
nor amend a money Bill* The position of the Australian Senate 
differs from that of the Canadian, not only in the greater 
loo s erne r 3 of the Voder al Bond hut also in its coiapoaition, The
Senate of the Commonwealth lifc* that of the United States, is based 
on the principle of equal representation of the part-States and 
contains six mem<b^2Blrom oach of the six States* It possesses co­ 
ordinate* power 8, except in financial natters, with the House of
Hep ro sen tat ires - even in the name* of the Hour-os the influeno* Of 
the United States is warkad » "but lest the * conventional* weakness 
of the Upper House in a Parliamentary Oovernaent should not
sufficiently safeguard the interests of the States it is strengthen^
(1)
"by its elective * and p«nnan«int •• character, and i^ the one tTt>p«r
House of s-ioh Legislatures ^iloh in more democratic than ths I»owtr.-»
Canada and Australia differ from all other federal States 
in th-iir msiriberiship of the British 15!g(pire» A double division of
(1). Except in case of dead-lock.
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authority is therefore mad a. Certain powers are exclusively 
e^roisad by the Imperial Government, others by the Pedsral 
Government, and still others by tne Government of the States* But 
for the urtluaa&e legal subordination of the colonies and their laok 
of r^proa^ntatiou in the I^parial Government and of course the
of any purely Ped^ral Gov^rnm^nt ,the ISrapire itself would be 
;.-. 7ed*r<%l system. 3ino«i the graait of internal self-Govarniaent to
the Qoloniss, tiie Imperial uOYt>rnmen^ has only retained exclusive 
control of foreign affairs. T>io la^arial relation is expressed in 
other '.f-ys but by no /a«,i,ns identically in Canada and Australia. Th* 
^.If-irer-snoe bet^oen th-tia is partly oau«s«d by the aii'ferenoe in th« 
nt.tur -t of t&e tvio Federations.
The Ifij^ei ial Oovcirmaant has surrendered to th* Federal 
t of Canadtt its relations with GJIQ separate Provinces,
deoroaeing .it.i ovm power and inor easing that Oi% th« Dominion 
aitent * A direcii relation is however preserved between/tmperiftl 
Government t.nd -die »*i>-v,rata Stut^s of the looser Australian Federation 
Tli- Gov^n^ors of the Stato for example ar^ like the Governor- 
General hirns^l^ api ointed by the Grown, although in praotiee the 
opinion of the State as well as of the !Fede*mtion, is usually 
obtained before tin; appointment* Through their Governors the 
States corrospond direotly with the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, on all &att<*rs within their sphere | and sometimes on 
nutters outside, aJUhoug/i in that ca«Q copiss ox the correspondence 
}f^gt bQ gent to the Govern or ̂ General andif the matter is public, 
(l) See supra p. 23.
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to the Teder&l Kin is try. On Psder&l mature the Colonial 
Secret -\ry replied through the COYv:r:>i or -General but ow subjects 
within the <ur i edict ion of to.* fM^.f-ss lie replies directly to the 
G-oyovnor of tho rtatc. tfirt only is ths Il^uteBarit-Iov^ nor of a 
Canadian TroTinc^ appointed "by r:..?, aorerncr-Ge-nsral ht^B-slf \mt all
"bstv-sn the T*ora&e 0 or^nr^rt and tha Proriuofe T.; ?.$I>
through the hands cf the Go-YsrDer-asnsral, T>.-.O may utie' hie •'
(1)
discretion in tr'^nR;:r:lttin?; tli-^a,. The qTxa&i-indapendent poyl
of th3 <'ov3rnors cf t'ic /.uttralian Stat33 scai? times cav?es fiction(a)
them and ths n- OT <-jrno-*-"-?n?52-^l f especially sine a KelV
both the seat. of tho Tiotorlan "OY^riTnynt, anol until t-he 
oosrpletlcn of tht 'Pederal ?»-.;• it al at Canteraa?., also the eevt of the 
federal c-ovrrnmy^t.
, Th^ IiBj>:jrial Gorgrnr-innt hat alec; ret^inad it» power of 
disallowance of Stato lavrs *«hich i4. ^x-rcic-us *hrpv^h (3)
of the ftat^s and has n<vt T^st--:: it in the Ccv^.-rir»j'«a-:-H>r^., ^il
appeals as ir» Canada ,nft,y also lie ~.r> certain casee tt. t}v> -Indicia!
(4) 
C07raaitt«e of th« -°rivy Council.
In the relations "batmen ^K. varti^lla a^ v, v-^ole and the
*•
ilie Coinmonwe^l-th possess^E grantor indca-uiuVi^cft tha-t 
, tn Taoth Colonies the I:.r;^rl-al ^OTer.-'ov r-t a:-j-v 
the* CiOYQmor-fltinar-'il ar>-i C3xercls5j? a « 1 -'ilc-.r po^-r of ^'i--ll^ 
of 'federal te^islation. Tt ir In Jx-^ical Ti---tt.?r^ -'"is.t. tli-?. greater
(1) Cf. Keith. Imip^rial lrnity of the Dominions, pp.428-31.
(2) >'•?, 'Uha disp*ut,»j e.^n-t the position cf rJovernwent rov«-»- In 
New flouth Wales« (3) Se« Instructions to Governor of State. 
(4) Cf. Moore. Conm'.orT':>.alt'i of .Australia, p.^.55
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independence of the Australian Federation is displayed* Xn 
Canada an appeal lies to the Privy Council on practically all 
matters "but "by Article 74 of the Commonwealth Constitution it is 
decreed that "no appeal shall he permitted to the King in Council 
from a decision of the High Court upon any question howsoever 
arising^ as to the limits inter Be of the Constitutional powers 
of the Commonwealth and those of any State or States, or as to the 
limits inter s« of the Constitutional powers of any two or more 
States unless the High Court shall certify that the question is 
one which ought to be determined by His Majesty in Council* The 
High Court of Australia therefore, fcnless it decides otherwise, 
may be the final Court in Constitutional questions, and its 
position as interpreter of the Constitution closely resembles/the 
Supreme Court of the United States. Moreover the principles it 
has adopted in imitation of the United States, have created a 
divergence in the interpretation of the Australian and Canadian 
Constitutions, the latter of which depends in the final case in the 
decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council* The 
British Nortb America Acts hw been regarded by the Priv£ Council 
as ordinary Acts of the Imperial Legislature and no more 
inaccessible than any other act to the ordinary method of 
legislation and Judicial approach; they have therefore been 
interpreted, like any other Imperial Acts on the principle that 
literal and full effect should be given to each clause according to 
the normal rules of English Judicial procedure, while it is 
T?n4erstood that any inconvenience arising fron conflicting decisions
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could be removed by simple legislation.
The High Court of Australia on the other hand, has based 
its judgments on a different principle. It has preserved the
American distinction between *be constituent and other legislation
Constitutors 
and has refardedthe/rather as a fixed and permanent "supreme law",
which must be interpreted with a view to its maintenance rather 
than its alteration and whose harmonious working depends on judicial 
decision rather than on legislative amendment*
An interesting illustration of the application of these 
two principles is afforded by the case of the taxation of federal
officials by local governments. The Privy Council arguinrr from the
(1)
clause in the Constitution of the Commonwealth which states that
the powers remain Inherent in them unless they were exclusively
vested In the Commonwealth decided that local governments had
(2) 
power to tax the salaries of Federal officials. The High Court
of Australia however, basing its decision on United States precedent, 
and on the principle of the immunity of Instrumentalities formulated 
by the Judiciary of that country, gave judgment in the ppposite 
sense. According to this principle by which instruments 
necessary to ths Federal Government for the execution of its functions 
were immune from *he contol by the authorities of the States. The
Australian Court declared that a State could neither make a Federal
(3) (4) 
officer give a stamped receipt for his income, nor pay an incometax.
(1) Art. 106 (2) Webb v.Oufctrim 1907. Ap.Cas. 81.
(3) D'^mden, v. Pedder. 1,C»L*R« 91.
(4) Deakin v. Webb. 1, C.L.R. 585.
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The Supreme Court of Canada which had, under the influence of the 
United States given the same judgment as the High Court of the 
Commonwealth in a similar case, reversed its decision in the n»xt 
case in accordance with the judgment of thy Judical Committe i of the 
Privjt Council.
A comparison of the relation between the Empire and 
Canada and Australia respectively shows a development in the 
direction of Colonial Independence* The Umpire is however, on the 
eve of still further development. Problems of Imperial Federation 
which havo long engaged the interest and attention of political 
writers and thinkers are becoming increasingly matters of 
Immediate or not far distant settlement. In 1900 Sir Wilfred 
Laurier demanded a voice in the Government of the Empire for 
Canada. "If you desire our help, call us to your Councils, * 
The process has been reversed. The Colonies have made loyal 
and generous contributions in the present struggle of the Empire, 
and in recognition of their help their Statesmen have been called 
to the Councils of the Umpire. These Imperial Councils are as 
yet only 'Conferences*, and although it may be asserted without 
much fear of contradiction that the resolutions and views which are 
there expressed will at least influence the terms of peace,at 
present the Conference possesses no leg>il authority with regard to 
the government of the Empire} it has not yet superceded the
(1) Abbott v. City of St. John. 40. S.C.R. 597. The whole question 
is discussed by Keith in "Imperial Unity and the Dominions. 11 
Part 11. ohap.l.p .446-8.
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Parliament ©f the United Kingdom* It is not possible to describe
\
the schemes of laperiil federation which are now being formulated.
(1) 
One feature is now gaining increasing recognition, and a study of
present federations emphasises its importance ~ the necessity of the 
construction of a separate Imperial Government, detailed from that 
of the TTnited Kingdom, now called the tlmperial* Government, but 
with organs as advanced, specialised and authoritative* The 
relation between England and the TSmpirs would resemble in oertain 
ways, that between Prussia and the German *Jmpir<^, but the acceptanoe 
of Responsible Government as a political principle would prevent 
such an identification of Governments as exists^ in the German 
and Prussian systems.
(1) Of. e&.'L* guftia* The Problem of the Commonwealth.
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The five Federations which are the subject of this study 
are distinguished by well-defined characteristics from Unitary 
States on the on© hand and flonfederations of States on the other. 
They are based on the principle of the partial union of semi- 
independent Statesj they possess central organised bodies with 
executive, Judicial as wel? as legislative powar, and they have 
established channels of direct communication between the Federal 
Government and the individual of the part-State, Within these 
limits however there exists an immense variety in the application 
of the Federal principle*
Germany and Australia are inhabited by a single race; 
Canada is occupied by two and Switzerland by three or even four 
different peoples while the original comparative homogeneity of the 
United States has been largely modified by subsequent immigration. 
The Federal principle has been extended to countries as large as 
the nnited states and Canada and as small as Switzerland, as 
densely populated as Germany or as sparsely as Australia* The 
histories of the five States are no less different. Germany has 
a history of not much less than a thousand years from the accession 
of Henry the Fowler to the formation of the new Empire, the growth
•more 6/xj.n
of the Swiss Federation is prolonged through noar-ly five centuries* 
The unity of the American Colonies was accomplished in less than 
two centuries from the landing of the Pilgrim Fathers or in two 
and a half to the ond of the Civil War; it might even be said to 
have been practically achieved during the twenty years from 1770 to
to 1790* Squally different is the nature of their histories - 
in the wealth of dramatic incident and the abundance of raried 
influences from Germany and Switzerland on the one hand to Australia 
on the other » as in their length*
A still greater point of difference between Germany and 
Switzerland on the one hand and Canada, Australia and the United 
States on the other, lies in she Continental origin of the fonaer 
and its feudal heritage contrasted with the English origin of the 
latter* Canada however has incorporated an Important Continental 
offstt&t in the province of Quebec, while the United States was 
influenced in the construction of its central government by 
Continental ideas* The federations are however alike in one 
respect. In all five cases the part-States were connected with 
each other before the formation of each federation, by a coiamon 
allegiance to a single head*
The causes of ^©deration are no less varied - the 
grinding necessity of union in the face of a ooimion foe, the 
promptings of a spontaneous nationality, the pursuit of a weans to 
reconcile racial antagonisms, the advantage of harmony in the 
relations towards powerful neighbours, or the deliberate 
appreciation of commercial co-operation* In the formation of all 
the Federal States some or all of these elements were present, but 
in each Stat*. one particular factor works with u compelling irresist­ 
ible force.
In the constitutional frame of the Federal State and in 
the oonqposition of the central Government the differences of
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condition and causes hare exerted a powerful influence* The 
tightness of the Canadian Federation distinguishes it from all 
other Federal States, and in the unequal representation of its 
Provinces it resembles Germany* On most other points however 
the Continental and English federations are far apart* In two 
respects the two Continental Federations - the powerful monarchical 
Germany and the small democratic Switzerland-* are in agreement; 
. "both are marked by legislative centralisation and executive 
decentralisation and neither have adopted Responsible Government, 
In this latter point the United States reveals Continental influence 
and, as it were, denies its English birth* Canada and Australia f 
although they resemble each other and differ from the remaining 
Federal States in their possession *>t Responsible Bovornment and in 
their connection ,with the British Empire, are as little alike in the 
relations of their pe,rtS| the rigidity of their Oonstitutionf, the 
composition of the federal House of their Legislatures, aa Canada 
and the United states*
It is net necessary, nor do the limits of a thesis 
permit it, to emphasise still further the rieh variety in expression
of the Federal principle* Btill more.statesmen are turning/
towards it in their search for solutions of modern political 
problems* To Ireland y India and the Balkan States has its
[arojaosdls
application been suggested, while I rope rial tariff $/xand Imperial 
Conferences have "brought incomparably nearer to realisation a 
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(1) 2,594,298 speak German{ 793,264 speak French) 302,578 speak 
Italian; 40,122 speak Romansch.
(2) Since Representation Aot 1914.
Yukon Territory possesses a member in House of Commons but none 
in the Senate.
